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There was a time when meadow, grove and
stream,
The earth, and every common sight
To me did seem
Apparell'd in celestial light,
The glory and the freshness of a dream.
It is not now as it has been of yore; Turn wheresoe'er I may,
By night or day,
The things which I have seen I now can see no
more!
*******
Whither is fled the visionary gleam?
Where is it now the glory and the dream?1
I.

Introduction

A defining characteristic of the Pacific Northwest is the Columbia River
Basin's legendary wild salmon runs.2 Sadly, however, some commentators say

1.

W. Wordsworth, Ode on Intimations of Immortality, in RECOLLECTIONS OF EARLY CHILDHOOD.

2. New York Times reporter Timothy Egan has described the Pacific Northwest as
"anywhere a salmon can get to." Michael C. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon: A History of Failure
and a Dubious Future, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 667, 668 (1991-92) [hereinafter Blumm, Saving Idaho's
334
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the Columbia River Basin is now "the most endangered river system in the
country."3 The backbone of an industry that supports 60,000 jobs in the Pacific
Northwest,4 the region's salmon5 population has plummeted since the late
nineteenth century. From stocks6 numbering in the many millions,7 the wild runs
have deteriorated to levels approaching extinction.8 The salmon's decline is the

Salmon] (citing Pat Ford, And Now - The Last Salmon Ceremony?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 22,
1991, at 8). Captain Meriwether Lewis knew that his two-year-long expedition to the Pacific
Ocean had neared an end when he ate roasted salmon "with a very good relish" as a guest of
Shoshoni Indians on the banks of the Lemhi River, in what is now Idaho, on August 13,
1805. Charles F. Wilkinson & Daniel K. Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery Conservation
and Allocation of a Transboundary Common Property Resource, 32 KAN. L. REV. 17, 22 (1983) (citing
THE JOURNALS OF LEWIS AND CLARK 194 (B. DeVoto ed. 1953)).
3. Brad Knickerbocker, Salmon Issue Poses a Stiffer Challenge Than The Spotted Owl,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 20, 1993, at 7.
4. OREGON RIVERS COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE OF PROTECTING RIVERINE
HABITAT IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 10 (1992). See also THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, 1 THE
LIVING LANDSCAPE: WILD SALMON AS NATURAL CAPITAL V (1993) [hereinafter SALMON AS
CAPITAL] (estimating that fishing industry provides 20,000 jobs in region). Salmon
may have a current economic impact on the region of as much as $1 billion. SAVE OUR
WILD SALMON COALITION, WILD SALMON FOREVER: A CITIZEN'S STRATEGY TO RESTORE
NORTHWEST SALMON AND WATERSHEDS 3 (1994) [hereinafter CITIZENS' STRATEGY].
5. The term "salmon," as used in this article, refers to all of the species of salmon native
to the Columbia River Basin, as well as to steelhead. Salmon are anadromous fish, which
means that they are born in fresh water, migrate to and live most of their lives in ocean
saltwater, and then return to freshwater to spawn. Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 23-26.
There are five species of anadromous salmon native to the Pacific coast. These are Oncorhyncus
(O.) tsawytscha, or Chinook (king) salmon; O. nerka, or sockeye (red) salmon; O. kisutch, or coho
(silver) salmon; O. keta, or chum (dog) salmon; and O. gorbuscha, or pink (humpback) salmon. A
sixth species of anadromous fish found in the Columbia River Basin is Salmo gairdneri, or
steelhead trout. The steelhead is a sea-run rainbow trout. Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at
18 n.2 (citing R. CHILDERHOSE & M. TRIM, THE PACIFIC SALMON 25-26 (1979)).
6. The term "stock" is often used interchangeably with the words "run" or
"population." A stock is "an isolated reproduction unit that shares both a common
environment and a common gene pool and is identified with a specific season and
watershed or stream." Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 24 n.33. This article discusses
spring, summer and fall runs of Snake River Chinook and Snake River sockeye runs.
7. During the mid-nineteenth century, the estimated salmon population of the
Columbia River Basin was 10 to 16 million fish. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT
MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 201 (1992); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: PAST ACTIONS TAKEN TO ASSIST COLUMBIA RIVER SALMON 8 (July
1992) [hereinafter GAO ENDANGERED SPECIES REPORT]; SALMON AS CAPITAL, supra note 4, at 5.
8. Recent estimates indicate that the Columbia River Basin's salmon
population has declined to approximately 2.5 million fish. SALMON AS CAPITAL, supra
335
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result of ecological harm caused by a variety of human activities.9 The most
significant contributors to salmon mortality, however, are the numerous dams
that transformed the once-wild Columbia and Snake Rivers into a series of flowcontrolled reservoirs.10 Not surprisingly, from the dawn of the dam building era,

note 4, at 5; Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The Unraveling of the Parity Promise: Hydropower,
Salmon, and Endangered Species in the Columbia Basin, 21 ENVTL. L. 657, 663 (1991) [hereinafter
Blumm, Parity V] (citing NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1987 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND
WILDLIFE PROGRAM § 203, at 35 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 PROGRAM]); John Daniel, The Dance of Denial,
SIERRA, March 1993, at 64. In 1990 only 1.1 million adult salmon returned to the Columbia River
Basin from the ocean, of which 300,000 were believed to be wild or naturally spawning fish. GAO
ENDANGERED SPECIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 11. In 1991, only four sockeye salmon returned to their
spawning grounds at Redfish Lake, Idaho. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 2, at 668. That was
an improvement over the returns in the immediately preceding two years when none and one
Redfish sockeye successfully reached its native spawning bed, id., and compares to a total return of
771 spawners in 1976. Id. Unfortunately, even this minimal improvement did not continue. By 1994,
Redfish Lake again was graced by only one sockeye spawner. Interview with Adam J. Berger, Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund, Inc. (Dec. 14, 1994). Nor are sockeye Idaho's only endangered run: Chinook
nests in the Salmon and Clearwater Rivers of that state declined 92% between 1957 and 1992.
Blumm, Parity V, supra, at 668-69 (citing S. Stuebner, Counting the Declining "Redds" of Frenchman Creek,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 22, 1991, at 12; BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ON
THE 1992 OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM 5 (Jan. 13, 1992)). Idaho's runs of
Snake River spring and summer Chinook are at approximately one-half of one percent of their
historic average levels. Idaho's historic habitat range - 8,300 miles - has declined to 5,400 miles, 3,000
of which are damaged. TIM PALMER, THE SNAKE RIVER: WINDOW TO THE WEST 221 (1991). Not surprisingly,
returns of wild Snake River spring chinook to their spawning grounds has nose-dived from
approximately 21,000 in the early 1990s to 3,116 in 1994, while the number of wild Snake River
summer chinook fell from an average of 3000-7000 to 799 over the same period. Katherine P. Ransel,
The Last Salmon Run?, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 18, 1995, at 21 (editorial).
9. Before large-scale dam construction began in the Columbia River Basin during the
1930s, excessive fishing was the leading cause of declining salmon populations. See Wilkinson &
Conner, supra note 2, at 30-35. Other principal adverse influences on the salmon population
include timber production, livestock grazing, mining, chemical contamination of streams and
rivers, and water withdrawals associated primarily with irrigation. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING
COUNCIL, COMPILATION OF INFORMATION ON SALMON AND STEELHEAD LOSSES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN
121-72 (1987) [hereinafter LOSSES STUDY]; Daniel, supra note 8, at 65. Timber production harms all
salmon, but coho are especially affected because high mountain streams carry the resulting high
loads of sediments downstream to coastal spawning beds. See Paul Koberstein, The Decline and Fall
of Salmon, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 15, 1993, at 1, 11.
10. Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 663-64 (referring to Losses Study, supra note 9;
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE NORTHWEST POWER BILL 20
app. IV at 1 (1979) [hereinafter GAO STUDY]); Clay Hathorn, Save our Salmon, Save our Soul,
NATION, Jan. 6, 1992, at 14; Jeanne McDowell, A Race to Rescue the Salmon, TIME, Mar. 2, 1992, at
59. By 1968, the proliferation of dams along the Columbia River left only one, fifty-mile
336
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Congress has often expressed its concern over the fate of the Pacific Northwest's
once-magnificent salmon runs.11 Finally, in 1980, Congress passed the Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (Northwest Power Act
or the Act).12 The Northwest Power Act directs that fish and wildlife in the basin
be placed on an equal footing with hydroelectric power generation.13
Unfortunately, the Northwest Power Planning Council14 (Council) has
not generally implemented the Northwest Power Act in a manner likely to
achieve the Act's promise of restored and harvestable runs. During the first
decade of its existence, the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program
(Program) failed to achieve the Act's goal of a renewed salmon fishery in the
Pacific Northwest.15 At the core of this tragic failure to reverse the salmon's

stretch of the river - the Hanford Reach - free-flowing. The completion of Lower Granite Dam
in 1975 had a similar effect on the Snake River. The National Marine Fisheries Services
estimates that 80% of the ten million fish loss that has occurred since the 1930s has been
caused by the hydropower dams. NMFS, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION,
FACTORS FOR DECLINE: A SUPPLEMENT TO THE NOTICE OF DETERMINATION FOR SNAKE RIVER
SPRING/SUMMER CHINOOK UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 8 (June 1991). The Columbia and
Snake Rivers are commonly described as "placid pools." See, e.g., WILLIAM DIETRICH,
NORTHWEST PASSAGE: THE GREAT COLUMBIA RIVER 42 (1995).
11. Michael C. Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's
Anadromous Fish Resources for a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal Columbia River Power System, 11
ENVTL. L. 211, 228 (1981) [hereinafter Hydropower vs. Salmon]. See Bonneville Project Act of
1937, Pub. L. No. 75-329, 50 Stat. 731 (1937) (codified as amended at 16 U.S. C. §§ 832832l (1985 & Supp. 1995)); S. Doc. No. 87, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. 1 (1937) (directing
Commissioner of Fisheries to study effects of Bonneville Dam on Columbia River fishers
and to recommend steps "to attain the full conservation of such fish. . . .").
12.

Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1985 & Supp. 1992)).

13. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. REP. NO. 976, 96th
Cong. 2d Sess. 49, 56, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5989, 6015 [hereinafter COMMERCE
COMMITTEE REPORT]. See also Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 801
F.2d 1505, 1514-15 (9th Cir. 1986); Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984).
14. The Northwest Power Act mandated the establishment of the Northwest Power
Planning Council, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a). Although a creature of federal law, the Council is not a
federal agency. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2)(A)(iv). Instead, the Council is a multi-state agency,
analogous to an interstate compact agency, comprised of two members from Washington,
Oregon, Idaho, and Montana. The constitutionality of the Council was upheld in Seattle Master
Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359
(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 (1987). See generally Dale D. Goble, The Council and the
Constitution: An Article on the Constitutionality of the Northwest Power Planning Council, 1 J. ENVTL. L. & LIT. 11
(1986); Symposium, Seattle Master Builders and Creative Cooperative Federalism, 17 ENVTL. L. 767 (1987).
15. A series of articles by Professor Michael Blumm persuasively lays out the history
of the Council's ineffective attempts to restore a healthy salmon fishery to the Columbia
337
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continued decline has been the Council's unwillingness to adhere to the
role Congress created for it. The Council has generally subjugated state fish
and wildlife agency and tribal views on the needs of salmon to a
commitment to achieve consensus in the management of the Federal
Columbia River Power System (FCRPS). Although Congress warned the
Council that it should not assume the role of a "superfish and wildlife
agency,"16 the Council has frequently refused to adopt measures thought by
fish and wildlife agencies and tribes to be necessary to restore healthy
salmon runs. Nor has the Council traditionally provided written
explanations of its reasons for failing to defer to the mission, expertise, and
unique roles of the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes.17
Recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit made clear the error of the Council's ways. In September 1994, the
court invalidated the Council's 1992 Strategy for Salmon because the
process that led to its creation violated several provisions of the Northwest
Power Act.18 The court ruled that the Council unlawfully failed to provide a
statutorily required written explanation of its rejection of fish and wildlife
agency and tribal recommendations and omitted mandatory biological
objectives from the Strategy.19 The court also indicated a strong belief that

River Basin during the 1980s. See Blumm, Hydropower v. Salmon, supra note 11; Michael C.
Blumm & Brad L. Johnson, Promising a Process for Parity: The Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act and Anadromous Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L. 497 (1981) [hereinafter
Blumm, Parity I]; Michael C. Blumm, Fulfilling the Parity Promise: A Perspective on Scientific Proof,
Economic Cost, and Indian Treaty Rights in the Approval of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program,
13 ENVTL. L. 103 (1982) [hereinafter Blumm, Parity II]; Michael C. Blumm, Implementing the
Parity Promise: An Evaluation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 14 ENVTL. L. 277, 283
(1984) [hereinafter Blumm, Parity III]; Michael C. Blumm, Reexamining the Parity Promise: More
Challenges than Successes to the Implementation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16
ENVTL. L. 461 (1986) [hereinafter Blumm, Parity IV]. Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8; Blumm,
Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 2, at 682-87, 689-96.
16. The Northwest Power Act commands the Council to base the Program on
fish and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations and to defer to the expertise of
those agencies and tribes. See infra notes 159-163 and accompanying text. The
quotation is of Congressman John Dingell, chief sponsor of the Act's fish and wildlife
provisions and floor manager of the Act. 126 CONG. REC. 29,810 (1980).
17. Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 661, 670, 675-76 & nn. 93-99, 683-85 & nn.
147-56, 691 & nn. 198-201. The Northwest Power Act allows the Council to reject fish
and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations only on very limited grounds, and if
the Council does reject such recommendations it must provide a written explanation
of its decision to do so. See infra notes 159-163 and accompanying text.
18. Northwest Resource Info. Center v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35
F.3d 1371, 1395 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 5305 (1995).
19.
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the Council failed to give appropriate deference to the region's fish and
wildlife agencies and tribes in developing the Strategy for Salmon.20
The immediate practical effect of the ruling in Northwest Resource
Information Center v. Northwest Power Planning Council has been the adoption of
1994 Program amendments that incorporate many of the recommendations
of the region's fish and wildlife agencies and tribes offered in 1991.21 Thus,
the 1994 amendments may signal a shift away from the Council's past
pattern of failure to lead the region toward resolution of the salmon crisis.22
Northwest Resource Information Center therefore has the potential to force a
permanent solution to the Pacific Northwest's salmon crisis. The case
provides a sweeping interpretation of the Northwest Power Act that confirms
Congress' intent to force a revolutionary change in the way the FCRPS is
managed. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's opinion induced the Council, during
its deliberations on the 1994 Program amendments, to afford significantly
more deference to the scientific judgments of the region's fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes than it had during the Program's first decade.23 That
change has been slow in coming, but the Council's recent decision to adopt
recovery measures long advocated by salmon advocates indicates that
Northwest Resource Information Center may fundamentally alter the weight
traditionally accorded the Basin's fish and wildlife in the management of the
Columbia River hydroelectric system. If the 1994 Program amendments are a
reliable indicator, the Council has taken to heart the court's warnings that
the Northwest Power Act's Program criteria impose substantive obligations
on it and that the public must be given a complete explanation of the
Council's decision to adopt or reject Program recommendations.24
The Northwest Power Act is not, however, the only tool that can help
bring back the salmon runs. In the short run, it may not even be the most
important mechanism.25 By the late 1980s, declines in many of the Columbia
River Basin's salmon stocks, and the failure of the Northwest Power Act to
bring about their restoration, motivated concerned citizens of the region to

20.

Id. at 1386-89.

21. See Joan Laatz, Power Council OK's Plan to Save Salmon, OREGONIAN, Dec. 15, 1994, at A1,
A26; Northwest Power Planning Council, News Release, Dec. 14, 1994 (on file with author).
22. See Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 703, 711-13 (discussing Council's
pattern of compromising the recommended fish mitigation measures).
23.

See infra notes 359-405 and accompanying text.

24.

See infra notes 359-361 and accompanying text.

25. Indeed, there may be some sentiment among the region's political leaders to reexamine the Northwest Power Act in the wake of Northwest Resource Information Center and the 1994
Program amendments. See Al Gibbs, Gorton Suggests Federal Law to Solve Region's Salmon Crisis,
[TACOMA] NEWS TRIBUNE, Oct. 13, 1994, at B6 (reporting Washington Senator Slade Gorton's view
that a legislative "solution" to the salmon crisis may be necessary).
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seek protection of several runs under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).26
The resulting listings27 may guarantee the end of a long era in which federal
dam operators downplayed the needs of salmon.
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) acquired substantial
power to protect the runs against further declines in the aftermath of the
salmon listings. Unfortunately, since the listings occurred, NMFS has not
exhibited the willingness to force fundamental changes that would reduce
the hydropower system's awesomely destructive impact on salmon. In 1992,
1993 and 1994, NMFS concluded that the operation of the region's
hydroelectric system would not jeopardize endangered salmon. Judge
Marsh, as well as the Ninth Circuit, have clearly expressed impatience with
NMFS' failure to challenge the status quo in the Columbia River system. In
Idaho Department of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Service, Judge Malcom
Marsh warned all of the parties directly affected by the operation of the
FCRPS that the courts and the region expect a "major overhaul" to rescue
the imperiled salmon stocks.28 Idaho Department of Fish & Game29 therefore
amounted to an invitation for NMFS to exercise bureaucratic courage in the
continuing debate over the fate of salmon.30
These expressions of judicial impatience should ensure that Idaho
Department of Fish & Game will be a vital step toward restoration of the runs. If
NMFS, and especially irrigators and the operators of the Columbia River
hydropower system, respond appropriately to the court's sentiments, Idaho
Department of Fish & Game will revolutionize the allocation of the region's

26.

Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1985 & Supp. 1995).

27. 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (1991); 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653-54 (1992); 59 Fed. Reg.
54,840 (1994) (proposing downlisting of Snake River spring/summer and fall chinook
to endangered). These requests resulted in findings that the Snake River sockeye
salmon and the Snake River spring and summer Chinook salmon are endangered
species. More salmon listings are possible. NMFS recently proposed to list certain
coho runs native to California and Oregon. 60 Fed. Reg. 38,011 (1995). Moreover,
while NMFS recently rejected a petition to list the mid-Columbia summer Chinook
run, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,855 (1994), the agency is conducting comprehensive, Pacific
coast-wide status reviews for coho, steelhead, pink salmon, chum, sockeye, Chinook,
and sea-run cutthroat trout. 60 Fed. Reg. 38,011 (1995); 50 Fed. Reg. 46,808 (1994).
28. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp.
886, 900 (D. Or. 1994), remanded, 56 F.3d 1071 (1995).
29.

Id.

30. Because NMFS used a methodology in its original 1994-98 biological
opinion on FCRPS operations similar to that employed in the 1993 biological
opinion, Idaho Department of Fish & Game cast equal doubt on its validity as well. NMFS
responded to Idaho Department of Fish & Game by revising the 1994-98 biological
opinion on the FCRPS. See Letter from Fred R. Disheroon, Esq., U.S. Department of
Justice, to Hon. Malcolm F. Marsh (Apr. 7, 1994) (copy on file with author).
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water resources among power interests, navigation needs, irrigators, and
fish and wildlife. Unfortunately, the decision has not had any obvious
positive impacts to date. In a revised 1994-98 biological opinion on FCRPS
operations and in a proposed recovery plan for listed salmon stocks, NMFS
has acknowledged that salmon need more and faster water to survive.
However, NMFS has failed to provide the tools necessary to provide such
water. The revised 1994-98 biological opinion on FCRPS operations and the
proposed recovery plan also do not effectively confront other significant
impediments to salmon survival, including inadequate flows and excessive
reliance on barge and truck transportation.31
Sections II, III, and IV of this article summarize the events that led to the
listing of several salmon runs under the ESA, outline the fish and wildlife
provisions of the Northwest Power Act, discuss the evolution of the Program
during its first decade, and outline the Council's 1992 Strategy for Salmon.32
Sections V and VI describe the decisions in Northwest Resource Information Center
v. Northwest Power Planning Council and Idaho Department of Fish & Game v. National
Marine Fisheries Service and analyze the holdings in each case.33 Section VII
discusses and criticizes the impacts produced by the two cases thus far,
particularly the 1994 Program amendments and the revised 1994-98 biological
opinion on FCRPS operations. Section VIII concludes that Northwest Resource
Information Center and Idaho Department of Fish & Game offer an avenue for overdue
and essential changes in the region's hydropower system. However, the
prospects for durable change rest on the willingness of the Council and NMFS
to exert consistent leadership and on the commitment of the federal dam
operators to abide by the Program and to accept fundamental changes in the
Basin's scheme for allocating use of the rivers. Thus far, there is little
assurance that these results will be forthcoming. Northwest Resource Information
Center and Idaho Department of Fish & Game have not induced the necessary
willingness to change the river's status quo.34
II.

A Short History of the Columbia River Basin and Its Salmon

From its headwaters high in the Selkirk Mountains of central British
Columbia, the Columbia River drains nearly 259,000 square miles and flows
1,450 miles to its mouth on the Pacific coast at Astoria, Oregon.35 The

31.

See infra notes 406-419 and accompanying text.

32.

See infra notes 35-121 and accompanying text.

33.

See infra notes 122-353 and accompanying text.

34.

See infra notes 3, 56-506 and accompanying text.

35. PALMER, supra note 8, at 228. The Columbia River drains portions of Oregon,
Washington, Idaho, western Montana, western Wyoming, northern Nevada, and
northern Utah in the United States and approximately 40,000 square miles of British
341
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Columbia's principal tributary, the Snake River, flows westerly from its
headwaters in western Wyoming36 before moving north to form a confluence
with the Columbia near the city of Pasco, Washington.37
These rivers have been the stage for one of "nature's most engaging
miracles."38 Each year for millions of years,39 salmon have migrated up the
region's rivers to their spawning grounds.40 For most of that millennia their
numbers were huge.41 Before Europeans discovered the Pacific Northwest,42

Columbia. See Michael C. Blumm, The Columbia River Basin, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
57 (Robert E. Beck ed. 1994) [hereinafter Blumm, Columbia River Basin].
36. The Snake River is 1,056 miles long and rises in Yellowstone National Park, Wyoming.
It is the tenth largest river in the United States and drains 109,000 square miles of the northern
Rocky Mountains, an area larger than Colorado. PALMER, supra note 8, at 5. Other tributaries of the
Columbia rise from headwaters in Montana, Idaho, and Nevada.
37. The Columbia River Basin is the second largest river basin on the continent, after the
Missouri-Mississippi River Basin. The Columbia itself is North America's sixth largest river
measured by annual runoff, ranking below the Mississippi, MacKenzie, St. Lawrence, Nelson, and
Yukon Rivers. Blumm Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 57. In an average year the Columbia
discharges into the Pacific Ocean more than twice the water discharged by the Nile River into the
Mediterranean. The Columbia's average annual runoff of 198 million acre-feet (maf) is prodigious,
but its flows are neither predictable nor stable: before the first dams were built in the basin, flows
ranged from a low of 14,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) to as high as 550,000 cfs. The Columbia
River is one of only two rivers in the American West that flow from the interior all the way to the
Pacific Ocean. The other is the Klamath, in southern Oregon. Id.
38.

Bob Devine, The Salmon Dammed, AUDUBON 82, 83 Jan. 1992.

39. Salmon were present in the rivers of the Columbia basin at least one million years
before humans first arrived in the region. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 179-80.
40. Pacific salmon migrate over a range extending from the California coast to
the Alaskan seas. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 25.
41. One early account of Oregon's settlement declared that salmon "literally fill the rivers.
. . in their season. And at all the falls and cascades in the various rivers of the country, the
quantities take and that might be taken, are beyond all calculation. As they penetrate far into the
interior, they afford almost inexhaustible supplies to the Indian tribes of the country, as well as
the whites. . . ." Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 30 (quoting G. Hines, OREGON: ITS HISTORY,
CONDITION AND PROSPECTS 331 (1851). See also STEWART HOLBROOK, THE COLUMBIA 234-50 (2d ed. 1974)
(describing early years of Columbia River fisheries).
42. Natives populated the Columbia River Basin for thousands of years before the first
European explorers arrived. Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 27 (citing L. CRESSMAN,
PREHISTORY OF THE FAR WEST 1-2 (1977)). See also GUS NORWOOD, COLUMBIA RIVER POWER FOR THE
PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF POLICIES OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION 7 (U.S. Dep't of Energy,
Bonneville Power Administration 1981) (noting presence of humans in the pacific Northwest
for at least 15,000 years). The arrival in the region by the explorers Meriwether Lewis and
William Clark was a "crackling, lightning-bolt event" for the 50,000 natives living in the pacific
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natives of the Columbia and neighboring river basins43 annually caught
millions of pounds of fish.44 After the Lewis and Clark expedition to the
region, mountain men, trappers, and settlers arrived and began building the
region's resource-based economy.
The federal government began building the dams that now form the FCRPS in the
1930s.45 During the following decades private parties built hundreds more dams in the
Basin. By 1964, the hydroelectric system was integrated through a contract between

Northwest in 1805. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 178. At that time the tribes constituted a strong
society, and during the first fifty years after the Lewis and Clark expedition the native tribes felt
relatively few adverse effects. Of course, large numbers of native Indians were killed off by
diseases transmitted by the white settlers, and conflicts between the natives and white settlers
took additional lives. Nevertheless, tribal societies continued to function and "the [Columbia
and its tributaries were] completely intact, and so were the great salmon runs." Id.
43.

Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 27.

44. The Pacific Northwest's tribes "relied on salmon more than the Plains Indians
depended on buffalo." WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 184. Before the decline of the fishery began in
the mid-nineteenth century, natives of the basin may have caught 42 million pounds of fish each
year. Id. at 185 (discussing 1986 Council estimate of pre-settlement annual fishing by region's
tribes). See also Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 28 n. 51 (natives caught approximately 18
million pounds of salmon each year); COURTLAND L. SMITH, FISH OR CUT BAIT 12 (Oregon State
University Sea Grant College Program, Publication No. ORESU-T-77-006) (1977) (estimating the
average annual catch at Celilo Falls on the lower Columbia to be 4-5 million pounds). In contrast,
during the modern era the total commercial salmon catch in the Columbia River Basin is 5-8
million fish per year. The principal native fishery was located at Celilo Falls, near the current
location of the city of The Dalles, Oregon, and two hundred miles inland from the Columbia's
mouth. Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 2, at 26-29. Other falls at which tribal fishers gathered for
seasonal harvests were the Cascades of the Columbia, 50 miles downriver of Celilo Falls; Salmon
Falls on the Snake River; Kettle Falls on the upper Columbia near the Canadian border; and
Williamette Falls southeast of what is now Portland. Id. at 27 n. 45. Celilo Falls was inundated
when the gates of the Dalles Dam closed in April 1956. The United States government later paid
the tribes $15 million for their fishing rights. See Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 818 (1962).
45. The FCRPS is composed of thirty federal dams in the Snake and Columbia basins. The
major dams, and the dates of their completion, are: Bonneville (1938), The Dalles (1957), and John
Day (1968) on the lower Columbia; and McNary (1953), Ice Harbor (1961), Lower Monumental
(1969), Little Goose (1970), and Lower Granite (1975) on the lower Snake. In addition, the FCRPS
includes, on the upper Snake River and in the upper Columbia Basin, Dworshak (1974), Hungry
Horse (1952), Libby (1975), Chief Joseph (1955), Grand Coulee (1941), and Albeni Falls (1955) dams.
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, MULTIPURPOSE DAMS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (1993). For an
excellent review of the history of dam building in the Pacific Northwest, including an analysis of
Congress' purposes in authorizing construction of the region's many dams, see Blumm, Hydropower
vs. Salmon, supra note 11, at 223-49; DIETRICH, supra note 10, at 249-322.
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Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the dam operators, and utility customers.46 That
same year, the United States entered into an agreement with Canada under which the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation obtained the ability to
store large portions of the spring flows on the upper Columbia River behind four large
dams.47 As a result, the dams now provide seventy-five percent of the Pacific Northwest's
electric power48 and help farmers irrigate seven million acres east of the Cascades.49 By
the late 1970s, however, the cost of these benefits became apparent, as a salmon
population that once numbered in the tens of millions each year dwindled to a few

46. See PACIFIC NORTHWEST COORDINATING AGREEMENT, AGREEMENT FOR COORDINATION OF
OPERATIONS AMONG POWER SYSTEMS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (Contract No. 14-02-4822)
(1964) (copy on file with author). The Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement of 1964
established system operating criteria and power exchange guidelines and laid the basis
for the system's annual integrated plan. See KAI N. LEE, DONNA LEE KLEMKA & MARION E.
MARTS, ELECTRIC POWER AND THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 54-55 (1980).
47. COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN: COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, Jan. 17, 1961,
U.S.-Canada, 15 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5538 (entered into force Sept. 16, 1964) [hereinafter
Columbia River Treaty]. See generally Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 11, at 215-19. The
treaty authorized Canada to build three storage projects and the Unites States to build a fourth
that would inundate Canadian lands. In exchange, the U.S. paid Canada $64 million and
promised Canada a one-half share of the hydropower generated. The four treaty projects went
on line in 1970. Blumm, Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 80.
48. PUBLIC POWER COUNCIL, PUBLIC POWER ESSENTIALS: AN INTRODUCTION TO NORTHWEST
ENERGY ISSUES AS PUBLIC POWER APPROACHES THE 1990S 9 (1987). Over 40% of American's
hydropower is generated by the region's dams. Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 662. The Pacific
Northwest's cheap hydroelectricity has also made the region America's manufacturing mecca.
Smelters in the Columbia River Basin produce approximately 2 million tons of aluminum each
year, approximately 43% of the nation's total annual supply. Jim Simon & Marla Williams,
Lifestyles, Livelihoods Are At Stake Over Pending Endangered Species, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 31, 1991, at A5.
49. Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 11. In Idaho alone, more than 4 million acres
are irrigated. 3.8 million of those acres are in the Snake River Basin. PALMER, supra note 8, at 90.
That ranks Idaho second only to California among the states for total irrigated acreage. Id. at 103.
Nevertheless, the reservoirs of the Columbia River Basin are not the only sources of irrigation
water east of the Cascades. A significant amount of the region's agricultural land is watered by
pumped groundwater and diversions from undammed rivers and streams. Interview with Reed D.
Benson, Staff Attorney, WaterWatch of Oregon (Nov. 18, 1994). See also Palmer, supra note 8, at 118
(irrigation withdrawals from groundwater totaled 8.5 maf in 1986, while surface water withdrawals
for irrigation totaled 16.6 maf the same year). Navigation is also a significant economic use of the
Columbia and Snake Rivers. Shipping in the Columbia River system transports more than $11
billion worth of goods each year, making it the nation's second-largest inland waterway. Marla
Williams, What Cost to Save Snake River Sockeye? Release of Salmon Recovery Plan Raises Stakes in Northwest
Fish War, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at A1.
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million fish.50 The plight of the salmon became so severe that NMFS considered listing
several runs under the ESA in 1978.51 The imminent listings convinced Congress that
previous legislative efforts to restore the region's famed salmon runs had failed.52 As a
result, Congress included in the Northwest Power Act substantial protection for salmon
in an effort to ward off additional ESA listings.53 Originally conceived as a response to
expected power shortages in the Pacific Northwest,54 the Act became an unprecedented
fish and wildlife restoration law.55

50. See supra note 8; Lorraine Bodi, The History of Legislative Background of the Northwest Power Act, 25
ENVTL. L. 365, 368 (1995). Several hundred wild runs native to the region are also at risk of extinction.
See Willa Nehlsen et al., Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads: Stocks at Risk from California, Oregon, Idaho, and
Washington, 16 FISHERIES 4 (1991) (concluding that more than 100 wild stocks are extinct and that 89
more face a high risk of extinction). The adverse effects of dams are numerous: they block access to
upstream spawning habitats, flood spawning grounds, change water temperatures, increase water
pollution, cause a reduction in available oxygen, and eliminate much of the spring and summer
flows needed to transport juvenile salmon to the ocean. Id. at 664 (citing LOSSES STUDY, supra note 9,
at 140, 146 (discussing flooding of spawning grounds and temperature effects)); JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA,
ET AL. RIVERS AT RISK: THE CONCERNED CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO HYDROPOWER 4-5 (1989). Notwithstanding their
well-known adverse effects, some continue to doubt that the dams are the principal culprit in the
destruction of the runs. See Brief of the DSIs, at 11, Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine
Fisheries Serv., No. 94-35524 (9th Cir., filed Sept. 16, 1994) ("Opponents of the FCRPS and self-styled
fishery 'advocates' have labored long and hard to create the myth that the FCRPS is almost singlehandedly responsible for the decline of salmon.") (citation omitted). Even the owner of the FCRPS
agrees, however, that the hydropower system has been the principal agent of salmon destruction.
See NMFS, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON 1993 OPERATION
OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM 51, 60 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 BIOLOGICAL OPINION]. Not
surprisingly, calls for the removal of some dams are growing louder and more frequent. See Michael
T. Pyle, Beyond Fish Ladders: Dam Removal as a Strategy for Restoring America's Rivers, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 97
(1995). Congress has even authorized removal of one of the Pacific Northwest's dams. See Elwha
River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-495, 106 Stat. 3137.
51. See 43 Fed. Reg. 45,622, 45,628-29 (Oct. 3, 1978) (notice requesting public
help in reviewing biological status of upriver salmon populations), cited in Lorraine
Bodi, Protecting Columbia River Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 10 Envtl. L. 349,
349-50 (1980) [hereinafter Bodi, Protecting Salmon Under the ESA].
52. See COMMERCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 6015; Blumm, Parity II, supra note 15, at
108-11. The most important of those previous laws was the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
(FWCA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666(c) (1988). For a discussion of the flaws of FWCA, see infra note 148.
53. The U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report to Congress
highlighting the plight of the salmon in 1979. See GAO STUDY, supra note 10.
54. See Central Lincoln People's Utility Dist. V. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th
Cir. 1984); Ralph Cavanagh, The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation (And
Thermal Power Plant Relief) Act, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 27, 30-31 (1980).
55. Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 666. Of course, salmon are not the only fish that have
been grievously harmed by the region's huge hydroelectric network. The impacts of the dams are
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The Council's Fish and Wildlife Program and the Salmon Listings
A.

The Evolution of the Program: 1981-90

As the required first step toward issuance of the Program, the Act
directed the Council to ask state fish and wildlife agencies and tribes to
recommend actions needed to ensure mitigation of fish and wildlife losses
and restoration of the runs.56 In 1981, a coalition of state fish and wildlife
agencies and Columbia River Basin tribes (the "fishery coalition") urged the
Council to adopt minimum average weekly spring flows at The Dalles Dam
on the lower Columbia57 and recommended peak flows at The Dalles, Priest
Rapids and Lower Granite Dams.58 The fish and wildlife agencies also
proposed a "sliding scale" plan that would allow dam operators to adjust
flows in years with high or low runoff.59
After unprecedented public involvement, the Council issued the Program in
1982,60 but declined to fully implement the fishery coalition's proposal for a sliding scale
of flows.61 Instead, the Council adopted a "Water Budget" designed to make available a
given volume of water to salmon during their annual downstream migration season.62

also felt by numerous other anadromous and resident fish, including Pacific Lamprey, burbot, white
sturgeon, and redband trout. Each of these fish species is likewise at risk of extinction. See John
Harrison, The Forgotten Fish, 14 NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS 7 (Summer 1995).
56.

Blumm, Parity III, supra note 15, at 285.

57. This flow level was below an optimum salmon survival flow level of 300-350 kcfs at The
Dalles Dam. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, I RECOMMENDATION FOR FISH & WILDLIFE
PROGRAM UNDER THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST ELECTRIC POWER PLANNING AND CONSERVATION ACT 167-69
(1981) [hereinafter 1981 COALITION RECOMMENDATIONS].
58. The recommended flows at Lower Granite Dam were 85 kcfs. Id. at 180.
Such a flow level would be below the biologically optimum flow level for the lower
Snake of 140 kcfs. See J. LAWRENCE, K. LEE & N. PALMER, THE WATER BUDGET: A STEP
TOWARDS BALANCING FISH AND POWER IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 76 (U. of Wash. Water
Resources Technical Rep. No. 81) (1988) [hereinafter THE WATER BUDGET] (discussion
recommendations of Columbia River Fisheries Committee made in 1979).
59. The "sliding scale" would have allowed dam operators to reduce flows 25% in
low flow years and increase flows by 15% at Priest Rapids and by 60% at Lower Granite in
high flow years. The region's tribes opposed the "sliding scale" plan. See 1981 COALITION
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 57, at 170 (assertion of Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish
Commission that treaties entitled tribes to optimum flows of 300 kcfs or greater).
60. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1982 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH
WILDLIFE PROGRAM (1982) [hereinafter 1982 PROGRAM].
61.

AND

Blumm, Parity III, supra note 15, at 294.

62. The Council adopted the "Water Budget" instead of a recommendation by a coalition
of state fish and wildlife agencies and tribes that it set minimum flows at several lower Columbia
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The Council also required installation of mechanical bypass systems to improve juvenile
passage63 and, to enhance the passage of adult fish migrating upriver, called for
improvement of fish ladders.64 Amendments during the early 1980s established specific
plans for implementing Program provisions,65 eliminated BPA's role as a source of funds
for "goals" studies,66 and established a goal of doubling the size of existing salmon runs.67

and Snake River dams. The Council allocated 4.64 million acre-feet (maf) to the Water Budget and
directed that it be made available for fish passage between April 15 and June 5 under the direction
of managers selected by the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes each year. Blumm, Parity III, supra
note 15, at 295-96. The Water Budget reduced the amount of water made available for power
production at the dam operator's discretion and instead allocates it to increased flows during
salmon migration season. Id. at 294 n. 71.
63. 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 60, § 401. Bypass measures are necessary to reduce salmon
mortality caused by power turbines built into the dams. As juvenile salmon attempt to pass
through the turbines, they are subjected to changes in water pressure, impacts of the turbine
blades, and increased water turbulence. In addition to the adverse consequences of the turbines,
the juvenile salmon become stunned and disoriented after passing through the turbines. In such
a condition they become increasingly vulnerable to predators, especially squawfish, which are
abundant at the base of each dam. See Blumm, Parity III, supra note 15, at 302 n.106 (quoting 1982
PROGRAM, supra note 60, § 401). The Council did not request biologically adequate interim flows at
five public utility district dams on the mid-Columbia pending juvenile bypass improvements. Id.
at 303-04 (quoting 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 60, § 401(a)(10)). For dams on the Snake operated by
the Corps, the Council did not order any minimum flows. Instead the Council simply authorized
the Corps to continue transporting juvenile salmon from reservoirs above Lower Granite and
Little Goose Dams and asked for further studies and proposals for further, undefined action. Id. at
309-10 (quoting 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 60, § 401(b)(6)-(7)).
64. The Council established, for all of the dams on the mainstem Columbia
and its tributaries, criteria for spills and flows that would ensure the attraction of
adult salmon to fish ladders. The Council also ordered improved operation and
maintenance of fish ladders and requested various studies of problems related to
adult passage. Id. 310-12. The program also emphasized reduction of ocean harvests,
consideration of habitat improvements in the Yakima River basin, and establishment
of fish and wildlife criteria for all new hydroelectric projects and designation of
stream reaches where such development would be discouraged. Id. at 320-31, 338-43.
65. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1984 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE
PROGRAM §§ 1503-04 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 PROGRAM]. For a discussion of the three interim
Program goals established by the 1984 Amendments, see Blumm, Parity III, supra note 15, at 298-93;
Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 679 n.127. The 1984 Amendments also attempted to improve fish
passage survival a mainstem Columbia dams. "Efficient fish passage is critical to the Program's
success because investments in habitat and fish flows cannot materially increase run sizes without
significant reductions in fish mortality at mainstem dams." Blumm, Parity V, supra Note 8, at 680. To
improve passage, the Council relied primarily on the Water Budget, which would increase flows and
thereby allow fish to pass more efficiently through reservoirs: installation of mechanical bypass
systems designed to keep juvenile salmon out of dam turbines; and barge or truck transportation of
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The Council intended the innovative conception of the Water Budget
to replace lost spring runoff and provide the flows necessary for juvenile
salmon to migrate downstream.68 Nevertheless, by mid-decade it became
clear that the Water Budget was not working.69 Nor were the Council's
laudable efforts to encourage and accelerate mainstem passage
improvements sufficient to materially increase run sizes. The 1982 Program
did not include deadlines for installation of bypass systems on the Corps'

juvenile salmon around dams. The Council declined to adopt fish and wildlife agency and tribal
recommendations to provide water spills to allow fish to move around the dams. Id. at 682.
Unfortunately, these initiatives were doomed to fail once the Council decided not to require
mainstem passage improvements sufficient to noticeably increase run sizes. Id.
66. The Program originally authorized BPA to fund such "goals studies." 1984 PROGRAM, supra
note 65, § 201(1). However, some commentators expressed concern that BPA was not adequately
committed to restoring the basin's fisheries. See Michael C. Blumm, The Northwest Power Act's Institutional
Innovations and Unfulfilled Promises, 2 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 165, 173 N.53 (1987). As a consequence, the
Council amended the Program in 1985. COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, FINAL
AMENDMENTS, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,032, 11,033 (1985) (final amendments to Program § 201). See also
Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 682.
67. The Council concluded in 1986 that hydropower production was responsible for the
loss of 5-11million of the 7-14 million salmon killed each year by activities that destroy its habitat.
LOSSES STUDY, supra note 9, at 1. Nevertheless, the 1987 amendments sought only to achieve a
total annual run size of five million fish. The Council asserted that current socioeconomic and
biological conditions reduce the possibility of restoring fish runs to historic levels. Blumm, Parity
V, supra note 8, at 686.
68. The Water Budget allocated 4.5 million acre feet (maf) for replacement
spring flows, and the Council created managers to oversee Corps implementation of
the Budget's requirements. Blumm, Parity IV, supra note 15, at 470. The attraction of
the Water Budget from the Council's point of view lay in its potential for less loss of
hydropower revenues than would be the case in a minimum flow regime and also in
its involvement of fishery advocates in the day-to-day operational management of
the FCRPS. Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 675.
69. Operators of the dams on the Snake and Lower Columbia Rivers usually responded
to the expiration of the Water Budget period by reducing flows. This was done in order to store
water behind the dams for power generation during the fall and winter, but its effect was "a
marked reduction in flows during the summer migration season." Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8,
at 688. In addition, the Corps did not consistently grant Water Budget requests, particularly in
average or below-average flow years. The Corps' actions were often motivated by a desire to
maximize power generation or refill reservoirs rather than meet fish and wildlife needs. Id. at
688-89. See also Blumm, Parity IV, supra note 15, at 494-501 (discussing Corps' evasion of Water
Budget flow priority over reservoir refill and secondary power considerations, inflexible
application of Water Budget during late migration season, and BPA efforts to control activities
of managers responsible for assuring adequate Water Budget flows for fish).
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dams on the lower Columbia and Snake,70 and by 1991 six of thirteen
mainstem Columbia and Snake federal dams still lacked such facilities.71 The
Council also consistently failed to establish minimum interim spill levels at
the mainstem dams, which are essential to reduce high levels of juvenile
mortality associated with passage through hydroelectric turbines.72
During the first decade after the enactment of the Northwest Power
Act, the Council showed little willingness to directly confront these
problems. The Council rejected fishery coalition recommendations that fish
flows be increased and implementation of the Water Budget be improved in
1987, and in 1990 the Council declined to tighten requirements for future
hydroelectric development in the basin.73 The Council did act to improve fish
flows in the basin in 1989, but its behavior did not reflect leadership on this
issue. The Council merely ratified an agreement among the fish and wildlife
agencies, tribes, BPA, and the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference
Committee (PNUCC) that resolved the long-running argument over spill
magnitude and timing at mainstem Columbia dams.74 The Council played no
role in negotiating the settlement.75

70.

1982 PROGRAM, supra note 60, § 404(b).

71. Installation schedules at the other seven dams are generally several years
behind schedule. Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 694.
72. Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 677. The Council required spill plans that
would achieve survival rates comparable to those associated with the best available
bypass systems. Id. The Council's reluctance to require spills adequate to improve
survival beyond that threshold might be a result of their high cost in terms of the
electric power that could otherwise be generated with the water spilled.
73. In 1988 the Council designated approximately 44,000 miles of basin streams as
"protected areas" which would be unavailable for hydroelectric project construction. Blumm,
Parity V, supra note 8, at 696 (citing NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, PROTECTED AREAS
SUMMARY AND RESPONSE TO COMMENTS (1988)). However, in 1990, the Council declined to adopt a
recommendation that the designation be applied to approved but unconstructed hydroelectric
projects. The fishery coalition had urged the Council to invoke protected area designation to
prevent construction of hydroelectric projects which were issued a preliminary permit or
awaiting a decision by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on a pending
license application and to impose protected area status on all projects for which "there had
not been a substantial investment of resources." Id. at 701-02 (citing NORTHWEST POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL, PROTECTED AREA SUMMARY AND RESPONSE TO COMMENTS 2, 4-15, 17-18 (1990)).
In fact, the Council's 1990 actions reflected a willingness to allow new hydroelectric
development to go forward. The Council removed approximately 500 miles of basin streams
from protected area designation in response to thirty requests for exemptions by FERC. Id.
Id. at 699 (citing NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, NOTICE OF FINAL ACTION ON SPILL
AMENDMENTS (1989)). The "Fish Spill Memorandum of Agreement" was a result of a settlement of
litigation alleging that proposed Pacific Intertie expansion violated the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321. It provided for spills at Lower Monumental, Ice Harbor, John Day, and
74.
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By the end of its first decade, the Program enjoyed success in some key
respects. However, many of the successes were evident only on paper or fleeting
in terms of improved run sizes. In 1987 the Council restructured the
implementation of the Program, creating a sub-basin planning process aimed at
avoiding unanticipated impacts on local fish production and inconsistencies with
overall Program goals and policies; issued principles to guide salmon research
and production objectives; directed that implementation of the Program give
priority to adequate genetic diversity, rapid improvement of mainstem dam
passage, and restoration of fisheries existing above Bonneville Dam, frequently
reiterated its concern that salmon production be increased and harvests reduced;
and institutionalized "roundtable" discussions among all parties interested in
fishery health.76 The 1988 creation of the "Protected Areas" list must also be
considered an accomplishment since it makes new hydroelectric development in
the basin less likely, although not impossible.77 The Council also took steps

The Dalles dams over a 10-year period. Those dams lack adequate fish bypass systems. The
agreement is designed to provide spills sufficient to protect a significant percentage of salmon
runs migrating between April 15 and August 21 each year and requires completion of an annual
spill plan by November 1 of each year. The spill plan governs during the following year's spill and
summer migration seasons and must be integrated with annual smolt monitoring programs
maintained by the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes. Although the Corps of Engineers and the
region's utilities refused to sign the Agreement, its implementation was "encouraging" in 1989
and 1990. Id. at 699-700. The Agreement was achieved following a long period of negotiations
commenced after salmon advocates filed a complaint aimed at blocking expansion of BPA's
proposed Pacific Intertie. The Pacific Intertie links power generating facilities in the Pacific
Northwest to California, thereby increasing power sales to that state and making spills less likely.
PNUCC is a non-profit corporation that represents many of the Pacific Northwest's electricity
customers. Blumm, Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 134.
75. Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 700 n.255. In 1990, the Council again failed to come
to terms with the flow problem. That year the Council rejected a comprehensive, biologicallybased flow regime proposed by a coalition of fish and wildlife agencies and tribes and
supported by a detailed scientific justification. Id. at 671-72, 675-77. The recommendations
would have required that the flows be considered "hard restraints" on hydropower system
operations, to be met under all conditions; reiterated the 1981 request for minimum flows on
the lower Columbia; requested summer flows through August of each year; and incorporated
the "sliding scale" concept originally proposed in 1981. Id. The Council instead opted for flows
still below the threshold through by biologists necessary to ensure juvenile salmon survival on
the lower Columbia and Snake. Id. at 675-76. Nor did the Council improve flows in 1991. The
1991 Amendments established a "low flow target" of 200 kcfs on the lower Columbia, increased
the Water Budget allocation to 6.45 million acre feet (maf), proposed the lowering of John Day
reservoir to minimum operating pool, and removed a 140 kcfs "flow cap" on the mid-Columbia.
See Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 2, at 691-92.
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1987 PROGRAM, supra note 8, §§ 204(a)-(g) to 205, at 39-44.

77.

Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 697.
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toward prioritizing the implementation of the Program's wildlife mitigation
provisions.78 By 1988, the Council's efforts apparently helped stocks in some
Columbia River sub-basins, such as the Yakima and the Hanford Reach, increase
perceptibly.79 However, the improvement proved illusory. By 1989, data indicated
that runs throughout the Pacific Northwest and California were again uniformly in
a rapid decline.80 That decline continues to the present day.81
Notwithstanding the Council's adoption of these effective measures, the
Council's refusal to adopt fishery coalition recommendations for larger flows
effectively precluded significant reductions in heavy smolt mortality caused by the
hydropower system.82 Without such improvements in juvenile passage survival,
the health of many of the Pacific Northwest's salmon runs precipitously
declined.83 By 1990, the continued deterioration of the resource had induced
several environmental groups and tribes to successfully petition for the listing of
several stocks under the ESA. In April 1990, the Shoshone-Bannock tribe asked
NMFS to list the Snake River sockeye as endangered.84 Two months later, a
coalition of Pacific Northwest environmental groups petitioned for the listing of
the Snake River spring, summer, and fall chinook and lower Columbia coho runs.85

78. Id. at 702 (citing Letter from Northwest Power Planning Council to
Interested Parties (Oct. 24, 1990)).
79. John M. Volkman, Making Room in the Ark: The Endangered Species Act and the
Columbia River Basin, 34 ENVIRONMENT 18, 38 (May 1992).
80.

Id.

81. See Joan Laatz, The New Order: The Endangered Species Act and Political Reality
Clash as new Leaders Look to Save Salmon, OREGONIAN Nov. 29, 1994, at A1 (noting that
"[m]any salmon runs are at record lows").
82. The Water Budget for the lower Snake River was met in 1992, after a number of
the basin's tribes and environmental groups successfully petitioned NMFS to list several
stocks of salmon. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 2, at 689 n.127.
83. According to a report issued by the American Fisheries Society in 1991, 101 wild
salmon stocks native to the region between California and the U.S.-Canada border are
facing a high risk of extinction, 58 are at moderate risk of extinction, and 54 others are
considered to be of "special concern." See Willa Nehlsen, et al., Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads:
Stocks at Risk from California, Oregon, Idaho, and Washington, 16 FISHERIES 4 (1991). BPA believes
that thirteen wild runs native to the Columbia River Basin are in critical condition. See Paul
Koberstein, Battle Lines Form Over Wild Salmon's Future, OREGONIAN, May 27, 1990, at A1. Some
estimate that as many as 200 stocks in Oregon and Washington alone face the threat of
extinction. See Volkman, supra note 79, at 19.
84.

55 Fed. Reg. 22,942 (1990).

85.

55 Fed. Reg. 37,342 (1990).
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In 1991, NMFS responded by listing the Snake River sockeye as endangered.86 The
agency also listed the chinook runs as threatened in 1992.87
B.

The Effects of the Salmon Listings

The listing of several salmon stocks triggered the ESA's command that federal
dam operators consult with NMFS before continuing status quo operations of
FCRPS dams.88 In 1992, NMFS89 issued a biological opinion concluding that
operation of the dams in the Columbia River Basin would not jeopardize the listed

86.

56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (1991) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11.)

87. 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (1992) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11.) NMFS denied listing of the
lower Columbia coho on grounds that those runs were not distinguishable from hatchery
coho. Environmental groups have also requested listing of the mid-Columbia summer
chinook runs. 58 Fed. Reg. 46,944 (1993). NMFS denied listing of the mid-Columbia summer
chinook, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,855 (1994). However, NMFS recently proposed to list certain steelhead
runs native to southwest Oregon and northern California as threatened, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,253
(1995), and will consider listing numerous coho stocks native to California and Oregon, 60 Fed.
Reg. 38,011 (1995). NMFS is also considering petitions to list other steelhead and coho runs in
the Basin, as well as a number of pink salmon, chum, sockeye, chinook, and sea-run cutthroat
trout runs. 59 Fed. Reg. 46,808 (1994).
88. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a). See generally DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT:
A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 12-35 (1989) [hereinafter ROHLF, ESA];
James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup Look from a
Litigator's Perspective, 21 Envtl. L. 499, 525-60 (1991) (outlining the ESA § 7 process). Prior to
1986, agencies considered that an adverse effect did not have to be likely before the
consultation requirement of the ESA applied. See ROHLF, supra at 114-16 (criticizing
changes in regulations, issued that year, which allowed federal agencies to make
decisions without complete biological information). Notwithstanding the 1986
regulation, the Ninth Circuit recently ruled that consultations is required whenever a
federal agency action "may affect" a listed species. See Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30
F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995).
89. NMFS and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service share jurisdiction over salmon
because they are species that survive in both marine and freshwater habitats at various
stages of their life cycle. Bodi, Protecting Salmon Under the ESA, supra note 51, at 353. See 16
U.S.C. § 1532(15) (defining the term "Secretary" as either the Secretary of the Interior or
Secretary of Commerce because both are vested with responsibilities under the ESA).
However, NMFS has assumed primary jurisdiction over anadromous fish because they
spend the bulk of their lives in the ocean. Bodi, Protecting Salmon Under the ESA, supra note 51,
at 353, n.21 (citing "Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service Regarding Jurisdictional Responsibilities
and Listing Procedures Under the Endangered Species Act" (August 28, 1974)).
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salmon runs.90 This conclusion was surprising in light of NMFS' notice to BPA, the
Corps and the Bureau that those agencies would be asked to "make progress"
toward reversing the decline of the listed salmon.91 The 1992 biological opinion did,
however, warn BPA, the Corps, and the Bureau that "future standards [likely] will
impose far more stringent requirements than are necessary to achieve the 1992
interim goal."92 Nevertheless, the 1993 biological opinion left the FCRPS status quo
undisturbed. Although the 1993 biological opinion ratified the improvements called
for in the Council's 1991-92 Program amendments, NMFS again found no jeopardy
to the listed salmon even though the Corps' and the Bureau's mitigation measures
were expected to result in only marginal improvements in salmon survival.93
IV.

The Strategy for Salmon
A.

The Salmon Summit: No Regional Consensus on Steps
Needed to Save the Salmon

The imminent listing of several stocks prompted Oregon Senator Mark O.
Hatfield to convene a "grand roundtable on salmon issues"94 in the spring of 1990.
The participants included major users of the Columbia River system, including
power interests, fishing industry representatives, and farmers, as well as
representatives of environmental groups and the region's tribes.95 Over a sixmonth period, the participants sought to find ways to increase the amount of
water allocated by BPA, the Corps, and the Idaho Power Company96 for fish flows.97
The group also persuaded federal land managers to consider how best to protect
salmon habitat under their jurisdiction.98
The attempt to build a regional consensus on other steps needed to
restore the runs failed, however. The participants could not agree on how

90. NMFS NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, BIOLOGICAL
OPINION ON THE OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM 50 (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 BIOLOGICAL OPINION].
91. Letter from William M. Fox, Director, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, to Maj. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (April 10,
1992), at 2 (quoted in Renewed Motion of Idaho Department of Fish & Game for
Summary Judgment, at 4, Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Or. 1994) (Dec. 28, 1993) (Idaho Motion)).
92.

1992 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 90, at 15-16.

93.

1993 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 50, at 64-65.

94.

Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 2, at 688.

95.

Volkman, supra note 79, at 39.

96.

Id. Idaho Power Company owns Hells Canyon Dam complex on the Snake River.

97.

Id. at 39.

98.

Id.
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much to increase flows in the lower Columbia, the degree to which salmon
harvests should be reduced, or on appropriate changes to the region's
hatchery system.99 The failure of the "Salmon Summit" to resolve these
issues induced the governors of the four Pacific Northwest states to turn to
the Council for solutions to them.100 Thus, the Council again found itself
acting as the region's de facto salmon manager. Unfortunately, the Council's
subsequent attempt to play this role did not result in a restoration program
likely to return healthy wild salmon runs to the region.
B.

The 1991-92 Program Amendments: The Council's Strategy
for Salmon

In May 1991, the Council requested recommendations for 1991
amendments to the Program. The fish and wildlife agencies of Idaho and
Oregon, the Columbia River Inter-tribal Fish Commission (CRIT-FC),101 and
the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority (CBFWA)102 were
among the parties that responded to the Council's request.103 At the core of
the recommendations offered by these agencies and tribes were two
concepts: (1) significant increases in spring and summer flows on the
Columbia and Snake Rivers, as well as minimum flows on the lower
Columbia and extension of summer flow requirements through August of
each year; and (2) establishment of tangible biological objectives, which
would make it easier to evaluate the restoration effort.104

99.
100.

Id.
Id.

101. CRITFC is a coordinating fisheries agency representing four tribes that possess treaty
rights to harvest salmon in the basin. CRITFC's participants are the Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Warm Springs, Umatilla, and Yakama Indian Nations, and the Nez Perce Tribe.
Blumm, Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 133.
102. CBFWA is a coalition of Pacific Northwest fishery agencies and Indian tribes and was
formed to enhance the coordination of fish and wildlife policies of regional importance. The
coalition members include NMFS, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the fish and wildlife agencies
of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho, and CRITFC. Blumm, Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 133.
103. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
AMENDMENTS TO THE SALMON AND STEELHEAD PROVISIONS OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH
AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM (1991) [hereinafter 1991 RECOMMENDATIONS].
104. See 6 1991 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 103, at 1437-45 (Idaho Department of
Fish and Game recommendations); 4 1991 RECOMMENDATIONS, at 663-63 (Oregon
Department of Fish and Wildlife recommendations); 5 1991 RECOMMENDATIONS,, at 889-92
(CRITFC recommendations); 4 1991 RECOMMENDATIONS, at 693-94 (U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service recommendations). CBFWA recommended minimum instantaneous flows all year at
The Dalles Dam, with average daily flows of 80 kcfs between January-March and SeptemberDecember, 250 kcfs between April 1-15, 300 kcfs between April 16-June 15, 200 kcfs between
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The Basin's fish and wildlife agencies and tribes recommended flows
of 140 thousand cubic feet per second (kcfs) on the lower Snake and 300 kcfs
on the lower Columbia.105 In addition, the agencies and tribes asked the
Council to adopt specific water particle travel time objectives that would
serve as an effective measure of the impact of increased spring and summer
flows on juvenile survival.106 BPA and several of its industrial customers
argued against the adoption of a travel-time objective and questioned the
increased biological benefits of flows above 85 kcfs on the lower Snake River
and above 200 kcfs on the lower Columbia.107

June 16-July 15, and 160 kcfs between July 16-August 21. At Priest Rapids Dam, CBFWA
proposed minimum flows of 70 kcfs between January 1-May 31, 36 kcfs between June 1October 15, and 50 kcfs between October 16-November 30. At Ice Harbor Dam, CBFWA
recommended minimum flows of 10 kcfs between January 1-March 31 and 30 kcfs between
April-December 31. CBFWA also advocated daily average flows of 140 kcfs at Priest Rapids
between April 1 and June 15 and at Ice Harbor Dams between April 16 and June 15. Blumm,
Parity V, supra note 8, at 708 (table).
105.

See, e.g., 6 1991 RECOMMENDATIONS,, supra note 103, at 1437-39.

106. Most biologists believe that juvenile salmon survival is related to the
velocity of river flows. See generally THE BIOLOGICAL AND TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
FLOW PROPOSAL OF THE COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE AUTHORITY 8-30 (citing
numerous scientific studies and academic articles), attached as appendix to Comments
of Northwest Environmental Defense Center (1991), reprinted in 3 1991
RECOMMENDATIONS,, supra note 103, at 582. A consensus exists among the Pacific
Northwest's fish and wildlife agencies and tribes that the Council should adopt a
juvenile travel time objective. The recommendation for travel time objectives
submitted by the Idaho Department of Fish and Game (IDFG) is representative of
that view. IDFG recommended that the Council:
Establish[] a biological objective of decreasing fish travel time
from the point of origin to below Bonneville Dam to as near the
pre-dam condition as practicable. This biological objective is
measured by the physical parameter of water particle travel time,
which is directly related to fish travel time.
6 1991 RECOMMENDATIONS,, supra note 103, at 1437 (Text of Proposed Program Amendment).
For a non-scientific overview of the importance of smolt travel-time objectives, see John
Ogan, The Need for a Smolt Travel Time Objective in the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program to
Protect and Restore the Northwest's Imperiled Salmon Runs, 21 ENVTL. L. 673 (1994).
107. BPA urged the Council to retain a 1.5 maf Water Budget for the Snake and a 3.45
maf Water Budget for the lower Columbia. 5 1991 RECOMMENDATIONS,, supra note 103, at 1187,
1189. Interestingly, BPA admitted that it did not support even these modest flow targets. BPA
acknowledged that its Snake River Water Budget recommendation would achieve a minimum
flow of 50 kcfs for 46 days of the April 15-June 15 migration period, with "pulses" to achieve
flows of 85-100 kcfs on "as many of the 46 days as possible." Id. at 1271. The Pacific Northwest
Utilities Conference Committee (PNUCC) recommended even less, adoption of Water Budgets
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In phase two of the 1991 amendments,108 the Council improved flows in
the mainstem Columbia and on the Snake for the first time since the
adoption of the Program nearly a decade before. The Council called upon
FCRPS operators to provide, as an "immediate action," a minimum monthly
average flow equivalent of 85 kcfs at Lower Granite Dam between mid-April
and mid-June109 and to achieve a "low flow target" of 200 kcfs on the lower
Columbia.110 The adoption of even these status quo flow targets was not
reassuring, however, because phases one and two did not include specific
measures guaranteed to achieve them.111 Moreover, the Council postponed
consideration of long-term biological objectives, escapement goals, and run
rebuilding schedules until phase three.112

of 1.2-1.5 maf for the Snake and 3.45 maf for the mid-Columbia. 4 1991 RECOMMENDATIONS,,
supra note 103, at 793-95.
108. The Council completed phase one of the 1991 amendments on
September 10, 1991. The phase two amendments were adopted on December 11,
1991. See 57 FED. REG. 3,077 (1992).
109. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, AMENDMENTS TO THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND
WILDLIFE PROGRAM (PHASE TWO) 34 (1992) (hereinafter PHASE TWO AMENDMENTS). A "flow equivalent" is
"the flow level required to achieve the same particle travel time as 85,000 cfs at average normal pool
elevations at all projects." Id. at 34 n.9. To achieve the desired minimum monthly flow equivalent on
the lower Snake, the Council asked the Corps to lower the four mainstem Snake River dams to "near
minimum operating pools," which would cause the release of 900,000 acre-feet from Dworshak Dam
for fish flows in low water years; shifted flood control storage space away from Snake basin reservoirs;
requested use of uncontracted storage water at several Bureau of Reclamation reservoirs and at
Idaho Power Company's Brownlee project to enhance fish flows; and called for efficiency
improvements, marketing, conservation, option-leasing, and storage buy-backs that would produce
excess water to be made available for juvenile migration. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 2,
at 690-91. To accomplish the "low flow target" on the lower Columbia, the Council called for lowering
John Day reservoir to minimum operating pool during the summer, id. at 39; removed a "flow cap" on
the mid-Columbia, id. at 42; and asked BPA to release an unspecified amount of water from its nontreaty storage allocation, so that studies of greater summer flows on the lower Columbia could be
performed, id. at 43.
110.

PHASE TWO AMENDMENTS, supra note 109, at 34.

111. See Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 2, at 692 (noting that
provisions for summer flows depend on cooperation by actions by the Bureau and
Idaho Power Company that may be considered "uncertain propositions").
112. See Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 2, at 693-94 (citing PHASE TWO
AMENDMENTS, supra note 109). The Council did ask the Corps to study the impacts of drawing
down reservoirs and to begin planning to implement them. PHASE TWO AMENDMENTS, supra note
109, at 43-48. The Council also emphasized continued mechanical bypass installation, harvest
management, id. at 63, and predator control measures. Id. at 27. Earlier in 1991 the Council
requested certain high priority habitat projects; a program to insert screens in water diversion
canals; and that measures to protect wild salmon from hatchery stocks proceed. NORTHWEST
356

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

Phase three incorporated the first two phases of the 1991 amendments and was
adopted by the Council as its "Strategy for Salmon" in September 1992.113 The Strategy
did not adopt the smolt travel time objectives advocated by the fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes,114 and it did not alter the lower Columbia and lower Snake flow
levels to those levels decided upon during phase one.115 The Strategy did include
numerous measures designed to improve juvenile salmon passage at federal and
privately owned hydroelectric projects throughout the Basin,116 called for various
measures to reduce predation of juvenile salmon117 and improve adult passage at
federal and non-federal dams,118 recommended that fishery regulators effectively

POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, AMENDMENTS TO THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM
(PHASE I) (1991) (hereinafter PHASE ONE AMENDMENTS).
113. COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH
Fed. Reg. 56,935 (1992).

AND

WILDLIFE PROGRAM, FINAL AMENDMENTS, 57

114. The Council adopted a goal of doubling the basin's salmon from 2.5 million fish
returning to the mouth of the Columbia each year to 5 million fish "with no appreciable risk to the
biological diversity of fish populations." 2 NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, STRATEGY FOR
SALMON 1-2 (1992) [hereinafter STRATEGY FOR SALMON]. The Council also announced that it would
seek to achieve "rebuilding targets" for naturally spawning Snake River salmon, and to apply six
principles to the evaluation of planning activities. Id. at 20. These principles include: (1) giving
priority to rebuilding weak, upriver populations; (2) avoiding appreciable risk to biological
diversity among or within fish populations; (3) approaching habitat and production activities from
a total-watershed perspective; (4) fulfilling obligations under Indian treaties and providing fish for
harvesters; (5) engaging in activities that are designed as experiments to increase understanding
of salmon, and (6) avoiding hatchery construction unless existing hatcheries cannot meet fishery
resource needs or a new hatchery would better achieve Program objectives. Id. at 18-19.
115.

See STRATEGY FOR SALMON, supra note 114, at 2.

116. The specific measures include studying and installing screens and other
turbine bypass systems. The Council called for turbine screen installation to be
completed at Lower Monumental Dam by march 1992, Ice Harbor Dam by March
1996, and The Dalles Dam by March 1998, and also requested that the Corps spill
sufficient water over the tops of those dams to aid juvenile migration in the interim.
The Council also asked the Corps to design and test extended-length turbine screens
at McNary Dam by March 1995; Lower Granite Dam by March 1996; Little Goose Dam
by March 1996; John Day Dam by March 1998; and The Dalles Dam by march 1998,
and to immediately commence improvements to the both powerhouses at
Bonneville Dam. The Council asked Eugene Water and Electric Board to improve the
screening and bypass systems at its Leaburg Canal and Walterville Canal projects
and requesting testing, evaluation, and installation of appropriate screening and
bypass systems at the public utility district dams: Wells Dam, Rocky Reach Dam,
Rock Island Dam, Wanapum Dam, and Priest Rapids Dam. STRATEGY FOR SALMON, supra
114, at 36-38.
117.

Id. at 38-39.

118.

Id. at 41-43.
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monitor and control salmon harvests,119 and required actions to improve habitat
enhancement and mitigation, weakened wild stock populations, and hatchery
operations.120 However, the Council never attempted to explain its reasons for failing
to adopt the recommendations of the region's fish and wildlife agencies and tribes.121
V.

Northwest Resource Information Center v. Northwest Power
Planning Council: The Ninth Circuit Rejects the Strategy for Salmon
A.

The Arguments

Few parties interested in the management of the Columbia River system
found the Strategy for Salmon satisfactory. Consequently, in February 1993,
Northwest Resource Information Center (NRIC),122 the Yakama Indian Nation,123 and
a group of BPA industrial customers petitioned the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit for review of the 1991-92 Program amendments.124
NRIC's principal concern with the Strategy was that it did not
guarantee adequate flows.125 Accordingly, NRIC argued that the Strategy was
invalid because the Council violated the Northwest Power Act by (1) failing

119.

Id. at 45-51.

120. Id. at 53-78. Among the specific steps the Council requested were studies
to determine the impacts of hatchery production on wild spawning salmon
populations. Id. at 63.
121. See STRATEGY FOR SALMON, supra note 114, at 8-9, 15 (noting "intense debate" over
"relationship of increased flows to fish survival"), 17-22 (establishing "Program Framework and
Goal" without discussion or mention of fishery coalition recommendations), 23-26 (discussing
mitigation measures without mention of fishery coalition recommendations).
122. NRIC, the brainchild of Idaho consultant Ed Chaney, has consistently maintained
that changes in the dams and reservoirs are needed to restore wild salmon to the region.
Hathorn, supra note 10, at 16 (quoting Ed Chaney as criticizing barge and truck transportation of
juvenile salmon in the Basin and harvest reductions as tools to restore the runs: "Once they stop
fishing, you can't blame them. Then you figure it has to be something else. It doesn't take a rocket
scientist to figure out what that something else is.").
123. After the tribal council agreed to change the spelling of the tribes' name to its original
form, Congress recognized the change of the Yakima Indian Nation's name to "Yakama" in the
Yakima River Basin Water Enhancement Project Act of 1994, Publ. L. No. 103-434, Tit. XII, § 1204(g),
108 Stat. 4526, 4557. The name change does not affect the city, river, or ski rack of the same name.
124. NRIC and the Yakama Indian Nation filed petitions for review of the Council's phases
one and two rules on March 27, 1992. Briefing on these petitions for review were stayed until after
the Council issued its phase three amendments, and ultimately the petitions were consolidated
with those challenging the Council's adoption of the entire Strategy for Salmon.
125. See Adam Berger, An Insider's Perspective on Northwest Resource Info Center v. Northwest
Power Planning Council, 25 ENVTL. L. 369, 372-73 (1995) [hereinafter An Insider's Perspective].
358

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

to establish biological objectives for the operation of FCRPS and for
provision of instream flows;126 (2) failing to adopt flow targets deemed
beneficial by fish and wildlife agencies, tribes, and its own staff and instead
instituting measures that would not ensure the attainment of the adopted
flow targets;127 (3) rejecting fish and wildlife agency and tribal
recommendations without adequate written explanation and failing to give
the "due weight" to those recommendations required by the Act;128 and (4)
improperly subjecting the biological opinions of the fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes to a standard of proof higher than "best available
scientific knowledge."129
The Yakama Indian Nation shared NRIC's belief that the Council
established flows on the lower Columbia and lower Snake at levels too low
to protect migrating smolts. However, the Yakamas' motivation for
participating in the process of formulating the Program, and its reason for
contesting the Strategy for Salmon, lay in its obligation to protect its treaty
rights to harvest Snake River chinook.130 Thus, the Yakamas' principal
objections to the 1991-92 amendments centered around the Council's
failure to adopt measures likely to restore those runs to stable sizes. The
Yakamas were concerned that the 1991-92 amendments did not include
measures designed to assess progress toward harvestable wild runs and
argued forcefully that the Council had not adequately deferred to the
scientific expertise of the region's state and tribal fish and wildlife managers.
The Direct Service Industries (DSIs),131 as large-scale purchasers of
federal hydropower, believed that the Council had adopted
recommendations that would dramatically increase power costs while
offering very little benefit for salmon. Thus, while agreeing with NRIC and
the Yakamas that the Council had not adequately explained the basis for its

126. Brief for Northwest Resource Information Center, Inc. at 30-31, 39-42,
Northwest Resource Info. Center, Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F3d
1371 (9th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-70190, 70064) (Sept. 10, 1993) (NRIC Brief) (relying on
16 U.S.C. § 839(h)(2)(B), (6)(E)(ii)).
127.

Id. at 31-32, 43-47.

128.

Id. at 32, 47.

129.

Id. at 33-34, 48.

130. Brief for Petitioner Yakama Indian Nation, at 7-42, -45. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d
1371 (9th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-70191-92, -70055) (Sept. 10, 1993) (Yakama Brief).
131. The DSIs are aluminum and other electro-process industries, including one pulp
and paper plant, many of which were drawn to the Pacific Northwest during the 1940s and
1950s by an abundance of low-cost federal hydroelectric power. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND
INSULAR AFFAIRS, H.R. Rep. No. 976, pt. II, 96th Cong., 2d sess. 27, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6023, 6025. There are fifteen such industries operating 51 plants in the region. They account for
approximately one-third of BPA's energy sales. Id. at 27-28.
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adoption of the measures contained in the Strategy for Salmon,132 the DSIs
complained that the Council improperly had failed to compare the
biological benefit of each adopted measure to its expected cost in terms of
power losses and increases in BPA power rates.133
The Council's response to the petitions for review rested on a claim
that its decisions were, for all practical purposes, beyond judicial scrutiny.134
The Council also argued that the Northwest Power Act did not obligate it to
provide any more of a written explanation of its decisions regarding
particular recommendations than it had.135 Thus, the arguments of all of the
parties revolved around two basic questions: (1) which regional interests or
parties determine the scientific soundness of proposed salmon mitigation
and restoration measures? and (2) to what extent must the Council explain
publicly the reasons for its refusal to adopt such proposals?
B.

The Ninth Circuit's Decision

On September 9, 1994, the Ninth Circuit granted review and remanded the
Strategy for Salmon to the Council for reconsideration.136 The court did not
determine the measures that the Council should have included in the Strategy for
Salmon. Instead, the court held that the Council (1) improperly declined to explain
its reasons for failing to adopt fish and wildlife agency and tribal
recommendations,137 and (2) unlawfully omitted biological objectives from the 1991-

132. Brief for Petitioners Aluminum Co. of America, Columbia Aluminum Corp.,
Columbia Falls Aluminum Co., Elf Atachem North America, Inc., Intalco Aluminum Co.,
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., Northwest Aluminum Co., Oregon Metallurgical Corp.,
Reynolds Metals Co., and Vanalco, Inc., at 11-12, 22-26, Pacific Northwest Generating
Cooperative v. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Council, 35 F3d
1371 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-70070) (Sept. 10, 1993) (DSI Brief).
133. DSI Brief, supra note 132, at 11, 12-20l; Reply Brief of DSIs, at 7-11, Pacific
Northwest Generating Cooperative v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F3d
1371 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-70070) (Mar. 16, 1994).
134. See Brief for Respondent Northwest Power Planning Council, at 20-22, Northwest
Resource Info. Center, Inc. et al. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F3d 1371 (9th Cir.
1994) (Nos. 92-70190, 92-70064) (Council Brief) (asserting that Strategy cannot be judicially
reviewed for compliance with 16 U.S.C. § 839(h)(6) because the statutory section "set[s] the
agenda but does not dictate the substance of measures" that must be included in Program
and that Congress intended for court to review only whether Council "considered" the
measures specific in that statutory section and arguing that court should not review Strategy
because issues are too "factually complex").
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Id. at 63.

136.

Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1395.

137.

Id. at 1386-89.
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92 amendments.138 While important as mandatory constraints on the Council's
procedure for developing future Program amendments, these two rulings were not
the only noteworthy findings of the court. The court also provided the Council with a
detailed explanation of its obligations under the Fish and Wildlife Program
provisions of the Northwest Power Act, including: (1) the Council must afford
significant deference to the expertise and mission of state and tribal fish and wildlife
agencies, and (2) the Council is not obligated to compare, before including a
recommended measure in the Program, its biological benefits to the costs it
imposes on the power system.139 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit determined that each
of the Program criteria contained in section 4(h)(6) of the Act140 are mandatory and
function as judicially-enforceable constraints on the Council's discretion.141 The
judges also provided the Council and the public with its interpretation of each of
those criteria.142 Each of these findings strongly reinforced Congress' intent that the
Northwest Power Act elevate fish and wildlife considerations in regional river
planning. They also substantially increased the likelihood that the Council would
take more aggressive action to restore the runs.143
This subsection will first provide an overview of the Northwest Power Act's fish
and wildlife provisions.144 The following subsection will then explain the court's
resolution of (1) the Council's argument that it was not obligated to afford more
than nominal deference to state fish and wildlife agencies and tribes, and (2) the
DSIs' claim that no Program measure can be adopted unless the benefit it produces
for fish and wildlife is likely to outweigh the costs it imposes on the power system.145
Finally, the subsection summarizes the court's interpretation of each of the Act's
mandatory Program criteria.146
1.

The Northwest Power Act's Fish and Wildlife Provisions

The Northwest Power Act is an unprecedented law. Congress' primary reason
for enacting it was a desire to avoid then-predicted power shortages in the region.147

138.

Id. at 1389.

139. Id. at 1394-95. However, the Council can reject a recommendation on the
ground that it is inconsistent with the Act's mandate to ensure an economical and
reliable power system. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(h)(5), (7).
140.

16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6).

141.

Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1389.

142.

Id. at 1390-93.

143. See infra notes 354-419 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Council's response to the Ninth Circuit's decision.
144.

See infra notes 147-168 and accompanying text.

145.

See infra notes 194-200, 239-241 and accompanying text.

146.

See infra notes 208-237 and accompanying text.

147.

Devine, supra note 38, at 83.
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However, Congress also wanted to return healthy and harvestable salmon fisheries
to the Pacific Northwest. Previous legislative efforts to assure the conservation of the
region's salmon populations were not successful, in part because they did not afford
fish and wildlife protection and enhancement significant priority in the management
of the FCRPS.148 Congress therefore specified that one purpose of the Northwest
Power Act is to ensure the "protect[ion], mitigat[ion] and enhance[ment] [of] fish
and wildlife" native to the Columbia River Basin.149 To accomplish this purpose,
Congress directed the Council to create and implement the Program. Congress
specified that the Program's aim should be to "protect, mitigate, and enhance" the
Basin's fish and wildlife "to the extent affected by the development and operation" of
the FCRPS and other hydroelectric projects in the region.150 The Program provisions
of the Act sharply limit the Council's discretion in designing the Program by
including a number of procedural and substantive constraints.151
Five basic principles form the statutory boundaries of the Council's freedom in
developing the Program. First, protection and enhancement of fish and wildlife is to be
afforded management consideration equivalent to that given power production and
other economic uses of the Columbia River system. This provision, also known as the

148. Before the Northwest Power Act was created, the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act
(FWCA) was the principal federal law protecting fish and wildlife in the region not listed as
endangered or threatened under the ESA, FWCA aimed to assure "equal consideration" of wildlife
and "other features" of water-resource development programs, 16 U.S.C. § 661. However, the
consultation process created by FWCA to achieve this objective failed for a number of reasons. While
Congress intended that fish and wildlife agency recommendations for mitigation be given "full
consideration," water project managers were given the discretion to reject mitigation measures if
they determined that they did not maximize "overall project benefits." 16 U.S.C. § 662(b). See Blumm,
Parity II, supra note 15, at 110-11. Second, because the extent of water project impacts on fish and
wildlife frequently could not be determined until after operation of the project commenced, water
project managers were able to reject proposed mitigation measures on grounds that they were not
tied to losses proven at the time the project was approved. Id. A third reason for FWCA's failure was
that the mitigation measures most often adopted were hatcheries concentrated in the lower
Columbia Basin, thus depriving upriver fishers, recreationalists, and native Americans the benefits of
restored salmon runs. Id. Finally, FWCA does not allow citizens to judicially enforce any particular
substantive level of wildlife protection. See Enos v. Marsh, 616 F. Supp. 32, 64 (D. Haw. 1984), aff'd 769
F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985); Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 356 (8th Cir. 1972).
For a general overview of FWCA's ineffectiveness, see MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW 181-95 (1983).
149.

16 U.S.C. § 839(6).

150.

16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A).

151. 16 U.S.C. § 839B(d)-(f). See Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific
Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1367 (9th
Cir. 1986) ("The preparation and consideration of the [1983 Northwest Conservation
and Electric Power] [P]lan is a matter within Council authority over which the Act
accords the Council considerable flexibility."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 (1987).
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equitable treatment mandate, was added to the regional power bill by the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce after fishery advocates complained to thenchairman John Dingell that federal managers of the FCRPS "ignored or treated with
disdain" their concerns.152 The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the equitable treatment
mandate constitutes a judicially enforceable restraint on the Council's discretion to
adopt or reject the policies, plans and priorities contained in the Program.153
Second, the Act requires the Council to set appropriate objectives by
which the success or failure of the Program can be measured.154 Congress
intended that these biological objectives remedy the tendency of
hydropower system managers to focus only on power production and other
economic goals.155 Thus, the Council must determine which species must be
protected, recovered, or restored and then incorporate into the Program
appropriate biological methods by which such goals will be achieved.156 The
biological objectives in turn help hydrosystem managers to focus on the
impacts of power production on fish and wildlife. The Council must
establish the Program's biological objectives with the guidance of the
region's fish and wildlife agencies and tribes.157
The Act's public participation requirements constitute the third
significant limit to the Council's authority. The Council is to obtain the
benefits of the fish and wildlife agencies' and tribes' biological expertise by

152. H.R. Rep. No. 976, Pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 46 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5989.
153. See Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984). Some commentators have argued that the
equitable treatment mandate obligates the Council and federal dam operators only to consider
hydropower production impacts on fish and wildlife. Michael B. Early & Egil Krogh, Balancing Power
Costs and Fisheries Values Under the Northwest Power Act, 13 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 281, 311 (1990) (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 976, Pt. II, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6023). Under
this view, the clause does not require any increased protection of the region's salmon runs if such
an effort would cause losses of power production, increases in BPA's costs, or higher regional
electricity rates. Id. at 295. Aside from the Ninth Circuit's apparent disagreement with this view,
see infra note 264, this interpretation of the Act's other fish and wildlife provisions. For example,
Congress explicitly contemplated that changes in dam operations would be necessary. See 16
U.S.C. § 839(h)(2)(B). Moreover, the Act specifies that the Program must require flows sufficient to
allow "improve[d] production, migration and survival" of salmon. 16 U.S.C. § 839(h)(6)(E)(ii).
154. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(2)(B) (directing the Council to establish "objectives for
the development and operation of [hydroelectric] project on the Columbia River and its
tributaries in a manner designed to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife").
155. See, e.g., 126 Cong. Rec. 29,808 (Nov. 17, 1980) (statement of Rep. Dingell)
("[The biological objective requirement] is clearly intended that no longer will fish
and wildlife be given a secondary status by [BPA] or other federal agencies.").
156.

16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(2)(B).

157.

Id.
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requesting recommendations for Program measures, including appropriate
biological objectives.158 In addition to complying with Congress' command
that interested parties be given a voice in the creation and modification of
the Program, the Council must explain in writing its reasons for failing to
adopt those recommendations not incorporated into the Program.159
Fourth, the Council is forbidden to act as a scientific free agent. All
recommendations accompanied by scientific justification that are submitted by fish
and wildlife agencies or tribes must be presumed to be scientifically meritorious.160
In the event that fish and wildlife agency or tribal recommendations conflict with
those submitted by other interested parties, the Council must resolve the
differences by giving "due weight" to the "expertise" of the fish and wildlife agencies
and tribes, as well as to their "legal rights and responsibilities."161 The Northwest
Power Act permits the Council to reject recommendations submitted by fish and
wildlife agencies and tribes only if they are economically or technically infeasible.
The Council may not reject such recommendations on grounds that "it knows more
biology."162 Indeed, the Act specifies the particular types of technical or economic
infeasibility adequate to support rejection of fish and wildlife agency or tribal
recommendations. Such recommendations may be rejected only if: (1) they are
inconsistent with the Act's goal of ensuring an "adequate and economical power
supply" for the region; (2) they would be "less effective" than other fish and wildlife
protection, mitigation, and enhancement measures to be included in the Program;
or (3) they will not complement the existing or future structure of the region's fish
and wildlife management system, are not supported by the "best available scientific
knowledge," or would achieve the same biological objectives as other measures but
at a higher cost.163
The fifth constraint on the Council's discretion exists in Congress' desire to
achieve biological objectives through changes in dam operations.164 In addition to
requiring the Program to mandate flows sufficient to recover the region's salmon
runs,165 the Act commands that the Program be based on the "best available

158.

Id.

159.

16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7).

160.

Id.

161.

Id.

162.

Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 737.

163.

16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7).

164. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(h)(1)(A), (h)(2)(B), (h)(5), (h)(6)(E)(ii); Blumm, Parity
V, supra note 8, at 667.
165. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(ii). Congress specified that the Program must establish
adequate flows because the legislators were convinced that the absence of this essential
characteristic of salmon habitat has been the main cause of the salmon's decline. See H.R. REP.
NO. 976, supra note 152, at 46 (quoting GAO STUDY, supra note 10) ("The river no longer has the
strong, swift current needed to carry the smolts rapidly downstream and out to sea. It now
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scientific knowledge."166 The Council must, as is the case with biological objectives,
primarily rely on the region's fish and wildlife agencies and tribes for a
determination whether Program measures meet this standard.167 Moreover,
Congress intended that the Council build the Program upon a foundation of today's
scientific knowledge, not on a concern that biologists may change their minds in the
future. The Council must act without waiting for certainty and may not delay efforts
to restore the wild runs while endless study proceeds. The Act therefore effectively
forbids the Council from imposing upon fish and wildlife advocates the burden of
proving that the region's dams cause harm to salmon or that appropriate
modifications to them will produce ecological benefits for the region.168
2.

The Ninth Circuit's Interpretations of the Northwest
Power Act
a.

The Council Must Provide a Written Explanation of
its Decision to Reject Program Recommendations

Section 4(h)(7) of the Northwest Power Act provides:
[i]f the Council does not adopt any recommendation of the fish and
wildlife agencies and tribes as part of the program or any other
recommendation, it shall explain in writing, as part of the program,
the basis for its finding that the adoption of such recommendation

takes young fish more than twice as long to migrate downstream as it did before the dams
were built. . . . It is the cumulative effects of hydro facilities which is so destructive. . . . River
waste is released from upstream reservoirs when needed to best serve flood control, power
production, and irrigation purposes. This may or may not provide enough water at the right
time to aid the downstream migration of young salmon and steelhead."); 126 CONG. REC.
28,814 (Nov. 17, 1980) (letter from U.S. Comptroller General) (recommending that Power Act
bill "establish minimum stream flows on the main-stream Columbia River system adequate to
protect and enhance the anadromous salmon and steelhead fisheries"); id. at 29,814
(statement of Rep. Dingell) (expressing view that Congress expected Council to adopt
"increased flows at opportune times to enhance fish migration").
166. 16 U.S.C. § 830b(h)(6)(B). See H.R. REP. NO. 976, supra note 152 ("The quality or quantity
of the data should not serve as a basis for turning down any recommendation.") See Blumm, Parity V,
supra note 8, at 667-68 n.47 (Northwest Power Act essentially places Council in circumscribed role as
a regional biological policy analyst) (citing Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Adaptive Management: Learning
from the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 435 (1986)).
167. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(h)(5), requiring Council to develop Program, "on the basis of,
inter alia, consultation with the [fish and wildlife] agencies [and] tribes"); 839b(h)(6)(B)
(Program must be "based on, and supported by, the best available scientific knowledge").
168. See Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 667-68 n.46; Blumm, Hydropower vs.
Salmon, supra note 11, at 298.
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would be (A) inconsistent with paragraph (5) of this subsection; (B)
inconsistent with paragraph (6) of this subsection; or (C) less effective
than the adopted recommendations for the protection, mitigation,
and enhancement of fish and wildlife.169
In Northwest Resource Information Center the Ninth Circuit ruled, unsurprisingly, that this
clear language requires the Council to explain in writing its reasons for rejecting
Program recommendations.170 The court also confirmed that the written justification
must be supported by specific constraints contained in section 4(h)(7) of the Act
and that the explanation must be made a part of the Program itself.171
The Council acknowledged that it had failed to include in the Strategy
for Salmon itself a response to recommendations not incorporated into the
Program. However, the Council argued that it complied with the Act's
written explanation requirement by providing a separate official response to
comments during the phase one and two rulemakings. The Council, in effect,
urged the court to find that those responses applied to comments received
during phase three.172 The Ninth Circuit did not find the Council's position
persuasive because the Council had previously announced its intent that
phase three supersede phases one and two. The judges thought the
Council's argument "somewhat analogous to a court's reference to a judicial
decision it previously vacated."173 Accordingly, the court noted that its
agreement with the Council on this point would cause "the validity and
authoritativeness of final decisions" to be undermined.174 Alternatively, the
Council maintained that its official response to the comments received
during phase three satisfied the Act's explanation requirement. The court
rejected this argument because the Council had not based its written
responses on the factors allowable under section 4(h)(7).175
The Ninth Circuit's ruling that the Council failed to comply with the Act's
written explanation requirement is significant for two reasons. First, it confirms
Congress' intent that the public be given an opportunity to participate in the
creation and evolution of the Program. Future Program amendments will also be
subject to effective judicial review. The Council will be less able to insulate itself
from popular pressure to restore the salmon runs. Consequently, Council decisions
may more clearly reflect the importance Congress assigned to protection and
enhancement of the Columbia River Basin's fish and wildlife. In the past the Council
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169.

16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7).

170.

Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1384-85.

171.

Id.

172.

Id. at 1385.

173.

Id.

174.

Id. at 1385-86.

175.

Id. at 1386.
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has often failed to give appropriate weight to this aspect of its mandate, preferring
instead to consider the economic concerns of BPA, utilities, and industrial energy
consumers the most significant restraints on its power.176 The Council may also take
more care to assure that its actions are supported by the statutory constraints on its
authority, since its actions will be more easily scrutinized by the public and the
region's fish and wildlife managers.
The second benefit of the court's ruling will be its reinforcement of the
Act's deference principle. The court apparently found the Council's failure to
explain in writing its reasons for rejecting fish and wildlife agency and tribal
recommendations more troubling than the Council's omission of
appropriate responses to other recommendations.177 The public can expect
less second-guessing of the scientific foundations supporting fish and
wildlife agency recommendations if the Council heeds the Ninth Circuit's
warning on this point in the future. Moreover, the Council will face increased
pressure to provide scientifically and legally adequate explanations for its
decisions. As a result, the Council will find it difficult to continue its practice
of summarily announcing that recommendations beneficial to salmon are
not supported by "good science" or enough information.178
b.

Biological Objectives

The Northwest Power Act contains several references to "biological
objectives."179 However, Congress failed to explain how the Council should
proceed to establish them or to define the term.180 In Northwest Resource
Information Center the Ninth Circuit confirmed that Congress nevertheless

176.

Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 711-12.

177. Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1386 ("Th[e] [written explanation]
mandate is particularly forceful with respect to the recommendations of those to
whom the statute gives deference—fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes.").
178. The Council often rejected fish and wildlife agency and tribal
recommendations during the first decade of the Program without providing reasons
consistent with the Act's equitable treatment mandate or deference principle. See
supra notes 79, 86, 112-119 and accompanying text.
179. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(2)(B) ("The Council shall request…recommendations
for…establishing objectives for the development and operation of such [hydroelectric] projects…in
a manner designed to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife."); 839b(h)(6)(C) ("The Council
shall include in the Program measures which it determines…will… utilize, where equally effective
alternative measures of achieving the same sound biological objective exist, the alternative with the
minimum economic cost."); 839B(h)(6)(E)(ii) ("The Council shall include in the Program measures
which it determines…will…in the case of anadromous fish…provide flows of sufficient quality and
quantity between such [hydroelectric] facilities to improve production, migration, and survival of
such fish as necessary to meet sound biological objectives.")
180.

See Blumm, Parity II, supra note 15, at 131.
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intended that clear benchmarks by which the Program's success could be
measured should guide the Council's administrative discretion.181 The court
also limited the Council's ability to fashion such measurement tools by
requiring the Council to give "due weight" to fish and wildlife agency and
tribal opinions as to appropriate biological objectives.182 Moreover, the
judges explained that the Act requires biological objectives to be "specific"
and "discrete."183 Although the court did not find that the Council failed to
adhere to these principles, the court instructed the Council to assure,
on remand, that the Strategy for Salmon incorporated adequate
biological objectives.184
The genesis of the dispute over this issue was the Council's refusal to
establish smolt travel-time objectives. A number of state fish and wildlife agencies
and tribes had unsuccessfully urged the Council adopt them as the Program's
primary tool of measuring salmon survival.185 NRIC and the Yakamas argued that
their omission from the Program would render it impossible to evaluate the success
of flow requirements aimed at achieving the ultimate goal of increased juvenile
survival.186 The Council maintained that the Strategy for Salmon's goal of doubled
salmon populations, rebuilding targets and performance standards were adequate

181.

Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1392.

182.

Id.

183.

Id.

184.

Id.

185.

See supra notes 106-107, 114 and accompanying text.

186. Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1391; Berger, An Insider's Perspective, supra note
125, at 375. Some commentators oppose travel-time objectives as an ineffective and costly
burden on the hydropower system. See, e.g., James L. Buchal, some Fallacies About Salmon Restoration,
25 ENVTL. L. 375, 380 (1995) (discussing "gross fallacies" in argument that salmon survival will
increase with greater instream flows; "[T]he correlation between flow and travel time is weak,
nonexistent for some stocks, a little stronger for others. But the correlation is nowhere near one to
one."); Harvey Spigal, The Implications of Salmon Recovery for the Bonneville Power Administration and the
Region, 25 ENVTL. L. 407, 408-09 (1995) ("[W]e do not know whether there is a causal relationship
between the types of measures which we have been taking and proposes to take, [including smolt
travel-time objectives,] and the survival and recovery of these species…. [A]lchemy cannot turn
lead into gold, and the law cannot turn politics into science."); Al Wright, Should the Courts Run the
River?, 25 ENVTL. L. 403, 405 (1995)) ("[T]he courts have apparently concluded, and a lot of the
socially correct rhetoric is, that we do not need a balanced, comprehensive fishery management
plan. Apparently all we need is an adequate water particle travel time…. [I]f we follow that
particular quest, I urge that there be at least consideration to the costs of losing a 12,000
megawatt firm hydrosystem…."). Notwithstanding the skepticism of these utility and industrial
power consumer representatives, there is substantial reason to believe that smolt travel-time
objectives are highly likely to provide a reliable device for assuring increased juvenile survival. See
generally Ogan, supra note 106.
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biological objectives.187 The court did not find the Council's position persuasive,
explaining that the Council's expressed desire that the Strategy for Salmon result in
doubled salmon populations was no more than a "policy statement" and not a
"sound," "specific," and 'discrete" biological objective.188 The judges pointed out that
the Council failed to establish a deadline by which the salmon populations were to
reach this hoped-for threshold. The same flaw contaminated the Strategy for
Salmon's rebuilding targets and performance standards. All three "framework
elements" of the Program were therefore deemed insufficient as measuring tools
because the Council did not specify a way to determine the Strategy for Salmon's
progress in achieving them.189
The significance of the Ninth Circuit's finding that the Strategy for Salmon
may not have incorporated appropriate biological objectives lies in the central
importance of these devices to the success of the Program. Without biological
objectives, the public cannot know the return on its investment in fish and wildlife
restoration.190 But biological objectives provide more than measurement
capability.191 They also facilitate application of the Act's command that fish and
wildlife needs be given more consideration than the costs of fulfilling them.192
Congress specified that the Council must first distinguish between Program
recommendations on the basis of their effectiveness at achieving the Act's fish and
wildlife mitigation, protection, and enhancement criteria. The costs of the
recommendations are properly taken into account only after the Council determines
that they are equally likely to achieve the same fish and wildlife-related objectives.193
Biological objectives must exist in order for this analytical process to take place.

187.

Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1392.

188.

Id.

189. Id. The Ninth Circuit also noted the Council's failure to use the
population goals, rebuilding targets, or performance standards as guides in
evaluating Program recommendations submitted during the 1991-92 amendment
process. Accordingly, the court pointedly remarked that the Council may have
intended these devices to serve as substitutes for biological objectives. Id.
190. See Ogan, supra note 106, at 706-11 (explaining necessity of biological
objectives as tools to measure Program success).
191. The measurement function is particularly vital in light of the Act's mandate that the
Program ensure "improved survival of [anadromous] fish at hydroelectric facilities located on the
Columbia river system" and "flows of sufficient quality and quantity between such facilities to
improve production, migration, and survival of [anadromous] fish." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E).
192. See Blumm, Parity II, supra note 15, at 131-39. Section 4(h)(6)(C) implies that the
Council must create a mechanism for determining the effectiveness of Program measures: "The
Council shall include in the Program measures which it determines…will…utilize, where equally
effective alternative means of achieving the same sound biological objective exist, the alternative with the
minimum economic cost." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(C) (emphasis added).
193.

See 16 U.S.C. §839b(h)(6)(C).
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c.

The Council Must Defer to the Expertise of Fish
and Wildlife Agencies and Tribes

All of the parties agreed that fish and wildlife agencies and tribes were
entitled to deference, although the Council asserted that it was obligated to
afford only "minimal" deference.194 NRIC and the Yakamas maintained that
the Council had not adequately deferred to the fishery managers. Although
the court declined to rule on this point because the Council had failed to
provide a written explanation of its decisions,195 the opinion nevertheless
provides guidance on the question of how much deference is due the fish
and wildlife agencies and tribes.196 The court's conclusion is another
important legacy of its decision because it will force the Council to include
in the Program, subject only to the Council's authority to ensure that other
specific requirements of the Act are not violated, fish and wildlife agency
and tribal recommendations for appropriate mitigation measures.
The Ninth Circuit found that the Act's fish and wildlife provisions "bind[], more
than unleash[], the Council's discretion."197 This conclusion followed from the "stark
contrast" between the fish and wildlife provisions and the rest of the Northwest Power
Act.198 In particular, the court's comparison of the Act's fish and wildlife provisions to

194. Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1386, See also id. at 1389 (discussing
Council's argument that 16 U.S.C. § 839b "grants it virtually unfettered discretion in
creating a fish and wildlife program") (emphasis omitted).
195. Id. at 1389. The court did, however, express its "concern" that the Council had not
appropriately deferred to the expertise of the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes. Id. ("This failure of
the Council is disturbing given that it adopted, for the most part, the flows and measures
recommended by power interests and DSIs, despite the overwhelming consensus among agencies
and tribes in favor of significantly higher flows and more scientifically-based biological objectives.").
196.

Id. at 1389-93.

197.

Id. at 1388.

198. Id. at 1387. The court explained that the Act's fish and wildlife provisions "require[]
the Council to develop the [P]rogram from sources outside the Council," and that the Council
"must adopt [P]rogram measures that are consistent with …the protection, mitigation, and
enhancement of fish and wildlife, while assuring the region an adequate, efficient, economical,
and reliable power supply." Id. Accordingly, Congress specified, in section 4 of the Northwest
Power Act, detailed rules governing the Council's responsibility for creating the Program. In
contrast, the power conservation plan requirements contained in section 3 of the Act are
significantly less confining. See Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the Council
has "considerable flexibility" under the Act's power conservation planning provisions), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1059 (1987). In preparing the power conservation plan, the Council is directed only to "set
forth a general scheme for implementing conservation measures and developing resources," and
must give "due consideration" to environmental quality, the limitations of the existing
hydropower system, and conservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife. 16 U.S.C. §
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its power planning requirements proved persuasive. Quoting Congressman Dingell's
admonition that the Council should "not try to become a superfish and wildlife entity,"
the court concluded that "Congress intended that the Council not simply tap this
resource of information and advice, but that it heavily rely upon it."199 Thus, the court
found that the Act "require[s] that a high degree of deference be given to fishery
managers' interpretations of such provisions and their recommendations for
[P]rogram measures."200
d.

Fish and Wildlife Program Criteria
(i)

The Act's Section 4(h)(6) Criteria are
"Mandatory" and "Substantive"

The court rejected the Council's argument that the criteria for the
Program contained in section 4(h)(6) of the Act201 are advisory only, and
declared that the criteria are "mandatory."202 The court thought the matter
was resolved by reference to Congress' choice of the word "shall" in that
statutory section.203 Nevertheless, the court also explained that a
construction of section 4(h)(6) that circumscribes the Council's ability to

839b(e)(2). Congress also required the Council to give priority to alternative energy resource
determined to be "cost effective," and mandated that the power conservation plan include: (1) an
energy conservation program; (2) recommendations for research and development; (2)
recommendations for research and development; (3) a method for determining environmental
costs and benefits; (4) an energy demand forecast; (5) data on the region's energy reserve and
power reliability needs and ways of providing for them at minimum cost; and (6) a method for
calculating any surcharges imposed pursuant to the Act. Id. § 839b(e)(3). The Council must also
incorporate the Program into its power conservation plan. Id. § 839(e)(3)(F).
199. Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1388 (quoting 126 Cong. Rec.
E10,683 (1980). Three paragraphs later, the court gave an additional hint about the
degree of deference due fishery managers and implied that it is substantial indeed:
the court declared that the Act's fish and wildlife provisions "significantly circumscribed
the Council's discretion." Id. at 1389 (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 1388. The court did not limit the applicability of the Act's deference
requirement to Program recommendations. The court also declared that the Council must
defer to fish and wildlife agency and tribal interpretations of the Act's fish and wildlife program
provisions: "We find it inherently reasonable to give agencies and tribes, those charges with the
responsibility of managing our fish and wildlife, a high degree of deference in the creation of a
program and in the interpretation of the Act's fish and wildlife provisions." Id. at 1389.
201.

16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6).

202. Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1389. Standards specified by 16
U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6) are "substantive" criteria that each program measure must meet. Id.
203.

Id.
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evade the Program criteria was consistent with Congress' intent to limit the
Council's discretion in creating the Program.204
The Council's position that the section 4(h)(6) criteria "merely set the agenda but
do not dictate the substance of measures" failed to satisfy the court.205 The court
reiterated that the Northwest Power Act "significantly circumscribe[s] the Council's
discretion with respect to fish and wildlife" and invoked precedent holding other
provisions of section 4(h) "substantive" to conclude that the fish and wildlife program
criteria should be treated similarly.206
(ii)

Interpretation of the Section 4(h)(6) Criteria

The court did not limit its opinion to the procedural questions at the
heart of the case. It also focused on the five specific Program criteria
contained in section 4(h)(6) of the Act, and provided its interpretation of
each. The court's discussion of many of these criteria may be dictum
because the application of only a few of them was contested by the parties.
Nevertheless, the court's interpretation of the Act's detailed Program
mandate will no doubt influence the Council's future actions.207 Moreover,
the court's interpretation will undoubtedly be invoked by the Ninth Circuit
itself should the Program again be challenged in the future.
(a)

Section 4(h)(6)(A)

This provision "requires that measures complement the existing and future
activities of the Federal and the region's state fish and wildlife agencies and
appropriate Indian tribes."208 The court quoted at length from Judge Marsh's ruling
in Idaho Department of Fish & Game and pointed out that that case "involve[d] . . .
what to do about preserving and restoring the salmon [and] urge[d] policy and
operation in a direction away from the status quo towards affirmative action."209
The court also expressed concern that "the Council's rejection of the agencies' and

204. Id. The court also took the opportunity to warn against inclusion in the
Program of measures unaccompanied by specific completion dates and
commitments to meet the Act's specified Program criteria: "[We] construe the
Program as the Council's binding commitment to the timely implementation of all
measures, if they satisfy the substantive criteria" of the Act. Id. at 1389.
205.

Id. at 1389.

206. Id. (citing Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984) (interpreting
"equitable treatment" clause of 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(i)).
207. See infra notes 362-419 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Council's
December 1994 Program amendments, which were issued after the Ninth Circuit's decision.
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Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1390.

209.

Id.
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tribes' consensus as to increased flows and biological objectives does not appear
to square well with those efforts."210 The significance of this portion of the opinion
is easy to overlook, but it underscores Judge Marsh's warning six months earlier
that the courts would not long remain satisfied with the status quo on the river.211
(b)

Section 4(h)(6)(B)

The court pointed out that the "best available scientific knowledge" standard
"ensures action in the promulgation and implementation of a [Program]."212
Importantly, however, the court explained that the Council must defer to the fish and
wildlife agencies' and tribes' view as to what is "best available scientific knowledge."213
The standard does not require the "best available data"; decisions may be based on
"reasonable inferences and predictions" extracted from the "best available scientific
knowledge."214 The court did not rule on the question whether the Strategy for Salmon
was based on the "best available scientific knowledge" because the Council did not
provide the required written explanation of its decisions to reject fish and wildlife
agency and tribal recommendations.215
The court's interpretation of section 4(h)(6)(B) may be the most significant
portion of the opinion. During the first decade of the Program, the Council frequently
rejected recommendations for mitigation measures submitted by fish and wildlife
agencies and Indian tribes. The Council frequently justified these decisions by
professing doubt about the scientific support for such recommendations.216 Requiring
the Council to defer to the scientific expertise of fish and wildlife managers will
foreclose that mechanism for avoiding decisions likely to be unpopular with parties
primarily interested in economic uses of the Columbia River system. The Council may
therefore find itself somewhat less able to continue its traditional cautious approach
to salmon recovery.217

210.

Id.

211.

See Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 850 F. Supp. at 900.

212.

Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1391.

213.

Id.

214.

Id. ("[T]he standard requires only the best available scientific knowledge, not data.").

215.

Id.

216.

See supra notes 60, 72, 103-112 and accompanying text.

217. Indeed, the Council's response to Northwest Resource Information Center
indicates that the Council intends to be more aggressive in leading the region's effort
to restore wild salmon runs. See infra notes 354-419 and accompanying text.
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(c)

Section 4(h)(6)(C)

This standard requires the Council to evaluate alternative Program
measures "for effective[ness] in achieving sound biological objectives."218
The court instructed the Council to determine the extent to which
recommended measures achieve "specific" biological objectives and ordered
the Council to give "due weight" to agency and tribal recommendations as to
what biological objectives to employ.219
(d)

Section 4(h)(6)(D)

This provision makes clear that the Northwest Power Act does not
affect either treaties which guarantee Pacific Northwest Indian tribes the
right to take fish at "accustomed grounds and stations"220 or tribal rights to
adequate water supplies.221 Because the Northwest Power Act does not

218.

Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1391.

219.

Id. at 1392.

220. Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, 1133. Similar language was
included in other treaties protecting tribal fishing rights. See, e.g., Treaty of Point No Point, Jan.
26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933, 934. The treaties protecting tribal fishing rights, known as the "Stevens
Treaties" in honor of Washington territorial Governor and federal Indian Affairs Superintendent
Isaac Stevens, also secured for America 64 million acres lf land. Comment, Empty Victories: Indian
Treaty Fishing Rights in the Pacific Northwest, 10 ENVTL. L. 413, 416-17 (1980). Governor Stevens
negotiated the Treaty of Medicine Creek; the Treaty of Point Elliot, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927;
the Treaty of Point No Point; the Treaty of Neah Bay, Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939; the Treaty with
the Walla Walla, June n9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945; the Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat.
951; the Treaty with the Nez Perce, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957; the Treaty with the Tribes of
Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963; the Treaty with the Quinaielts, July 1, 1855 and Jan.
25, 1856, 12 Stat. 971; and the Treaty with the Flathead, July 16, 1855, 12 Stat. 975. The
Shoshone-Bannock tribe does not have a Stevens Treaty - guaranteed right to a tribal fishery.
However, their treaty hunting rights have been interpreted to include fishing rights. See State v.
Tinne, 94 Idaho 759, 497 P.2d 1386 (1972) (implying fishing right from Article IV of the Treaty of
Fort Bridger, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 1020-21).
221. Under the rule of Winters v. United Sates, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the establishment of an
Indian reservation implies reservation of water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.
Thus, the Winters doctrine protects tribal water rights utilized for agricultural production or
maintenance of fisheries. Id. (enjoining construction of off-reservation dams and reservoirs that
would have deprived the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation of water needed for irrigation); Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (fishery needs may be basis of reserved water right under Winters
doctrine); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.) (reaching similar holding), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). But cf., e.g., Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 866 F. Supp. 520 (D. Wyo.
1994) (tribe is not guaranteed right to hunt or fish on national forest lands by applicable treaties,
notwithstanding Winters doctrine or United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) and Tulee v.
374
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authorize the Council or any federal agency to infringe on the tribes' treaty
fishing rights, the Program must protect such rights.222 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit expressed sympathy with the Yakamas' argument that the
Strategy for Salmon violated section 4(h)(6)(D).
The court found it "reasonable" to conclude, based on the
administrative record before the Council which demonstrated that the
Program would allow the extinction of Snake River fall chinook, that the
Strategy for Salmon "may very well" have violated the Yakama Indian
Nation's treaty-reserved fishing rights.223 There is no reason to assume that
this warning does not also apply to other salmon stocks and other tribes.
This aspect of the Ninth Circuit's opinion is therefore likely to induce the

Washington Dep't of Game, 315 U.S. 681 (1942)). For a good overview and critique of the federal
government's handling of its trust obligations to the treaty tribes, see Mary Christina Wood, Indian
Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471 (1994), and
Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Towards the Native Nations on Environmental
Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administration's Promise and Performance, 25 Envtl. L. 733 (1995).
222. Tribal treaty rights are reserved rights, subject to infringement only if Congress explicitly
abrogates them. See generally Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). Courts are generally extremely reluctant to find that Congress has exercised
its power to negate treaty-guaranteed rights. Id. at 690. Thus, unlike other policy priorities that federal
agencies may balance in an effort to implement Congress' will, tribal treaty rights are property. Unless
purchased by agreement or through subsequent treaty, or extinguished in a "just war," they must be left
undiminished by the United States and its political subdivisions. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 50-58 (1982). Treaty tribes have an "absolute right" to maintain their historic fisheries
in the Columbia River Basin and are entitled to a "fair share" of the fish present in the river system. See
Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969), aff'd as modified sub nom., United States v. Oregon, 529
F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1976). Later judicial decisions have clarified that treaty tribes must be allocated fifty
percent of each fishrun destined for or passing through traditional tribal fishing areas. See United States
v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd 520 F.2d 676 (9th cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom.,
Northwest Steelheaders Council v. United States, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). The Supreme Court upheld this
allocation in Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association. Tribal treaty rights also require
federal, state and local governments to impose "environmental restraints on activities" that may
adversely affect treaty fishing or water rights. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374, 1375, 1381-82,
1389 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, op. replaced, on rehearing en banc, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994
(1985). But see Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Id. 1994) (adopting magistrate's
report that concluded that Stevens treaties do not provide tribes with right to protection of ecosystems).
See Generally Michael C. Blumm, Why Study Pacific Salmon Law?, 22 IDAHO L. REV. 629, 637 n.94 (1986)
(asserting that all appellate judges who have considered the issue on the merits have concluded that an
implied environmental right exists). The Pacific Northwest's treaty tribes estimate that violations of their
fishing rights caused by reductions in harvest quotes entitles them to $4 billion in damages. See Tribes
Declare Ambitious Salmon Recovery Proposal, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK: GREENWIRE, June 19, 1995 (available
on Westlaw, APN-GR Database).
223.

Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.2d at 1392.
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Council to adopt only those Program recommendations not likely to allow
any stocks to slide closer to extinction.224
(e)

Section 4(h)(6)(E)

This provision specifies Program criteria unique to anadromous fish. The
Council must: (i) provide for improved survival of such fish at hydroelectric facilities
located on the Columbia River system; and (ii) provide flows of sufficient quality and
quantity between such facilities to improve production, migration, and survival of
such fish as necessary to meet sound biological objectives.225
The court explained that the criteria in this subsection "accent[] the
importance of the Council strictly complying with the Act's mandates with regard to
fish and wildlife, especially that requiring that a high degree of deference be given to
fishery managers."226 While the court did not decide whether the Council had failed
to afford adequate deference to the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes, it
expressed concern that the Council has been more concerned with avoiding
economic duress than in improving salmon survival: "The record evokes in us. . .a
strong sense of skepticism; without explanation, the Council rejected the consensus
of most fishery managers on the issues of flows and biological objectives in favor of
the recommendations of power interests and DSIs."227
The court declined to address the argument that the Council did not, as the
Act requires, defer to the expertise of fish and wildlife agencies and tribes and
therefore afford a presumption of scientific correctness to their recommendations.
The judges could not do so because the Council's failure to explain its decisions
rendered it impossible to determine how much deference was actually given.228 But
the court made it clear that the Council had provided very weak support for its
decision not to increase fish flows. Rejecting the Council's reliance on NMFS' 1992
biological opinion on FCRPS operations, the court pointed out that NMFS had
warned the Council that the status quo would not sustain the runs.229 The court also
noted that the Council's own staff had concluded that the Strategy for Salmon
would "probably" push low productivity stocks to extinction and stabilize, but not
rebuild, medium productivity stocks.230

224. But see Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994) (treaty
tribe cannot pursue claim for damages based on adverse impacts of FCRPS on salmon runs
under Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803(c), or federal or state common law).
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225.

16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(i), (ii).

226.

Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1392.

227.

Id. at 1392-93.

228.

Id. at 1389.

229.

Id. at 1393.

230.

Id.
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Balancing the Biological Benefit of a Program
Recommendation Against its Cost is Not Required

The court rejected the DSIs' argument that each Program measure
must be subjected to a comparison of its biological benefit to the costs it
imposes on the hydropower system. Because Congress did not intend for
cost considerations to preclude restoration of the basin's salmon runs as
long as the Act's baseline condition of an "adequate, efficient, economical,
and reliable power supply" remains in place, the court found that such
comparisons are not permitted.231 The court's dismissal of the DSIs'
argument on this point eliminates an obstacle often invoked by
commentators as a basis for blocking ecologically beneficial reform of the
Basin's hydropower system.232 This aspect of the Ninth Circuit's decision is
therefore another important legacy of the case.
The court offered a summary of the role of cost calculations in the
adoption of a Program that confirms academic opinion that measures are
acceptable even if they impose substantial costs on the hydropower system.233
We conclude from our study of § 839b(h)(5) and the legislative history
that: (1) Congress did not say the Council should perform a critical
cost-benefit analysis of each measure; (2) a fish and wildlife measure
cannot be rejected solely because it will result in power losses and
economic costs; and (3) the Council must assess overall power and
economic impacts so that the Program does not cause an inadequate,
inefficient, uneconomic, and unreliable power supply.234

231. Id. at 1394. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(c) "emphasizes the achievement of
predetermined biological objectives in a least cost manner….[C]ost effectiveness, in this
context, prevents cost considerations from precluding the biologically sound restoration of
anadromous fish in the Columbia River Basin to the extent affected by hydropower
development and operations so long as an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable power
supply is assured." Id. Note the use of the word "power." As the court explained, "the statute
assures a 'power supply,' not a 'hydropower supply.'" Id. at 1378, no.13.
232. See, e.g., Early & Krogh, supra note 153, at 300 (arguing that the intent
behind the Northwest Power Act was to require the Council to balance "the
incremental cost to power as measured from current power costs, against the
incremental value to the fishery of the proposed mitigation measure.").
233. See Blumm, Parity I, supra note 15, at 122-38 (biologically sound measure
must be adopted unless it would cause "large scale power outages," a "demonstrated
BPA inability to fulfill [its] self-financing requirement," or "an entire class of power
customers [being forced] out of business.").
234.

Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1394.
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The court's handling of this issue turned on the state of the administrative
record before the Council. The judges found that there was insufficient evidence
to conclude that the "minimum cost" requirement imposed by section 4(h)(5)
was violated.235 Nevertheless, the court also explained that it could not apply
section 4(h)(5) of the Act unless a biological objective was first established.236
The court also noted that the DSIs had not proved that the Program's "overall
economic impact" on the hydropower system was "unreasonable."237
C.

Summary: How Must the Council Change its Ways?

The Ninth Circuit's decision ensures several important changes in the way
the Council has traditionally crafted the Program. First, the court's opinion left the
Council no choice but to establish clear biological objectives. Moreover, the
Council must not dismiss as scientifically unsupportable, without adequate
explanation, the fish and wildlife agencies' and tribes' view that smolt survival can
best be improved by anchoring the Program to water particle travel times. The
Program may therefore include smolt travel time objectives in the future.238 The
Council must also heed the court's warnings that it should give substantial
deference to the scientific views and recommendations of state fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes.239 The court did not say, or even imply, that the
recommendations of the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes are conclusive.
However, the court left the Council very little room to ignore these
recommendations, going so far as to say that deference is due even the
interpretation of the Act by the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes.240
Northwest Resource Information Center eliminates the possibility that future
Program amendments will be so weak as to allow the extinction of listed
salmon stocks.241 The court strongly suggested in its discussion of section
4(h)(6)(D) that protection of tribal treaty rights to a salmon harvest must be

235.

Id. at 1395.

236.

See id., at 1394-95.

237. Id. The court also rejected the DSIs' argument that reservoir drawdowns
would violate the Act because the Council had included in the Strategy qualifying
language to the effect that drawdowns would not proceed if they are not consistent
with sections 4(b)(5)-(7) of the Act. Id. at 1395.
238.

See Ogan, supra note 106.

239. The Council apparently is finally convinced. Although speaking as an
individual and not in his role as the Council's chief counsel, John Volkman has
indicated that the Council reads the Ninth Circuit's opinion as a warning that the
Council should avoid substituting its own view of biology for that of the fish and
wildlife agencies and tribes. John M. Volkman, Steering By Dicta, 25 ENVTL. L. 385 (1995).
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Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1388.

241.

See supra notes 220-224 and accompanying text.
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protected, and in any event a failure to provide this protection raises
questions of potential liability that counsel against risking the loss of any
runs.242 Thus, the Program is likely to include measures more protective of
the most imperiled runs, particularly Snake River fall chinook.
The Council must justify, in writing, any decision not to adopt
recommendations submitted by fish and wildlife agencies or tribes. The Council
must also avoid the temptation to act as the region's scientific arbitrator. One
immediate consequence of these two limitations on the Council's authority should
be the adoption of higher minimum instream flows on the lower Columbia and
lower Snake Rivers, since such measures have been advocated and scientifically
justified by the fishery coalition for more than a decade.243
Northwest Resource Information Center does not erase all of the Council's discretion.
The Act gives the Council authority to make an independent evaluation of Program
recommendations for consistency with the section 4(h)(6) criteria and also
authorizes the Council to reject any recommendation that is "less effective than the
adopted recommendation for the protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish
and wildlife."244 These provisions of the Act allow the Council to reject
recommendations on the grounds that they are insufficiently supported by current
scientific knowledge, so long as the Council affords fish and wildlife agencies and
tribes the deference to which they are entitled.245

242. Although the Council is an interstate compact agency, and not a part of the
federal government, it is obligated to respect Indian tribal treaty rights. See 16 U.S.C. §
839b(h)(6)(d). Moreover, the region's tribes might well have a substantial claim for
compensation under the takings clause of the Constitution if a government agency allows
the tribes' treaty-guaranteed property right to a productive fishery to be destroyed. Lorraine
Bodi, Panel Discussion, in Colloquium: Who Runs the River?, 25 ENVTL. L. 417, 421 (1995).
243. In the past the Council has asserted authority to determine whether fishery
coalition flow recommendations are justified by its own view of correct biology. Kai N. Lee,
Rebuilding Confidence: Salmon, Science, and Law in the Columbia Basin, 21 ENVTL. L. 745, 750, 795 N.190
(1991) (maintaining that Council has engaged in a "science-driven planning process" and that
requests for higher flows on lower Columbia and lower Snake Rivers do not "represent any
biology"). Of course, if the Council adheres to Professor Lee's views on the flow issue, it will be
at risk to violating the Ninth Circuit's admonition that the Council's task is to find out from the
state fish and wildlife agencies and tribes the nature and extent of management actions
justified by scientific knowledge. See Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 737 n.442.
244.

16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7)(B), (C).

245. Thus, future Program amendments may incorporate additional scientific
information aimed at reinforcing application of section 4(h)(7) criteria. In addition, the Ninth
Circuit's opinion does not affect the Council's authority to require scientific support for all
submitted recommendations. Nevertheless, rejection of fish and wildlife agency and tribal
recommendations on the grounds that biological knowledge does not support them entails
the risk that the Council will cross the line between permissible independence and necessary
deference to fishery managers' expertise.
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During future proceedings to amend the Program the Council may invoke
the Act's power supply assurance clause as an excuse for avoiding fishery coalition
or environmentalist recommendations.246 The Ninth Circuit has not defined the
scope of this constraint on the Program.247 However, Northwest Resource Information
Center indicates that Congress' desire to preserve for the region a reliable and
affordable source of electricity may not be a significant barrier to an aggressive
salmon restoration effort. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the Act's drafters
sought only to prevent the creation of an "inadequate, inefficient, uneconomical,
and unreliable power supply."248
While BPA may legitimately fear intense price competition from other
electric wholesalers if salmon restoration costs rise,249 the Northwest Power

246.

See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7)(A), (B).

247. Northwest Resource Information Center does not include any detailed discussion of the
power supply assurance. Cf. PACIFIC NORTHWEST UTILITIES CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, DEGREE OF
POWER COUNCIL FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONDING TO FISHER AGENCY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT
AND ADOPTION OF A FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM 5 (no date) (arguing that phrase should be read as
a qualifying ingredient to the Act's specific requirements to "compliment[] existing and future
agency and tribal objectives," achiev[e] sound biological objectives," and "be consistent with
treaty rights"), quoted in Blumm, Parity II, supra note 15, at 120 n.71. But see Early & Krogh, supra
note 153, at 295 (arguing that Congress did not intend for electricity consumers to pay a higher
price for power in order to pay for fish and wildlife restoration and protection measures; power
costs "must be considered before large scale power shortages occur, before the BPA is unable
to pay its bills, and before customers are driven from the region due to high power costs"). The
Krogh and Early view of Congress' intent is not supported by the language of the Act. Section
4(h)(8)(B) explicitly contemplates that power users must "bear the cost of measures designed
to deal with adverse impacts caused by the development and operation of electric power
facilities and programs." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(8)(B).
248. Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1394. BPA has hinted that it would invoke
this clause to avoid implementing Program measures it deems too expensive. See Bill
Mackenzie & Joan Laatz, Planners Weigh Cheap Power, Salmon, OREGONIAN, Dec. 7, 1994, at C1, C7
(quoting BPA Administrator Randy Hardy) (BPA considers costs of saving salmon
"risk[y]…from a reliability and financial standpoint" and would "rather not be in the position
of having the [C]ouncil say to do something and we say, 'No, we won't….'").
249. Increased costs associated with salmon recovery are hardly the most significant
drain on BPA's bank account, since they amount to a very small fraction of the amount BPA
allocates toward payment on bonds issued to build Washington Public Power Supply
System (WPPSS) nuclear plants. Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 741. BPA owes
approximately $7 billion to the lenders who financed the one remaining and three
discontinued plans. Nuke Debt: Hole That May Become a Grave, 14 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION ACT
REPORT 1, 3 (Mar. 17, 1995). Maintenance of BPA's WPPSS debt costs the agency
approximately one-fourth its entire annual budget. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION,
SERVING THE NORTHWEST: 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 26 (reporting FYI1994 WPPSS debt service of
approximately $469 million) [hereinafter BPA 1994 REPORT].
380
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Act does not permit BPA to disregard the Program. BPA must implement the
Program unless the Administrator can provide specific reasons why doing so
would be inconsistent with either the power conservation plan, into which
the Program is incorporated, or other legal obligations facing that agency.250
In fact, Congress clearly explained that BPA must "coordinate," "to the
greatest extent practicable," its actions under the Program with federal and
state fish and wildlife managers and tribes.251 Refusal to do so solely on the
grounds that the agency fears losing customers does not appear to fit within
the statutory authority for such a decision. Section 4(h) of the Act does not
contemplate resistance to the Program simply because it will increase power
production costs or reduce BPA's revenues.252
The structure of the Act also indicates that the Program cannot be evaded on
financial grounds. The Act mandates that the hydropower system pay the costs of fish
and wildlife losses for which it is responsible.253 Moreover, section 4(h)(8)(D) of the Act
indicates that Congress contemplated that the Program would cause a loss of electric
power and that BPA should allocate those costs and power losses "consistent with
individual project impacts and system wide objectives."254 Thus, Northwest Resource
Information Center unsurprisingly confirms that the Council may not reject
recommended measures just because they impose power losses and economic costs
on the region.255 The Northwest Power Act does not guarantee an effective, efficient,
economic, and reliable hydropower supply.256 Thus, while the Council theoretically
possesses the ability to reject biologically beneficial measures thought by the region's
power interests and DSIs to be too onerous, its discretion to do so does not appear to
be wide enough to accommodate the status quo.

250.

See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(j)(2)B).

251.

Id. § 839b(h)(11)(B).

252. See Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1394 (Northwest Power Act
guarantees only that an "inadequate, inefficient, uneconomical, and unreliable power
supply" should not be the consequence of Program implementation).
253. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(8)(B). Section 2)4) of the Act declares that this allocation of the
burdens of salmon restoration follows from the Act's purpose to ensure that users of electricity
"pay all costs necessary to produce, transmit, and conserve resources to meet the region's
electric power requirements." 16 U.S.C. § 839(4) (emphasis added).
254. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(8)(D). See also COMMERCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 57
("[C]ost should not be a deterrent if a fish and wildlife need might be sacrificed to save dollars.").
255.

Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1395.

256. See id. at 1379, n.13. There is some doubt as to how large a power cost increase has to
be before being considered "uneconomic." However, the Council has indicated that t his standard
is not violated where power rate increases "constitute a burden for specific consumers and
relatively electricity-intensive industries." NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, DOC. NO. 94-56,
ASSURING AN EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT, ECONOMICAL AND RELIABLE POWER SUPPLY AND THE ABILITY TO CARRY
OUT OTHER PURPOSES OF THE POWER ACT 26 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter ASSURING POWER SUPPLY].
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Of course, the Council's future course of action implies that the Council
members will continue to agree on one. The Council, however, faces a risk that its
members will deadlock and be unable to maintain majority support for a more
aggressive Program. The Act requires that Program amendments be approved by
either a majority of the Council's members, "including the vote of at least one member
from each State" represented on the Council, or at least six members.257 The Council's
recent decision to pursue a more effective salmon restoration effort will not prove
durable unless a consensus of each state's Council representatives can be maintained.
That may prove elusive. The Washington representatives object, in general, to
measures that would require drawdowns of lower Snake reservoirs.258 The newlyappointed Idaho members have made clear their unwillingness to support allocation
of upper Columbia River Basin water currently used by that state's irrigated agriculture
sector for salmon recovery.259 Montana can be expected to continue its resistance to
bold salmon recovery efforts, since it has little incentive to surrender storage water or
hydroelectric generating capacity to sustain anadromous fish that do not reach its
rivers, streams and lakes.260 The Montana representatives to the Council have also
expressed concern about the possible impacts of drawdowns and increased flows on
resident fish indigenous to reservoirs in that state.261 These conflicts among Pacific
Northwest states may render it impossible for the Council to achieve the necessary
degree of agreement on the kinds of steps needed to restore the salmon runs.262

257.

16 U.S.C. § 839b(c)(2).

258.

Interview with Laird Lucas, Esq., Land and Water Fund of the Rockies (Nov. 4, 1994).

259. Northwest Power Planning Council, UPDATE, vol. 12, no. 2 (Feb. 1995), at 1; Idaho Power
Attacks Salmon Recovery Plan, Oregonian, Feb. 25, 1995, at F3; interview with Tim Weaver, Esq., counsel
for Yakama Indian Nation (Nov. 4, 1994). That attitude will likely be strengthened as a consequence
of Idaho voters' election of Republican onion farmer Phil Batt as Governor. Batt has said that he
believes reservoir drawdowns are unnecessary and too costly for Idaho's agriculture and navigation
interests. Bill Loftus, Salmon Plan: Power Council's Idaho Members Have Doubts: Republican Governor Also Has
His Own Ideas, LEWISTON MORNING TRIBUNE, Jan. 17, 1995, at A5.
260. See John Etchert & Stan Grace, Salmon Plan Disregards Evidence, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 12, 1995, at A15 (editorial).
261. Id. Additional water needed to provide fishery coalition-recommended flows for salmon
may be sought from Montana reservoirs that provide habitat for kokanee, white sturgeon, and bull
trout. Montana may find it difficult in any event to surrender water stored in that state's reservoirs,
since the bull trout may be listed under the ESA in the near future and therefore conservation
requirements affecting the availability of stored waster may be imposed. See Groups Sue for Protection of
Bull Trout, OREGONIAN, Nov. 1, 1994, at B8; Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
No. CV 94-1318-JO (D. Or. Filed Oct. 31, 1994). Indeed, Montana has threatened to sue in an effort to
prevent use of water stored in that state for salmon recovery. Lynn Francisco, Doubts over Spill and
Salmon Flows Plague Idaho and Montana, CLEANING UP: NORTHWEST ENERGY MARKETS, May 8, 1995, at 7.
262. That prospect has already led the Council to reconsider the scientific rationale for its
December 1994 Program amendments. See infra note 426 and accompanying text.
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Even if the Council maintains the consensus necessary to sustain support for a
stronger Program that includes higher flow levels and reservoir drawdowns, the Ninth
Circuit's decision does not guarantee that the dam operators will follow the Program.
Although BPA must abide by the Program,263 the Northwest Power Act gives the Corps
and the Bureau discretion in deciding how much of the Program to incorporate into
their activities.264 The question is how much that discretion is confined.265 Ninth Circuit

263. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A). BPA's general counsel has hinted that BPA may
not consider the Program enforceable against it because it constitutes "state law." He also
has stated his personal belief that section 4(h)(11)(A)(i) of the Act grants BPA the authority
to reject Program measures if they are not "consistent with" the Act's other purposes,
particularly the assurance of an "adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable power supply"
for the region. Spigal, supra note 186, at 412. See infra notes 265-267 and accompanying text
for this writer's view of the validity of those arguments.
264. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A) provides that BPA, the Corps, the Bureau, "and other
[f]ederal agencies…responsible for…regulating Federal or non-Federal" dams in the basin must:
(i) exercise such responsibilities consistent with the applicable purposes of this
chapter and other applicable laws, to adequately protect, mitigate, and enhance
fish and wildlife, including related spawning grounds and habitat, affected by
such projects or facilities in a manner that provides equitable treatment for such fish and
wildlife with the other purposes for which such system and facilities are managed
and operated; [and]
(ii) exercise such responsibilities, taking into account eat each relevant stage of decisionmaking processes to the fullest extent practicable, the Program adopted by the Council…."
(emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has not interpreted the extent to which this
provision gives federal agencies the authority to ignore the Program or its particular
requirements. Nevertheless, it is clear that the agencies retain "a great deal of
discretion." Blumm, Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 129.
265. In making decisions that affect FCRPS operations, BPA, the Corps, and the Bureau
must take the Program into account "to the fullest extent practicable." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii).
The Council apparently believes that the Northwest Power Act essentially places it in the position of
an "advocate" with respect to the federal agencies, rather than as a basin manager with authority
over their decision making. Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 712. BPA, on the other hand, may doubt
that the Program is enforceable against it. According to BPA's general counsel, BPA is concerned
that Congress has not clearly subjected that agency to the authority of an interstate compact agency.
Spigal, supra note 186, at 412. The courts will defer to BPA's interpretation of the Northwest Power
Act. See California Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n v. Bonneville Power Admin., 831
F.2d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln People's Utility
Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389 (1984)). Nevertheless, this objection is difficult to take seriously in light of the
Act's clear reflection of Congress' intent to create a regional mechanism for solving the basin's
salmon crisis. To be effective, Congress must authorize state regulation of a federal agency in
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case law and Council evidence conflict on that issue. Several cases have indicated that
BPA, the Corps, the Bureau, and FERC are obligated only to consider the Program as
one factor controlling their actions, not as a restraint.266 The Council has interpreted
this to mean that these agencies must either implement the measures included in the
Program or provide a written explanation of the physical, legal, or other reason that
would make compliance impracticable.267
On the other hand, the broad language of the Northwest Power Act and the
lack of clear judicial guidance does not necessarily mean that no constraints exist.
Whatever amount of discretion is conferred on federal dam operators and regulators
by the broad language of the Act is constrained by two more specific factors. First,
the Act includes an explicit recognition of Indian treaty rights to harvest salmon.268
Thus, to the extent that a Program measure is necessary to protect treaty rights, a
federal dam operating or regulatory agency is obliged to follow it.269 Second, the Act

language that is "clear and unambiguous." Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 164, 179 (1976). See also United
States Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426
U.S. 200, 211 (1976). The foundation for this rule is the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
Because the Constitution and federal law take priority over state law, "the activities of the Federal
Government are free from regulation by any state" unless Congress declares otherwise. Hancock, 426
U.S. at 178 (quoting Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943)). This principle does not apply to
the Council, however. The Council is an agency of an interstate compact and has received Congress'
express sanction. See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1363. Thus, the Program, which is issued
by the Council pursuant to Congress' command, is enforceable as a matter of federal, not state, law.
See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981). Moreover, the language of the Act leaves little doubt
that Congress has clearly subjected BPA to the authority of the Council. See 16 U.S.C. §
839b(h)(11)(A)(i), (ii). Cf. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 787-88 (1976)
(finding that federal agencies must comply with the similar requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act unless doing so would conflict with other statutory obligations). As to the
obligations of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which licenses privately built
hydroelectric projects, to comply with the Program, see Blumm, Parity IV, supra note 15, at 508-10.
266. See Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Douglas County v. Bonneville Power Admin., 947 F.2d
386, 392 (9th Cir. 1991) (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 839(h)(11)(A) to mean not that BPA and other
agencies "are limited to the program in exercising their responsibilities under the Act," but only that
"a measure be something that results from a federal agency taking the Program into
consideration at each relevant state of the decision-making processes, in exercising their
responsibilities consistent with the Act and other applicable law."), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004
(1992); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 801 F.2d 1505, 1514-15 (9th Cir. 1986), later
proceeding, 870 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1989).
267.

See Blumm, Parity III, supra note 15, at 296, n.80, 336-37.

268. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(b)(A) (Program measures must "complement the
existing and future activities" of region's tribes), (D) (Program must "be consistent
with the legal rights of appropriate Indian tribes in the region.").
269. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(D); Washington v. Washington State Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 695 (1979).
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specifically requires federal agencies to "exercise [their] responsibilities consistent
with. . .other applicable laws."270
While the Council has never tested the extent of its authority to require the
Corps and the Bureau to comply with the Program,271 the question is, for the
present, academic. The ESA unquestionably removes a substantial amount of the
federal dam operators' freedom to ignore some of the measures contained in the
Program because similar mandates may be imposed as a result of consultation or in
a recovery plan. Thus, the importance of the recent decision in Idaho Department of Fish
& Game v. National Marine Fisheries Service is clear: the case could prove to be a strong
boost of the Council's ability to enforce the Program, at least if NMFS requires dam
operators to undertake similar measures. NMFS' reaction to the holding in Idaho
Department of Fish & Game also may have the effect of severely reducing the ability of
the Corps, the Bureau, and FERC to avoid taking actions that would effectively
restore and mitigate salmon populations at the expense of power generation.
VI.

Idaho Department of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries
Service: The End of Compromise?

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Northwest Resource Information Center was not the
first occasion for judicial scrutiny of the Pacific Northwest's response to the
continuing decline of the salmon runs. In March 1994, Judge Malcolm Marsh of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon ruled that NMFS violated the ESA and
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)272 when it decided that operation of the
FCRPS would not jeopardize the continued existence of listed salmon stocks.273 Idaho
Department of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Service should produce, in the short
run, a greater impact than will Northwest Resource Information Center . The ESA, and thus
Idaho Department of Fish & Game, will govern the actions of BPA and the region's federal
dam operators until the listed stocks are no longer at risk of extinction. Idaho
Department of Fish & Game should also motivate NMFS and the Council to coordinate
their salmon recovery actions.274

270. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(i). See also 16 U.S.C. § 839 (Purposes of Act "are . . . intended
to be construed in a manner consistent with applicable environmental laws.").
271.

Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 738.

272.

5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06.

273. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp.
886 (D. Or. 1994), remanded, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
274. Idaho Department of Fish & Game may have already affected the Council's actions in the
wake of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Northwest Resource Information Center. See infra notes 354-405
and accompanying text. Both the Council and NMFS have expressed a desire to coordinate their
actions in an effort to avoid judicial control of the region's salmon recovery process. See Laatz,
Power Council OK's Plan to Save Salmon, supra note 21, at A1, A26; Volkman, supra note 79, at 41-43.
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This section first outlines NMFS' power, under section 7 of the ESA, to force
changes in federal agency activities.275 It next provides an overview of the 1993 biological
opinion on FCRPS operations, which concluded that status quo management of the
region's hydropower system would not cause an increased threat to the survival of listed
stocks.276 After summarizing the arguments of the parties in the case, this section
analyzes Judge Marsh's opinion in Idaho Department of Fish & Game.277 The section
concludes with a brief discussion of the decision's likely impacts on other Basin-wide
river management efforts and other activities affecting the salmon's vitality.278
A.

The Nature of NMFS' Power: ESA Section 7

The ESA allows NMFS to exercise substantial control over the actions
of federal dam operators insofar as they affect listed species. The foundation
of this power lies in section 7 of the ESA.279 Under the ESA, BPA, the Corps
and the Bureau are required to "insure" that "any action" that they
"authorize[], fund[], or carr[y] out. . .is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species."280 The relevant
federal agency must therefore first determine whether its proposed action
will affect a listed species.281 If so, then the action agency must evaluate the
effects of the proposed action in a biological assessment.282
If the biological assessment demonstrates that listed species will be adversely
affected, then the action agency must consult with NMFS before engaging in the
action.283 NMFS then issues a biological opinion284 which evaluates the nature and
extent of the impacts to a listed species posed by the action agency's proposed
undertaking.285 During the pendency of this required consultation, the action agency
is forbidden to make "any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources with
respect to the. . .action which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or

275.

See infra notes 279-287 and accompanying text.

276.

See infra notes 288-302 and accompanying text.

277.

See infra notes 303-326 and accompanying text.

278.

See infra notes 328-353 and accompanying text.

279.

16 U.S.C. § 1536.

280.

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).

281. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1); 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.02, 402.12. See generally Rohlf, ESA,
supra note 88, at 107-10.
282. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1). The implementing regulations for the ESA limit an
agency's obligation to prepare a biological assessment to "major construction
activities." 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(b).
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283.

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(b); 50 C.F.R. § 402.13.

284.

16 U.S.C. § 1536(b).

285.

Id.
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implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternatives."286 The action agency is
also prohibited from "taking" a listed species without first obtaining the "incidental
take statement" that ordinarily accompanies a biological opinion.287
B.

The 1993 Biological Opinion

After the listings of chinook and sockeye occurred, NMFS had its first
opportunity to compel changes in FCRPS operations, but NMFS declined to
issue a jeopardy opinion.288 That unwillingness to compel ecologically
beneficial change on the river persisted in 1993. The biological opinions on
FCRPS operations issued during 1992 and 1993 were limited in scope to a
nine and one-half month period and did not require any immediate changes
in FCRPS operations.289 NMFS issued a "no jeopardy" opinion in 1992, but
the agency also put BPA, the Corps, and the Bureau on notice that it would
require changes in dam operations in future years.290
Notwithstanding its own warning, NMFS was unwilling to challenge
the FCRPS status quo in 1993.291 NMFS first concluded in a draft 1993
biological opinion that FCRPS operations would jeopardize listed salmon,292

286. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d). See Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995); Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1455 N.34 (9th cir. 1988), cert. denied sub
nom., Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Lujan, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F.
Supp. 332, 356 (D.D.C.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
287. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4), (o); 1538(a)(1)(B). See generally Forest Conservation Council
v. Roseboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995). In theory, BPA, the Corps, and the Bureau
could reject an NMFS opinion that their actions in operating the dams jeopardize salmon. 50
C.F.R. § 402.15. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410,
1418 (9th Cir. 1990). Such a response is unlikely, however, because failing to abide by the
reasonable and prudent alternatives suggested by NMFS would place the agencies at risk in
violating the prohibitions against jeopardizing and taking species contained in ESA sections
7(a)(2) and 9, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2), 1538(a)(1)(B). See, e.g., Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel,
859 F.2d 651 (9th Cir.), amended, 869 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom., Cowper v.
Secretary of Interior, 493 U.S. 873 (1989); Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. U.S. EPA,
684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied sub nom., Boteler v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
288.

1992 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 90, at 50.

289. 1992 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 90, at 2; 1993 Biological Opinion,
supra note 50, at 1.
290.

1992 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 90, at 15-16.

291.

See 1993 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 50.

292. NMFS, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, 1993 DRAFT BIOLOGICAL
OPINION ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM (May 5, 1993) [hereinafter
1993 DRAFT BIOLOGICAL OPINION], cited in Idaho Department of Fish & Game's Renewed Motion for
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but came to a different conclusion after receiving rainfall projections from
the Corps that predicted "slightly increased river flows."293 In the final 1993
biological opinion, NMFS stated that slower river velocity caused by the
dams delays juvenile migration and increases smolt mortality. In addition,
NMFS confirmed that large numbers of young salmon are killed when they
pass through hydroelectric turbines.294 NMFS also determined that dams
delay upriver adult passage, causing significant adult mortality.295 Thus, the
1993 biological opinion seemed to reiterate the bleak predictions about the
fate of the Snake River runs issued by NMFS two years earlier in a status
report on spring and summer chinook: These stocks were "likely to become
endangered in the near future if corrective actions are not taken";296 fall
chinook "face a substantial risk of extinction if present conditions
continue";297 and sockeye have "declined dramatically in recent years."298
Notwithstanding its conclusion that the FCRPS is the largest single
human-induced cause of salmon mortality,299 NMFS issued a no jeopardy
opinion. This result was particularly surprising in light of computer modeling
results that showed continued substantial mortality rates for all of the listed
runs.300 However, these models did not sway NMFS from its resolve not to
issue a jeopardy opinion. NMFS decided not to consider "low case" test
results that demonstrated a likelihood of only a 41-42% chance that stable
populations of the listed species would be achieved.301 NMFS also declined to

Summary Judgment, Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886
(D. Or. 1994) (Dec. 28, 1993) [hereinafter Idaho Motion].
293. Compare DRAFT 1993 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, quoted in Idaho Motion, supra note
292, at 5, with 1993 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 50.
294.

1993 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 50, at 18. See also 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653, 14,660 (1992).

295.

57 Fed. Reg. at 14,660. See also 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653-14,654, 14660.

296. See NMFS, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, STATUS
REVIEW FOR SNAKE RIVER FALL CHINOOK 50 (1991) [hereinafter FALL CHINOOK REVIEW].
NMFS downlisted Snake River spring and summer chinook to endangered in summer
1994. 50 Fed. Reg. 54,840 (1994).
297.

FALL CHINOOK REVIEW, supra note 296, at 50.

298.

56 Fed. Reg. at 58,622 (1991).

299. 1993 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 50, at 51, 60 ("mortality of Snake River
Chinook salmon associated with passage through the FCRPS is much higher than
other sources of human-induced mortality").
300. NMFS concluded that 55-77% of juvenile spring and summer chinook, 8192% of juvenile fall chinook, 33-41% of adult spring-summer chinook, and 41% of
adult fall chinook, would be killed while attempting to pass through FCRPS dams.
1993 Biological Opinion, supra note 50, at 46, 48, 51 (table 7).
301. 1993 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 50, at 56, 64, NMFS used three tests to calculate
the probabilities of achieving a desired spring/summer chinook goal in 2008: the System Planning
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factor into its jeopardy decision certain biological risks—the "extinction
vortex" and "demographic risk"—unique to very small species populations.302
C.

The Arguments

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game (IDFG) challenged the 1993
biological opinion, arguing that it violated the ESA because NMFS had
failed to consider all scientific information, including the "low case" test
results, the extinction vortex and demographic risk.303 IDFG also argued that
a "no jeopardy" conclusion was unjustified because the FCRPS is
responsible for the destruction of too many salmon.304 IDFG also argued that
NMFS had arbitrarily and capriciously used the years 1986-90 as the base
period against which future salmon survival would be measured.305
A coalition of DSIs and utility interests intervened in the case.306 They argued
that (1) the existence of the dams could not be considered as a potential cause of
jeopardy; and (2) NMFS was legally barred from finding jeopardy once the agency had
concluded that survival of juvenile listed salmon would improve in 1993 over the

Model (SPM), developed by the Council; the Stochastic Life-Cycle Planning Model (SLCM),
developed for BPA; and the Empirical Life-Cycle Model (ELCM), developed for state fish and
wildlife agencies and tribes. In 17 of 18 results under low-, mid-, and high-range assumptions, the
likelihood of continued decline for spring and summer Snake River chinook was greater than onethird. Id. at 18-20. NMFS also failed to consider corrected ELCM results, prepared several months
prior to the release of the 1993 biological opinion, that demonstrated no scenario under which
Snake River falls chinook would return to levels equivalent to the "base period" employed in the
biological opinion's jeopardy analysis. Idaho Motion, supra note 292, at 19.
302. 1993 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 50. Attachment Appendix 1, at 13 ("[I]t appears
that the target population size is large enough that no significant problems from inbreeding
would be expected if the population behaved as a single, randomly mating unit"). NMFS had
earlier expressed its view that adult salmon generally mate with fish from the same spawning
stream and therefore that no significant likelihood of a particular stock acting as a single mating
unit exists. See Idaho Motion, supra note 292, at 26 (quoting NMFS, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, STATUS REVIEW FOR SNAKE RIVER SPRING/SUMMER CHINOOK SALMON 23-24
(1991) [hereinafter SPRING/SUMMER CHINOOK STATUS REVIEW]). These risks, called the "extinction
vortex," include increased in-breeding between individual fish of the same run and random
events such as drought or fire. Id. (citing SPRING/SUMMER CHINOOK STATUS REVIEW, supra, at 22).
303. The States of Oregon and Alaska joined Idaho in challenging the 1993 biological
opinion. Several of the region's Indian tribes, including the Warm Springs Tribe, the Yakama
Nation, the Nez Perce Tribe, and the Umatilla Tribe, participated as amici and generally supported
the states' arguments. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 850 F. Supp. at 890-91 & nn.10-11.
304.

Idaho Motion, supra note 292, at 10-24.

305.

Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 850 F. Supp. at 892-93.

306.

Id. at 891.
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chosen base period.307 The DSIs, as well as NMFS and the other federal defendants,
also asserted that NMFS properly took into account qualitative judgments about the
likely impacts of future regulatory and other activities that would reduce ecological
impacts on listed salmon.308 In addition, the government and the DSIs maintained
that the disputes over which test results to consider in crafting the biological opinion
and the proper interpretation of the various test results were questions of scientific
dispute beyond the reach of judicial review.309
D.

The Marsh Decision

NMFS' struggle to avoid confronting the impacts of hydropower
production on salmon produced a court ruling that should encourage the
region's river users to find the consensus and commitment needed to
reverse the decline of the runs. In March 1994, Judge Malcolm Marsh of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon ruled that NMFS' issuance of a
"no jeopardy" opinion in 1993 violated the ESA and the APA. Just as the
Ninth Circuit later invoked procedural flaws in the process to reject the
Strategy for Salmon,310 Judge Marsh rejected NMFS' 1993 biological opinion
on FCRPS operations because NMFS had not adhered to procedural
requirements mandated by those two laws.311
The court first ruled that NMFS improperly selected 1986-90 as the "base
period," or period against which salmon survival would be measured, to determine
whether population stability targets would be reached.312 NMFS had used this four
year period without explanation of why the longer base period used in the 1992
biological opinion was no longer adequate.313 Judge Marsh concluded that the base
period selected did not accurately reflect average numbers of listed species in the
region or reflect the region's ordinary annual rainfall and runoff.314 The court also

307. See Joint Memorandum of DSIs, PPC & PNGC in Opposition to IDFG's
Motion for Summary Judgment, Pacific Northwest Generating Coop v. Brown, 850 F.
Supp. 886 (D. Id. 1994) (No. CIV 92-973-MA) (Feb. 9, 1994), at 15-18 [hereinafter DSI
Memorandum].
308. Federal Defendants' Reply to IDFG on Summary Judgment, Idaho Dep't of
Fish & Game v. Nat'l marine Fisheries Serv. (Mar. 11, 1994), at 7-20; DSI
Memorandum, supra note 307, at 19-30.
309.

Id.

310.

See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.

311.

Idaho Dep't of Fish and Game, 850 F. Supp. 886.

312.

Id. at 892-93.

313.

Id. at 893.

314. Id. at 893 & n.21. If years characterized by more rainfall and runoff were included in
the base, then improvements in survival of salmon during years where runoff improves cannot
with certainty be attributed to FCRPS operation improvements.
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found reason to reject the biological opinion in NMFS' failure to consider the "low
case" test results and 'extinction vortex" risks.315 The court also rejected the
government's (and the DSIs') attempt to prevent NMFS from considering the impact
of the dams' existence on salmon.316 Judge Marsh found that the administrative
record indicated that no effort had been made to distinguish between salmon
mortality caused by dam existence and salmon mortality caused by dam
operations.317 Moreover, the court found that the relevance of the "environmental
baseline" dispute was limited only to the question of consultation requirements, not
to the permissible scope of alternatives to actions that would cause jeopardy.318
Nor did the DSIs' other arguments fair well. Although the DSIs
protested that NMFS lacked authority to require changes in FCRPS
operations as a condition of a no jeopardy opinion,319 the court refused to
draw a bright line between preventing injury to the survival of listed salmon
and increasing the likelihood of their survival.320 The court explained that
Congress intended the focus of the ESA to remain on the needs of the listed
species, as opposed to requiring NMFS actions to fall strictly in categories of
permissible "alternatives," "measures," "conservation requirements," or
"recovery plans."321 In other words, the court declared that NMFS may require
agencies to take mitigation actions with one goal in mind: jeopardy to the
species.322 Because NMFS concluded that measures to increase salmon
survival are needed to reduce the likelihood of extinction, the court found
that NMFS was within its discretion.323
Idaho Department of Fish & Game is important in two fundamental
respects. First, Judge Marsh's decision will drive NMFS' handling of the
consultation process on a revised 1994-98 biological opinion; and second,
the decision is one of the first ESA cases in the nation to rule on the legality
of a no jeopardy opinion.324 But the more lasting impact of the ruling may lie

315.

Id. at 896-99.

316. Id. at 893-95. The DSIs and the federal government argued that 50 C.F.R. §
402.02 precluded NMFS from considering the fact of the dam's existence in
determining whether the FCRPS jeopardized salmon.
317.

Id. at 894.

318.

Id.

319.

DSI Memorandum, supra note 307, at 14.

320. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 850 F. Supp. at 895 ("I expressly reject any
attempt to impose bright-line definitions upon the hydropower system's 'existence'
vs. 'operations' or the terms 'survival' vs. 'recovery'.").
321.

Id. at 895.

322.

Id. at 895-96.

323.

Id. at 896.

324. But it is not the first. In Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied
sub nom., Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Lujan, 489 U.S. 1012 91995), the court invalidated a
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in Judge Marsh's rejection of the government's argument that NMFS could
not consider modifications to dam structures, as opposed to their operation,
in determining whether agency action would jeopardize listed salmon stocks
and in considering alternatives available for avoiding jeopardy.325 Moreover,
although the decision does not immediately compel any specific changes in
the FCRPS operations, Judge Marsh indicated that the court will not tolerate
indefinitely the delays that have thus far blocked serious efforts to restore
the salmon runs:
NMFS has clearly made an effort to create a rational, reasoned process
for determining how the action agencies are doing in their efforts to
save the listed salmon species. But the process is seriously,
"significantly," flawed because it is too heavily geared towards a status
quo that has allowed all forms of river activity to proceed in a deficit
situation—that is, relatively small steps, minor improvements and
adjustments—when the situation literally cries out for a major
overhaul. Instead of looking for what can be done to protect the species
from jeopardy, NMFS and the action agencies have narrowly focused
[sic] their attention on what the establishment is capable of handling
with minimal disruption.326
E.

Implications of the Marsh Decision

Just as the Ninth Circuit did in Northwest Resource Information Center,327 Judge
Marsh put NMFS and the federal dam operating agencies on notice that substantial

biological opinion that did not evaluate all of the phases of a proposed sale of oil and gas
leases on two National Forests. In Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (D.
Mass), aff'd, 715 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1983), the court rejected a biological opinion that failed to
consider recent research results. For examples of decisions rejecting challenges to biological
opinions, see, e.g., Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), amended, 14 F.3d 1324
(9th Cir. 1992); Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984); Friend of Endangered
Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 589 F. Supp. 113 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985); Swan
View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992).
325.

Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 850 F. Supp. at 894-95.

326.

Id. at 900.

327. Northwest Resource Info. Center v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371,
1395 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The Council's approach seems largely to have been from the premise that
only small steps are possible, in light of entrenched river user claims of economic hardship.
Rather than asserting its role as regional leader, the Council has assumed the role of consensus
builder, sometimes sacrificing the Act's fish and wildlife goals for what is, in essence, the lowest
common denominator acceptable to power interests and DSIs.").
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changes from the river's status quo are required.328 That warning prompted NMFS to
issue a jeopardy opinion for 1994-98.329 However, the 1994-98 biological opinion
may represent only "[s]mall steps, minor adjustments and improvements," and
accordingly may be subject to future ESA challenges.
Little improvement in the river's suitability for salmon has occurred since
1993, and Judge Marsh's decision required NMFS to consider pessimistic test
results and demographic risks associated with the small populations of some of
the basin's endangered salmon stocks. The court's expression of impatience with
current conditions on the river suggests that NMFS must require more than
marginally improved smolt survival in order to fulfill its statutory obligation to
assure the "survival" and "recovery" of listed salmon runs.
The revised 1994-98 biological opinion is not, however, the only forum
in which Idaho Department of Fish & Game will be noticed. NMFS' plan for
recovering the listed salmon was also affected by the decision. Although the
recovery team's recommendations, issued in October 1993,330 recognized the

328. Although the judgment in Idaho Department of Fish & Game was vacated by the Ninth
Circuit on mootness grounds, the court hinted that it approves of Judge Marsh's warning. In
Northwest Resource Information Center, Judge Tang's opinion for the court favorably discussed and
quoted the language cited in the text. Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1390-91. The
Ninth Circuit also concluded its opinion in that case with language quite similar in its meaning:
[T]he Council's approach seems largely to have been from the premise that
only small steps are possible, in light of entrenched river user claims of
economic hardship. Rather than asserting its role as a regional leader, the
Council has assumed the role of consensus builder, sometimes sacrificing the
Act's fish and wildlife goals for what is, in essence, the lowest common
denominator acceptable to power interests and DSIs.
Id. at 1395. Moreover, in Idaho Department of Fish & Game the Ninth Circuit did not vacate or
reverse Judge Marsh's opinion containing his criticism of NMFS' actions. Interestingly, the
Council's current chairman has publicly warned that consensus on the merits of recovery
measures is virtually impossible to achieve. See Angus Duncan, Biology, Politics, and Salmon
Recovery, WILD FISH (Nov.-Dec. 1992) 4 ("There is no such creature as unanimous conclusive
scientific opinion when it comes to divisive questions of how much water the fish need, what
kind of travel times [fish need]…."].
329. See infra notes 458-464 and accompanying text, NMFS first issued a 1994-98
biological opinion on FCRPS operations in March 1994 and again reached a "no jeopardy"
opinion. See Blumm, Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 84. However, that biological opinion
adopted a similar methodology as the 1993 biological opinion overturned in Idaho Department of
Fish & Game. Id. Accordingly, in the aftermath of Judge Marsh's ruling, NMFS asked the parties
to recommend mutually acceptable alternatives to be considered for incorporation into the
amended 1994-98 Special Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice (Nov. 1, 1994).
330. SNAKE RIVER SALMON RECOVERY TEAM, DRAFT SNAKE RIVER SALMON RECOVERY
PLAN RECOMMENDATIONS (1993), cited in Blumm, Columbia river Basin, supra note 35, 1t 86
[hereinafter DRAFT RECOVERY RECOMMENDATIONS].
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importance of many of the measures long urged upon the Council by the
fishery coalition,331 NMFS' draft recovery plan did not ask for the needed
fundamental changes in FCRPS operations. Instead, the draft recovery plan
included only two major alternatives for increasing smolt survival through
the FCRPS gauntlet: drawdown of several Snake River reservoirs to enhance
flows,332 and increased reliance on transportation of smolts past lower Snake
and Columbia River dams.333

331. The recovery team recommended improved fish ladders for adult salmon,
Draft Recovery Recommendations at XI-3; augmentation of flows during migration
seasons, id. at VIII-6; reduction of salmon harvests, id. at IX-12; improvement of
hatchery practices, id. at VI-ii, VII-ii; restoration of spawning and rearing habitat, see
generally id. ch. V; and control of salmon predators, see generally id. ch. X; Blumm,
Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 87.
332. See STRATEGY FOR SALMON, supra note 114, at 30-32. The proposal to drawdown several
Snake River reservoirs during the spring as a device to improve flows and juvenile passage is
controversial. Opponents argue that lowering reservoirs will not speed juvenile migration or reduce
smolt mortality, and navigation and agricultural interests are concerned that drawdowns would have
a seriously adverse effect on use of the river for shipping an irrigation. In addition, drawdowns would
cause a decline in hydropower production, which in turn would cause a reduction in BPA's revenues
derived from the sale of surplus power to California utilities. Blumm, Columbia River Basin, supra note
35, at 103. On the other hand, the agriculture community's share of drawdown consequences could
be reduced by modifying the pumps that remove irrigation water from the reservoirs and the adverse
effects on navigation would be limited to a two-month period each spring, during which time only
five percent of the tonnage shipped downriver would be affected. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra
note 2, at 688 n.123. The Corps tested the drawdown proposal by lowering Lower Granite and Little
Goose reservoirs in March 1992. Initial results indicate that the economic consequences of lowering
reservoirs in the region are not as high as was previously feared. Andrew S. Noonan, Just Water Over the
Dam? A Look at the Endangered Species Act and the Impact of Hydroelectric Facilities on the Anadromous Fish Runs of
the Northwest, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 781, 799 (1992). Businesses and highways suffered damages of
approximately $1.1 million during a 1992 test. See House Panel Approves Aid for River Drawdown Damage,
Oregonian, June 11, 1992, at B6. A more recent analysis concluded that drawdown of Lower Granite,
Little Goose, Little Monumental, and Ice Harbor dams to spillway crest (approximately 33 feet) may
cost approximately $9.5 million per year, plus approximately $259 million for construction costs.
Daniel D. Huppert & David L. Fluharty, ECONOMICS OF SNAKE RIVER SALMON RECOVERY: A REPORT TO THE
NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE 3-71 (Feb. 1995).
333. The recovery team advocated increased reliance on transportation on the basis of
social and economic factors. DRAFT RECOVERY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 330, at VIII-3 (explaining
that the team used social factors for want of sufficient information to make a wholly biology-based
decision). Unfortunately, state, federal, and tribal fishery scientists generally oppose continued
transportation because its benefits for fish are unclear and because there is some evidence that
transported fish suffer adverse stress effects upon release back into the river. Blumm, supra note 35, at
104-05. The Corps' transportation program has been in full operation since 1981. Juvenile salmon are
captured above upper Snake River dams and are transported by barge or truck to the lower
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Judge Marsh's ruling also aggrandizes NMFS' recent designation of critical habitat
for Snake River sockeye and chinook.334 For Snake River sockeye, NMFS designated the
Columbia and Snake Rivers, historical spawning lakes, and certain inlet creeks.335 For
chinook, NMFS designated the Columbia and Snake Rivers and all tributaries presently
or historically accessible to the stock except the Clearwater River in Idaho.336 In addition,
as NMFS lists more salmon stocks,337 additional critical habitat designations are likely
and each of those may affect FCRPS operations.338

Columbia below Bonneville Dam, where they are released. For a thorough discussion of the Corps'
collection and transportation program, see U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ET AL., INTERIM COLUMBIA
AND SNAKE RIVERS FLOW IMPROVEMENT MEASURES FOR SALMON DRAFT AND SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT 244 (1992). Federal water managers favor transportation because, unlike
modifications to dam operations, it does not require a decline in hydropower production. Blumm,
Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 104. One might find it ironic that the Corps' transportation
program often results in a situation in which what is afforded the use of the river is grain while fish
are forced to use I-84. Daniel J. Rohlf, Legal Issues Shaping Salmon's Future, 25 ENVTL. L. 415, 416 (1995).
334. See 58 Fed. Reg. 68,543 (1993). NMFS must designate critical habitat in order to
effectuate the ESA's goal of conserving ecosystems. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3). "Critical habitat"
is loosely defined as areas with physical and biological features that are essential to the
conservation of a given species and that require special management considerations or
protection. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 424.12.
335.

58 Fed. Reg. at 68,543.

336.

Id.

337. See supra notes 30, 87, 91. Although the language of the statute leaves the question
open to some doubt, NMFS may be prohibited from listing additional imperiled salmon stocks
under the ESA until October 1, 1995 by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and
Rescissions for the Department of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, Tit. II, ch. IV, 109 Stat. 73, 86 (1995) (prohibiting Fish and Wildlife
Service from listing species under the ESA after Sept. 30, 1995).
338. Federal dam operators are also preparing a plan for FCRPS operations. See UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM
OPERATIONS REVIEW: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1994) [hereinafter SOR]. The SOR is
intended to help BPA, the Corps, and the Bureau coordinate management of the hydropower
system and was commenced in order to facilitate renegotiation of the Pacific Northwest
Coordinating Agreement (PNCA) and the Canadian Entitlement Allocation Agreement (CEAA).
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, MIGHTY COLUMBIA: DESTINY
OF A GIANT, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (Portland, OR., July 1994), at 1. The three federal
dam operators have announced that SOR will select a management plan for the FCRPS that
accommodates salmon, id., but the SOR does not include a preferred management alternative.
The Columbia River Alliance, a coalition of utilities and navigation, irrigation, and reservoir
recreation interests, have asked the federal dam operators to choose a management plan that
would increase transportation of juvenile salmon and reduce the quantity of water dedicated to
fish flows. See Recover 1: An Option for Salmon and Us, Alliance Backgrounder (Columbia River Alliance for
Fish, Commerce, and Communities, Portland, OR, Sept. 1994). The management option selected
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While acknowledging that adequate river velocity is an essential
component of migratory salmon habitat, neither critical habitat designation
includes designated flow levels.339 In addition, consultation should, but does
not, address temperature changes and sediment deposits, which negatively
affect salmon spawning and rearing habitat.340
Idaho Department of Fish & Game also reduces the Council's salmon restoration
efforts to a less important status in the short term. The listing of salmon under the
ESA empowered NMFS to require "reasonable and prudent alternatives" as a
condition of a "no jeopardy" opinion. The agency's recovery plan is therefore likely to
become the most significant region-wide effort for salmon recovery. However, it is
not clear that the recovery plan binds the Corps, the Bureau, BPA and FERC
anymore than does the Program.341 However, these federal agencies are likely to

during the SOR process is likely, however, to be consistent with NMFS' recovery plan for listed
salmon stocks. PNCA is a contract between the region's utilities and federal dam operators that
governs the power production of the region's hydroelectric system. PNCA, signed in 1964, is due
to expire in 1003. Negotiations to renew it commenced in 1991. CEAA, which is no longer in
effect, was a U.S.-Canada agreement signed after ratification of the 1964 Columbia River Treaty
that allowed a portion of hydropower generated by Canadian dams to be assigned to U.S.
utilities. A new agreement is necessary to allocate responsibility for returning hydrosystemgenerated power to Canada.
339.

Blumm, Columbia River Salmon, supra note 35, at 118.

340. In an unrelated case, the Ninth Circuit enjoined ongoing Forest Service
timber sale, range, and road-building activities in the Wallowa-Whitman and
Umatilla National Forests until the Forest Service initiated consultation under ESA §
7 because such activity may adversely affect listed Snake River chinook. Pacific Rivers
Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995).
341. NMFS is required by the ESA to develop plans for the "conservation and survival" of the
listed salmon stocks. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1). The plan, prepared by a team of scientists employed by
federal and state governments and private employers, must contain (1) site-specific management
actions; (2) objective criteria against which progress towards recovery can be measured; and (3)
estimates of the amount of time and resources needed to achieve plan goals. 16 U.S.C. §
1533(f)(1)(B). BPA, the Corps, and the Bureau may not be obligated to comply with the salmon
recovery plan. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Dep't of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410,
1481 (9th Cir. 1990) (Department of Navy has discretion to decide whether to implement
conservation measures recommended by U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service as part of a recovery plan for
listed fish species); ROHLF, ESA, supra note 88, at 28 ("[T]he legal weight and enforceability of recovery
plans are not well-defined."). But see Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1304 n.3 (9th Cir.
1994) (finding Forest Service adoption of plan that failed to incorporate grizzly bear recovery
guidelines arbitrary and capricious where Fish and Wildlife Service issued "no jeopardy" finding on
condition that grizzly plan is followed). Of course, since a recovery plan is aimed at preventing
jeopardy to a listed species, failure to abide by it could result in a violation of the ESA. See 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a)(1), (2). The Fish and Wildlife Service apparently believes that recovery plans serve as
guidance to federal agencies. Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private
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comply with the recovery plan because they have participated in its preparation, and
the Clinton Administration has stated that federal agencies will speak with one voice
on natural resource issues.342 The Northwest Power Act does not permit the Council
to focus exclusively on recovery, as that term is defined under the ESA. The Council
must pursue harvestable runs, not simply the removal of endangered stocks from
the endangered species list, and therefore the requirements of the Program exceed
the requirements imposed by NMFS as part of the 1994-98 biological opinion and
recovery plan.343
The Corps, BPA or the Bureau could conceivably seek an exemption from ESA
section 7 requirements if the impact of salmon listings and NMFS' biological opinion
and recovery plan are thought too damaging to the FCRPS.344 The Endangered Species
Committee345 could grant an exemption for the FCRPS only if (1) there is no
reasonable and prudent alternatives to continuing the status quo, (2) the benefits of
the FCRPS clearly outweigh the benefits of agency actions taken pursuant to the ESA,
and (3) unchanged operation of the FCRPS is of local or national importance.346
However, invocation of the ESA exemption process does not appear to be a likely
outcome of the Columbia River Basin's salmon crisis. First, such exemptions are rarely

Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 377 n.48 (1994) (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Memorandum in Support of
Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, submitted in Hawaii Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, No. 91-00191
(D. Haw., filed Apr. 4, 1991) ("FWS consistently has taken the position that recovery plans serve as
guidance documents . . . , but are not in themselves specific proposals to undertake federal agency
actions.") See also Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery Priority Guidelines, 48
Fed. Reg. 43,098, 43,103 (1983) (describing recovery plans as "guiding documents"). BPA, the Corps,
the Bureau and FERC may also be able to avoid implementing the Program. See supra notes 265-266
and accompanying text.
342. Remarks Announcing the Forest Conservation Plan, WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 1211 (June
10-July 6, 1993) (explaining that government "owe[s] the people of the Pacific Northwest at least a
unified Federal position that would break the logjam. . . .").
343. Compare 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(h)(1)(A) (requiring Program to "protect, mitigate, and
enhance" fish and wildlife); 839b(h)(6)(E) (requiring increased flows to "improve" "survival,"
"protection" and "migration" of salmon) with 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(f) (requiring recovery plan only to
"promote the conservation and recovery" of listed species, 1532(3)) (defining "conserve" and
"conservation" as "methods and procedures which are necessary to bring [listed] species to the
point at which [the EPA's] protections are no longer necessary").
344. See Noonan, Just Water Over the Dam?, supra note 332, at 788; Blumm,
Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 120-21.
345. The Endangered Species Committee is a seven-member, Cabinet-level
committee empowered to determine that an agency action may go forward even if it
could cause the extinction of a listed species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e). The Committee
must hold hearings on requested exemptions, and the exemption will not be granted
if it finds that the exemption applicant or agency made any irretrievable commitment
of resources before the exemption was granted. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(4), (h)(1)(A)(iv).
346.

See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A).
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granted;347 second, the criteria may prove difficult to meet, since drawdowns, increased
flows and other salmon mitigation measures have either been attempted or are the
subject of studies that show them to be economically feasible; and third, the region
almost certainly lacks the degree of political consensus required to encourage the
Committee to grant such an exemption.348
Nevertheless, NMFS and the federal dam operating agencies may not
appropriately respond to Judge Marsh's warning that the imminent
disappearance of the region's wild salmon runs requires more than tinkering
with the current state of the river. Policy makers in Washington, D.C. may
decide that the economic costs of rebuilding the stocks justify sacrificing the
salmon.349 Even if Congress does not intervene, and the Clinton

347. Only two exceptions from a jeopardy finding have been granted since Congress created
the Endangered Species Committee in 1978. See Blumm, Columbia River Basin, supra note 35, at 121 &
n.510 (discussing exemption adopted for Nebraska whooping cranes, granted on condition that
comprehensive mitigation plan be adopted, and exemption granted the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management in 1992 for certain timber sales in northern spotted owl habitat). The exemption
granted BLM never took effect. BLM withdrew its application to the Committee after the Ninth
Circuit found reason to believe that the White House attempted to exert illegal influence over the
Committee and the Clinton Administration too office. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered
Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1540 (9th Cir. 1993).
348. Of course, such consensus is not necessary for the Endangered Species
Committee to act. The fact that Oregon's representative on the Committee voted against the
BLM exemption indicates that the citizens of the Pacific Northwest did not clearly support
continued unsustainable timber harvesting in northern spotted owl habitat. In any event,
however, the Clinton Administration is apparently committed to preventing the sort of
interagency dispute that caused the spotted owl crisis to reach the Committee. See Spigal, supra
note 186, at 413; Joan Laatz, The New Order: The Endangered Species Act and Political Reality Clash as
New Leaders Look to Save Salmon, OREGONIAN, Nov. 29, 1994, at A1, A7. Moreover, these factors
might make it difficult to convince Congress to grant the FCRPS a legislative exemption from
the ESA, should the federal dam operating agencies or private utility, irrigation, navigation, or
aluminum interests seek one. Of course, if BPA is successful in convincing Congress and the
citizens of the region that the costs of recovering the salmon runs threaten its financial viability
or the reliability of the hydropower system, then increased political consensus to avoid those
costs could develop. See Spigal, supra note 186, at 414.
349. One prominent Pacific Northwest politician has indicated that he believes the costs
of recovery salmon are high enough to justify allowing the listed runs to go extinct. See Scott
Sonner, Gorton: Salmon Might Have to Go, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 20, 1995, at B1. Vice President Al Gore
and NMFS' fisheries manager for the Pacific Northwest have publicly promised that the Clinton
Administration will not adopt this attitude. See Jessica Maxwell, How to Save a Salmon, AUDUBON 28,
31, July-Aug. 1994 (quoting Vice President Gore's comments at the Northwest Watershed
Restoration/Partnership Conference, Tacoma, WA, Feb. 16-17, 1994) (stating that Administration
intends to "get the jump on restoring the great salmon runs that are the heart and soul of the
Northwest."); Bill Mackenzie & Joan Laatz, Planners Weigh Cheap Power, Salmon, OREGONIAN, Dec. 7,
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Administration maintains a public commitment to restoring the runs, BPA,
the Corps or the Bureau may nevertheless delay or otherwise resist taking
actions mandated by NMFS. Under such circumstances, Judge Marsh may
find himself asked to become the Pacific Northwest's rivermaster.
Judge Marsh could find precedent for acting in such a capacity. In the past
other federal judges in the region have been forced to exert substantial control
over natural resource allocation where government agencies have refused to obey
laws limiting their management discretion. During the 1970s, the federal courts
began acting as regional fisheries manager after decades of state fish and wildlife
agency interference with tribal treaty fishing rights.350 Similarly, during recent years
federal judges in Oregon and Washington have sharply restricted timber
harvesting on the region's national forests as a consequence of federal foresters'
violations of laws protecting wildlife.351

1994, at C1, C7 (quoting NMFS regional director Will Stelle) ("The administration is committed to
. . . restoring the health of the entire basin and the financial health of the energy system itself."). Of
course, the Republican takeover of Congress in January 1995 may result in increased pressure in
the Administration to avoid expending significant federal resources on salmon restoration. Cf.
Joan Laatz, The New Order, supra note 348, at A1, A7 (noting that NMFS and Fish and Wildlife
Service are likely to experience budget cuts during 104th Congress and that Republican majority
in Congress is likely to weaken the Endangered Species Act); Joan Laatz, Natural Resources Face
Cloudy Future in Congress, OREGONIAN, Dec. 15, 1994, at A1, A16 (noting that region's industrial
leaders are planning to ask Congress to force NMFS and federal dam operating agencies to weigh
costs of salmon restoration measures against their benefits). Cf. John H. Cushman, Jr., Timber! A
New Idea is Crashing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1995, at E5 (reporting congressional Republicans' hostility
to ecosystem management approach for public natural resources). Moreover, the four-state
Pacific Northwest region lost many Congressmen friendly to salmon restoration efforts in the
1994 elections. See Laatz, The New Order, supra at A7 (noting defeat of five Washington state
incumbent Representatives considered "salmon-friendly"). Thus, political support within the
region for costly restoration is now significantly weaker than it was when the Vice President
committed the Administration to unified efforts to rebuild the runs.
350. See United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part, vacated in part en banc, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985); United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.Wash.
1978), aff'd sub nom., Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573, F.2d 1123
(9th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom., Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); United States v. Washington,
384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086
(1976); Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969), aff'd as modified sub nom., United States
v. Oregon, 529 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1976).
351. See Allison C. Flournoy, Beyond the "Spotted Owl Problem": Learning From the
Old Growth Controversy, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 261, 284-300 (1993) (outlining history of
ancient forest management in Pacific Northwest); Victor M. Sher, Travels With Strix: The
Spotted Owl's Journey Through the Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 41 (1993).
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Nevertheless, those who seek judicial control of the river may be
disappointed. The challenges to a judge who assumes the role of Columbia
River system manager would be much greater than the problems confronted
by the judges in the treaty fishing rights and forest management cases. In
the treaty fishing and forest management cases the plaintiffs generally
sought an order dividing the natural resources available or injunctions to
maintain the status quo. A judge who chooses to manage the economic
uses of the Columbia River system would face a much more difficult task,
since the manipulation of a river to produce power, allow irrigation and
navigation, and protect the fish and wildlife that depend on it, requires dayto-day, and sometimes even hour-to-hour, changes in dam operations.352
Because judges are ordinarily reluctant to undertake tasks inconsistent with
the traditional role of courts in our society, Judge Marsh may resist any
invitations to become the judicial overseer of the river.353 Moreover, the
public may suffer unfortunate consequences if Judge Marsh, in spite of the
complexity of the task, eventually assumes a more significant role in
controlling the operations of the hydropower system. Concerned citizens
would no longer have the opportunity to influence decisions affecting a
significant regional economic asset nor participate in the public dialogue
about how best to save an important natural and cultural resource. Thus,
neither a decision to incur the costs necessary to save the salmon runs, nor
one that society's interests are best served by sacrificing them, would rest
on a foundation of public awareness and support.
VII. Responses to Northwest Resource Information Center and Idaho
Department of Fish & Game: Little Cause for Hope, Necessary
Steps Towards Recovery Not Forthcoming
A.

The Council's December 1994 Program Amendments and
Their Aftermath

During the first decade of the Program, the Council often rejected, on the
basis of its own scientific views and in the interests of consensus, recommendations

352. See Michael C. Blumm, Columbia Basin Salmon and the Courts: Reviving the Parity Promise,
25 Envtl. L. 353, 362 (1995) ("Courts have neither the institutional competency nor the interest
to manage this system that has become such a headache for so many.").
353. For this reason, Idaho did not seek an injunction in Idaho Department of Fish & Game,
Will Whelan, Idaho's Strategy in Idaho Department of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 25 Envtl.
L. 401, 404 (1995). Moreover, Judge Marsh himself has previously demonstrated an unwillingness
to insert his court into controversies over the scientific merit of particular salmon conservation
activities. See Northwest Resource Info. Center, Inc., v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 93-870-MA
(slip op.) (D. Or. 1993) (denying plaintiff's request for injunction halting transportation of juvenile
salmon), aff'd in part and rev's in part on other grounds, 56 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1995).
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aimed at restoring sustainable and harvestable runs to the Basin's rivers and
streams.354 But Northwest Resource Information Center ensured that the Council could not
continue compromising the biological needs of the region's salmon. The Ninth
Circuit emphasized that the region must begin the process of returning river
conditions to the rivers. Northwest Resource Information Center therefore closed the door
on the accommodation of the utilities' and DSIs' interests and delaying tactics the
Council used for so long to avoid confronting the imminent disappearance of one of
the Pacific Northwest's defining characteristics.355 The public waited only thirteen
weeks for the Council's response to the Strategy for Salmon's demise.356 When it
came, there could be no doubt that the Council heard the judges' message. On
December 14, 1994, the Council approved bold new measures to restore the
Columbia River Basin's disappearing salmon runs.357
In contrast to the Strategy for Salmon, the 1994 program amendments
reflect the urgent necessity for prompt and aggressive actions to stave off
the extinction of listed salmon stocks.358 Finally, the Council accepted that
increased water velocity may be essential if mortality during passage is to be
significantly decreased, and acted to assure adequate flows in the lower
Columbia and Snake Rivers. Thus, the Council demonstrated that it takes
seriously the Ninth Circuit's warnings that the judgments of fish and wildlife
managers are entitled to significant deference and that sound biological
objectives, based on knowledge existing today, must be established.
1.

Written Explanation

The Council responded to numerous comments submitted when the
draft 1994 amendments were released and included in the amended

354.

See supra notes 61-62, 72-73, 82, 108-121 and accompanying text.

355. But Cf. Volkman, supra note 239 (comments on Northwest Resource Information
Center by Council's general counsel) (stating belief that the Ninth Circuit's opinion
precludes the Council from doubting the biological justifications for
recommendations submitted by fish and wildlife agencies and tribes).
356. Northwest Resource Information Center was decided on September 9, 1994. The
Council adopted amendments to the Program on December 15, 1994.
357. Press reaction to the Council's December 1994 Program amendments noted the
unprecedented nature of the Council's actions. See, e.g., Northwest Power Council Unveils Sweeping
Strategy, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK: GREENWIRE, Dec. 15, 1994 (available on Westlaw, APN-GR
Database) (characterizing 1994 Program amendments as the beginning of "the biggest
endangered species bailout in history" and as a "bold plan"); Joan Laatz, Power Council OK's Plan to
Save Salmon, OREGONIAN, Dec. 15, 1994, at A1 (labeling Program amendments "aggressive").
358. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1994 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH
AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM 1-1 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 PROGRAM] (acknowledging that
previous efforts to restore salmon runs "have not been enough to rescue some
species"); 1-2 (urging region to "redouble the efforts" to protect salmon).
401

12/16/2007 4:57 PM

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

Program itself a detailed discussion of the rationale supporting adopted
measures. The Council provided a useful summary of the current state of the
scientific inquiry into the controversial question whether juvenile salmon
survival is directly related to high water velocity.359 Similarly, the Council
treated the question of whether smolt mortality is significantly decreased
through the use of barge and truck transportation with a broad overview of
the current state of scientific support for that Program.360 The Council's
findings on Program recommendations were extensive and reflect
substantially more deference to the expertise of fish and wildlife agencies
and tribes than was shown during the 1991-92 amendment process. On the
central issues of flows, smolt travel times and hydroelectric project
operations constraints, the Council largely adopted the recommendations of
fish and wildlife agencies and tribes.361
2.

Biological Objectives

After providing a detailed analysis of the Northwest Power Act's biological
objective requirements, the Council established biologically-based goals for the
development and operation of the hydroelectric system. In determining the extent
of the biological objectives required by the Act, the Council wisely dodged an
attempt by power interests to slow the amendment process and force the Council to
shift restoration responsibility away from the hydropower system. Several power
interests argued that the Act required a comprehensive set of quantifiable objectives
for the entire salmon life-cycle.362 While disagreeing with the argument that
biological objectives must relate to all actions that cause salmon to die, the Council
acknowledged the central role of biological objectives in comparing the cost of
alternative measures363 and emphasized that such objectives must be "sound,"
meaning "supported by data and information," and "reflect the best available
scientific knowledge."364 The Council took pains to point out that Congress
considered biological objectives especially important with respect to flows,
specifically noting that the Act requires flow decisions to be "based on biology and
not other considerations."365
The Council reaffirmed a short-term Program goal, set several years
ago, of doubling the runs in the interim and a long-term focus on protecting,
mitigating and enhancing fish and wildlife as much as possible while also

402

359.

1994 PROGRAM, supra note 358, at 5-9 to 5-12.

360.

Id. at 5-12 to 5-13.

361.

See infra notes 374-405 and accompanying text.

362.

1994 PROGRAM, supra note 358, at 15-16.

363.

Id. at 15-18.

364.

Id.

365.

Id. at 15-19.

12/16/2007 4:57 PM

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

avoiding the loss of biological diversity.366 To accomplish these goals, the
1994 amendments establish four system-wide sub-goals: (1) halt declines in
the runs and rebuild populations to sustainable levels by 2000;367 (2) halt
declines in particular salmon runs and "rebuild [the] population by 2030 to a
level that will support commercial and sports harvest" and contribute to the
doubling of all salmon in the Basin;368 (3) rebuild by 2194 all populations to
a level that goes beyond the first two sub-goals and allows the protection,
mitigation and enhancement of all fish and wildlife affected by the
hydropower system;369 and (4) accomplish the populations without loss of
biological diversity.370
The Council further broke down the sub-goals into a series of planning
principles aimed at restoring the long-term health of the runs. These include: (1)
give priority to actions that aim to rebuild the weakest stocks, particularly the listed
Snake River runs; (2) generally avoid Program activities that create an "appreciable
risk" to biological diversity; (3) approach habitat and production activities "from a
total-water-shed perspective," which means that such activities should include
comprehensive actions and local involvement; (4) provide harvest opportunities in
tributaries and weak-stock areas to meet treaty obligations; (5) give priority to
actions that examine "critical uncertainties" or "test important hypotheses" about
salmon; and (6) avoid construction of new hatcheries "unless it is clear that the need
for fish cannot be met with existing facilities or a new facility would be a better way
to achieve the [P]rogram's goals."371

366. Id. at 4-4. The Council accepted with modifications CRITFC's
recommendation that all salmon losses caused by the hydroelectric system be fully mitigated.
The Council believed its mandate to maintain an "adequate, efficient, economical and reliable
power supply" might be compromised if it established a focus solely on fish restoration. The
Council believed this modification was not inconsistent with CRITFC's recommendations
because its Program goals include a focus on avoiding any further loss of biological diversity.
Id. at 15-42. The doubling goal applies to the whole Basin, not particular runs. Id. § 4.1A, at 4-5.
367.

Id. at 4-4.

368.

Id. at 4-4.

369.

Id.

370. Id. The regulation goals are not set as numeric targets because the
Council was concerned that doing so would lead to insufficient protection against
adverse genetic impacts. Id. 4-4, 4-5.
371. Id. at 4-5 to 4-6. The Council noted that its focus on weak stocks should receive the bulk
of the funds for the Program for at least five years, but also declared that listed runs are not the only
stocks to be considered weak and therefore subject to priority rebuilding efforts. The Council
acknowledged that many imperiled runs are not listed under the ESA and pointed out that failure to
focus on them immediately would surely lead to more listed runs. Id. at 4-6. But the Council also
emphasized the importance of investing toward the goal of restored tribal harvests: "Upriver fishers
are entitled to salmon populations that are more than museum specimens." Id. at 4-6.
403
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To achieve the Program goals and rebuilding targets, the Council set one
central biological objective: increased water velocity.372 After thirteen years of
failing to confront or even frankly to acknowledge the conflict between adequate
fish flows and power generation, the Council finally agreed with the opinion of fish
and wildlife agencies and tribes that increased water velocity was the most
reliable method for improving smolt survival.373
3.

Other Provisions

The Council acknowledged that the Water Budget, as modified by the Strategy
for Salmon, would fail to provide the flows needed to rebuild the Snake River
stocks.374 The Council also admitted that it did not fully understand the exact
relationship between flows, water velocity and salmon survival.375 But the Council
recognized that the salmon runs are affected by numerous human and natural
impacts and that the runs had thrived before large-scale hydroelectric development
because they had not been subjected to the lethal impacts of dams and slackwater
reservoirs.376 Therefore, the Council took seriously the Northwest Power Act's
command not to wait for scientific certainty before acting.377 To achieve juvenile
travel time objectives, the Council ordered three reservoirs to be lowered over the
next five years and committed itself to decide whether to drawdown two others.378

372.

Id. at 5-9 to 5-17.

373. Id. at 5-9 ("The Council accepts that there is a relationship between flow,
water velocity, fish travel time and survival such that increasing water velocity
increases the survival of salmon and steelhead from the onset of active downstream
migration to adult spawner."); id. at 5-10 (The "biologically important" aspect of the
relationship between flow, water velocity, and transportation "is water velocity.").
374. Id. at 5-2 ("Analyses conducted by the Council indicate that, absent
additional action and a substantial change in ocean conditions, salmon populations
in the Snake Basin will not rebuild and will, in all likelihood, go extinct.").
375.

Id. at 5-3, 5-10.

376. Id. at 5-2 ("The salmon runs were able to survive poor natural conditions
in the past and would be able to survive in today's conditions but for a wide variety
of human-caused sources of mortality.").
377. See id. at 2-5 ("Congress directed the Council . . . not to await scientific certainty
prior to action."). The Council also established a research agenda aimed at clarifying the
effects of increased flows on smolt survival, announcing that the relationship requires "the
highest priority in the region's research efforts." Id. at 5-13. To accomplish the needed
research, the Council called for the establishment of a technical working group to be
organized by an independent Scientific Group. Id. § 5.0F1, at 5-14.
378. Id. at 5-14 to 5-32. The affordable economic consequences of using drawdowns to
increase water velocity in the lower Columbia and lower Snake Rivers apparently helped convince
the Council to include a reservoir drawdown plan in the Program amendments issued in
404
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On the lower Snake River, the amendments call for Lower Granite reservoir to be
lowered to an elevation of 710 feet during the spring of 1995379 and an additional
twenty feet commencing during the spring of 1996.380 Little Goose reservoir is to be
drawn down to "near spillway crest" during the two spring months beginning in
1999.381 Based on the results of the Lower Granite and Little Goose drawdowns, the
Council will decide, before 2002, whether to draw down the reservoirs behind Lower
Monumental and Ice Harbor Dams to spillway or natural river levels.382
The objective of the Snake River drawdowns is to achieve a water
velocity of 140 kcfs.383 That velocity, which would be a substantial
improvement over that achievable under the Strategy for Salmon, is to be
attained by establishing a minimum monthly average flow of 85 kcfs.384
However, drawdowns do not make more water available for increased flows.
Accordingly, the Council issued a number of directives aimed at acquiring
additional water for Program implementation. First, the Council required
BPA and the dam operating agencies to shift storage water between
reservoirs in low-flow years.385 To make such shifts possible, the Council
directed that Dworshak reservoir be raised as close to its power-production

December 1994. See infra notes 389-393, 403 and accompanying text. The Council decided to delay
the planned drawdowns in order to allow adequate time for modifying salmon passage facilities
at Lower Granite and Little Goose Dams and irrigation pumps at John Day reservoir, as well as to
permit the study of how best to modify John Day Dam to allow continued irrigation and
navigation and minimize drawdown impacts on power production and flood control. Id.
379.

Id. § 5.3A.1, at 5-25.

380.

Id. § 5.3B.2(1), at 5-26.

381.

Id. § 5.3B.2(2), at 5-26.

382. Id. § 5.3B.9, at 5-27. To effectively monitor the effects of the Snake River
drawdowns, the Council established an oversight committee that will include
representatives of BPA, the dam operating agencies, federal and state fish and
wildlife agencies and treaty tribes. The committee is also assigned responsibility for
overseeing implementation of the drawdown program. Id. § 5.3B.14, at 5-27.
383.

Id. at 5-24.

384. Id. at 5-20. The velocity target applies between April 10 and June 20 in all water years.
Id. Thus, the 1994 amendments should avoid the risk that inadequate fish flows will be available
in low water years. Between June 21 and July 31, dam operators are to maintain a monthly average
flow equivalent to 50 kcfs. Id. These flow standards had been recommended by the Oregon
Department of Fish and Wildlife. Id. at 15-29. Interestingly, CRITFC did not recommend Snake
River flow targets. Instead, it sought "flow augmentation volume objectives" that would apply
between April 15 and September 30 and which would have maintained the underlying
methodology of the Water Budget. See NORTHWEST PACIFIC POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1
RECOMMENDATIONS TO AMEND THE ANADROMOUS FISH SECTIONS OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND
WILDLIFE PROGRAM, § 5-2, at 2-3 (1994).
385.

Id., § 5.2A.1, at 5-20.
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role curve as possible by April 10 each year386 and that 1 million acre-feet of
water be made available for flows from Dworshak during the spring and
summer migration season.387 In addition, the Council asked BPA, the Bureau,
and the states of Washington, Idaho and Montana to allocate 90 kaf of
storage toward spring migration flows,388 and to increase that annual
dedication by 500 kaf in 1996 and 1998.389 The Council also requested state
water agencies to facilitate water transactions390 and directed that Brownlee
Reservoir be operated to achieve spring flow targets and release substantial
storage between the spring and September of each year.391
Flows must also be improved on the lower Columbia River. Accordingly, the
Council established a series of flow equivalents at The Dalles Dam ranging between
300 kcfs between April 15 and June 15 in 1995; 200 kcfs between June 16 and July 31
in 1995; and 160 kcfs between August 1-31, 1995.392 In 1996, and in the second years
of future biannual "critical periods," the spring flow equivalents are lower: 260 kcfs
between April 15-June 15; 200 kcfs between June 16-July 31; and 160 kcfs between
August 1-31. During 1997 and the third and fourth years of a "critical period," the

386.

Id. at 5-21.

387. Id. To achieve the Dworshak targets during summer migration season, the
Corps must draft the reservoir to an elevation of 1520 feet by July. Id. § 5.2B.2, at 5-23.
388.

Id., § 5.2A.2, at 5-21.

389. Id., § 5.2A.3, at 5-21. The additional 1.09 maf thus allocated would be in addition to
the 427 kaf provided for by the Strategy for Salmon. Id. However, the Council's directive may
not be implemented because the needed water must be acquired through voluntary sales
transactions, "non-structural approaches," new storage, or a combination of these possibilities.
Id. Early indications are that Idaho farmers may be unwilling to sell any water for fish recovery
efforts. See Rocky Barker, NMFS Plan Lets Farmers Control Tap., IDAHO FALLS POST-REGISTER, Mar. 2,
1995, at A-1 (noting that Bureau is offering $150 per acre-foot for water purchased by irrigation
districts from federal government for $2.50 per acre-foot and is experiencing difficulty finding
willing sellers).
390.

1994 PROGRAM, supra note 358, § 5.2A.5, at 5-22.

391. Id., §§ 5.2A.9-5.2A.10. To comply with the Council's request, Idaho Power
Company, the Corps, the Bureau, and FERC must guarantee that 110 kaf of water
could be made available if needed during the spring migration season and avoid
refilling in June, provide a maximum of 137 kaf of storage for summer migration in
July, pass through 50-140 kaf in August, and allocate 100 kaf for fall flows in
September. Id., § 5.2A.10. In addition, Idaho Power Company is directed to modify
operations at its Hells Canyon complex to achieve coordinated fall and spring flows
and maintain chinook spawning, incubation, and emergence. Idaho Power Company
must also examine how Hells Canyon can provide more water downstream to assist
migration at Brownlee Reservoir, Id., § 5.2a.11.
392.
406

Id. at 5-29.
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spring flow equivalent is set at 220 kcfs.393 Thus, the Council has not wholly retreated
from its paradoxical approach to fish flows during drought years: when less rainfall
creates more adverse river conditions for fish, less water is provided. That method of
allocating the Columbia River system's waters was a flaw in the Water Budget of the
1980s,394 and will continue to be an unjustified and counter-intuitive barrier to
effective salmon recovery efforts in the future.
The Council's lower Columbia River goal is 3.45 maf for the Water
Budget's fish flow allocation, to be supplemented by a firm allocation of 4
maf during spring migration.395 The Council directed that adequate water,
beyond the Water Budget volume, be available to assist summer migration
behind The Dalles Dam by April 30.396 To achieve its lower Columbia River
velocity goals, the Council decided to lower John Day reservoir to a
minimum irrigation pool between May 1-August 31 starting in 1996 and to
require an evaluation of whether to require an additional thirty-seven foot
drawdown, to spillway crest, before April 30, 1996.397
As an additional device to reduce juvenile mortality, the Council commanded
the Corps to spill enough water over dam spillways to allow eighty percent of the
smolts migrating between April 15 and July 31 on the Snake and between May 1 and
August 31 on the Columbia to avoid encountering hydroelectric turbines during their
voyage to the sea.398 The Council mandated additional improvements in facilities
allowing adult salmon to bypass the dams and intensified efforts to control predation
of juveniles in hydropower system reservoirs.399

393.

Id.

394.

See notes 62-63 and accompanying text.

395. The Water Budget allocation of 3.45 maf is the aggregate of a monthly
minimum velocity standard of 58 kcfs/month. Id., § 5.4A, at 5-29.
396. Id., § 5.4A.3, at 5-29 to 5-30. Other measures to assist summer migration
include directives to BPA to allocate non-Treaty Dam storage during July and August
of low-water years; seek energy exchanges to facilitate greater summer flows; and
allow the reservoir behind Grand Coulee Dam to draft to an elevation of 1,280 feet if
necessary to achieve flow targets. Id., § 5.4B, at 5-31.
397.

Id., § 5.4C, at 5-32.

398. Id., § 5.6A, at 5-36. To reduce the likelihood that increased spills will
cause juveniles to contract nitrogen supersaturation disease, the amendments
require the Corps to conduct the spills in compliance with Washington and Oregon
laws limiting dissolved gases in reservoir waters. Id., § 5.6C.1, at 5-40. Accordingly,
the 1994 Program amendments also ask the Corps to accelerate dams' modifications
that reduce gas supersaturation. Id., § 5.6E.2, at 5-41. The Council also required the
Corps to install slotted spillway gates at all FCRPS dams and to continue improving
hydropower turbine screens. Id.
399.

Id., §§ 5.6A-5.6B, 5.7, at 5-36 to 5-40, 5-42 to 5-47.
407
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Of course, the 1994 amendments do not focus exclusively on flows and the
means necessary to achieve them. The Council also directed that a number of steps be
taken to improve adult salmon survival during up-river migration, including: (1)
initiating upgrades to existing passage facilities at the Basin's dams;400 (2) performing
evaluations of the necessity for new passage facilities, more effective attraction flows
and corrected fishery hydraulics;401 and (3) retaining fish screens in place after the
juvenile migration season ends where adult fallback is a documented problem.402
Moreover, the Council recommended that additional water be allowed to flow into the
lower Snake to reduce water temperatures.403 To improve the Basin's efforts to protect
spawning habitat, the Council mandated immediate efforts to gather data on wild
stocks, review the impacts of the hatchery system, and coordinate all supplementation
activities.404 In addition, the Council called for changes in land and water management,
water diversion screening, habitat priorities, and an expedited funding process.405
The Council's adoption of velocity goals, greater flows and increased
allocation of storage to assist migration is consistent with recommendations long
advanced by fish and wildlife agencies and tribes and indicates that the Council took
its statutory obligation to afford deference on scientific issues seriously. Those

400. The Council directed the Corps to automate all control systems; place measuring
devices in accessible areas; place velocity meters in low velocity areas of collection channels;
construct additional ladders at Lower Granite and Little Goose Dams by 1999; provide increased
attraction water for all ladder collection channels and entrances by 1997; modify the collection
channel at McNary Dam by 1996; construct collection channel extensions at Lower Granite and
Little Goose Dams by 1998; complete fishway modifications and improvements at Bonneville
Dam by 1997; and determine whether to cover existing ladders. Id., § 6.1A.4, at 6-2. The Council
also mandated compliance with existing fishway operating and passage centers, including,
among other things, minimization of power peaking; establishment of ramping rates; elimination
of zero-flow operations; and reduction of ladder water temperatures. Id., at 6-1, 6-2. The owners of
the mid-Columbia's dams were ordered to determine whether adult losses are occurring between
those hydroelectric projects and to evaluate whether establishment of optimum flows and spill
configurations is necessary. Id., § 6.1E.1, at 6-5. Douglas County Public Utility District (PUD),
Chelan County PUD, and Grant County PUD were directed to rectify and correct fishery problems
at Wells, Rocky Reach, Priest Rapids and Wanapum Dams. Id., §§ 6.1E2-6.1E.4, at 6-5.
401. Id., § 6.1A.2, at 6-2. The Corps is commanded to install backup parts,
attraction water pumps, or fish turbines as necessary. Id.
402.

Id., § 6.1A.3, at 6-2.

403. Id., § 6.1D.3, at 6-4 (requiring releases of 100 kaf of storage from Brownlee
Dam and Hells Canyon complex, reduction of water temperatures at Ice Harbor Dam,
and studies of whether cool water releases from Dworshak Dam and Hells Canyon
complex in August and September improves adult fall chinook survival).
404.

Id., §§ 7.0-7.5.

405. Id., § 7.6-7.8. The 1994 amendments also focus on resident fish and
wildlife, however, detailed discussion of those aspects of the Program are beyond the
scope of this Article.
408
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measures will, if implemented, be a positive step toward salmon recovery, and the
Council accordingly deserves credit for committing the region to them.
Unfortunately, for all of the Council's willingness to accept that restored runs require
healthy river conditions, the Council failed to take the one step that could have,
more than any other, left no doubt that the Basin is willing to invest in a renewed
fishery: making plain its commitment to ending transportation as a means of
assisting smolt migration.
The Council remains convinced that barge and truck transportation
may, under some circumstances, improve salmon survival.406 Thus, the
Council concluded that it could achieve its objective of "an effective fish and
wildlife rebuilding effort"407 that "meets the needs of salmon with a level of
certainty comparable to that accorded other operational purposes" by
continuing the region's reliance on the transportation program. But
transportation, as a tool for improving smolt survival, has never been
assessed in terms of its performance relative to allowing juvenile salmon to
pass over dam spillways.408 Moreover, transportation actually harms wild
fish.409 In fact, studies of the effects of transportation on salmon have been
performed on all species.410 Some of these studies show that transportation
increases the number of smolts that successfully pass Bonneville Dam, but
there is also evidence that fewer transported fish return from the ocean.411
Thus, the biological merits of transportation are at least debatable and

406. See id. at 5-12 ("The Council accepts that under some passage conditions,
transportation can increase the survival of salmon and steelhead from the onset of
active downstream migration to their return as adult spawners relative to survival
experienced by fish migrating in the river.").
407.

Id. at 1-3.

408.

The Council acknowledges this. See id. at 5-12 n.6.

409. Some studies show that smolts of some species lose some of their ability
to survive in saltwater after undergoing barge transportation. See Carl B. Schreck &
James L. Congleton, EVALUATION OF FACILITIES FOR COLLECTION, BYPASS, AND
TRANSPORTATION OF OUTMIGRATING CHINOOK SALMON (abstract) (Oct. 1993).
410. NMFS, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
SECTION 7 BIOLOGICAL OPINION OF THE REINITIATION OF CONSULTATION AND 1994-98 OPERATION OF THE
FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND JUVENILE TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM (Mar. 1995)
[hereinafter 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION] (discussing several scientific studies).
411. See Ad Hoc Transportation Review Group, Review of Salmon and Steelhead Transportation
Studies with Columbia and Snake Rivers (1984-89) (Dec. 31, 1992); P.R. MUNDY ET AL., TRANSPORTATION OF
JUVENILE SALMONIDS FROM HYDROELECTRIC PROJECTS IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN (FINAL REPORT) 116
(U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 1994) (concluding that available evidence indicates that
transportation can improve adult survival under some adverse river conditions, but also declaring
that the evidence also indicates that transportation cannot ensure reconstruction of Snake River
and upper Columbia River runs). The Council acknowledged these studies. 1994 PROGRAM, supra
note 358, at 5-12 n.7.
409
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possibly entirely absent.412 The most likely result of continued reliance on
transportation of migrating smolts will not be restored runs, but the
perpetuation of collective indecision. Transportation is an anesthetic that
dulls the region's awareness of the choice that must be made: manage the
Columbia River system in a manner likely to afford adequate habitat for
salmon, or allow that resource to disappear in the interests of continued
dependence on the cheapest electric power in the nation, subsidized
navigation and irrigated agriculture.
Aside from the Council's commitment to transportation in the face of
increased concern among scientists that this form of passage harms salmon,413
the Program also continues to depend on hatcheries as a means for sustaining
the Pacific Northwest's fishing industry and satisfying treaty obligations to Indian
tribes.414 This is equally unlikely to advance the Council's restoration goals.
Hatchery production damages the adaptive capability of wild stocks,415 which are
ecologically unique as a result of genetic differences fostered by the isolation of
one stock from another.416 Hatchery production also tends to reduce genetic

412. 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 358, § 5.0F, at 5-13. The Council wisely
requested that research on the effects of transportation be afforded the "highest
priority" and appropriately labeled the barging program an "experiment."
413. The transportation program may violate the ESA. Many critics, including state fish
and wildlife agencies, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the region's tribes, and other fishery
advocates, believe that transportation has not increased smolt survival. They argue that
transportation may actually increase juvenile mortality by contributing to increased stress levels,
disease transmission, and disorientation created by the process. See Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8,
at 693; note 410, supra (discussing recent scientific studies). Because the transportation program
requires the capture of endangered juvenile salmon, the ESA requires the Corps to obtain an
"incidental take permit" for the program. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(d), Environmentalists have
challenged the program on grounds that NMFS should not have granted such a permit when
alternative methods for improving in-river conditions for juvenile migration exist. The district
court rejected this argument. See Northwest Resource Info. Center, Inc., v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries
Serv., Civ. No. 93-870-MA (slip op.) (D. Or., Dec. 22, 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
56 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1995). The issue is again before Judge Marsh in American Rivers, et al. v.
Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., et al., Civ. No. 94-940-MA (D. Or., filed August 4, 1994).
414. The region's fishers and tribes generally support reliance on hatchery
supplementation of wild runs. Jessica Maxwell, How to Save a Salmon, AUDUBON 28, 3031, July-Aug. 1994; Rob Taylor, Hatcheries That Once Aided Coho Salmon Are Now Potential
Foes, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 13, 1994, at A10.
415.

Michael Blumm, Parity V, supra note 8, at 695.

416. Michael L. Goodman, Preserving the Genetic Diversity of Salmonid Stocks: A Call for Federal
Regulation of Hatchery Programs, 20 ENVTL. L. 111, 116, 119 (1990) (citing Bevan, Problems of Managing
Mixed-Stock Salmon Fisheries, in SALMON PRODUCTION, MANAGEMENT AND ALLOCATION: BIOLOGICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND POLICY ISSUES 103, 104 (W. McNeil ed. 1988)). This point was made recently,
somewhat more colorfully by biologist Jim Lichatowich. "A hatchery is like a Ford assembly plant.
410
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diversity, impair natural reproduction417 and harm wild fish by transmitting
disease and increasing competition for available food and habitat.418 But the risks
to existing populations of wild fish are not the only reasons that hatcheries should
be used sparingly, if at all. Artificially produced fish do not adapt well to life in the
wild.419 Continued reliance on hatcheries therefore will not prove to be an efficient
mechanism for sustaining the region's fish harvests.
4.

Aftermath of the 1994 Program Amendments

Recent political developments in the Basin and in Washington, D.C. may render
the Council's actions temporary. Seven of the region's eight United States Senators, all
but one a member of the Senate's new Republican majority, have expressed
opposition to the December 1994 Program amendments.420 At least one, Slade Gorton
of Washington, has indicated a willingness to push a legislative cancellation of the
Council's actions.421 Impacts on Idaho's agriculture also underlies Idaho Governor Phil

It functions best when the product you're working on is all uniform." Sandy Daughton, Hatcheries on
the Hot Seat, [TACOMA] NEWS TRIBUNE, Dec. 27, 1994, at A1.
417. Goodman, supra note 416, at 123-31. 164 (citing Reisenbichler & McIntyre,
Requirements for Integrating Natural and Artifical Production of Anadromous Salmonids in the Pacific Northwest, in
FISH CULTURE IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 372 (R. Stroud ed. 1986) [hereinafter FISH CULTURE]; Blumm,
Parity V, supra note 8, at 695 (citing Fish Culture and William Bakke, Review of Scientific Literature
on the Supplementation of Anadromous Fish from Hatcheries with Comments for the Northwest
Power Planning Council (Nov. 1987) (unpublished manuscript)).
418. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 2, at 680; Blumm, Columbia River
Basin, supra note 35, at 89-90.
419. One study found that wild salmon spawn nine times as successively as
hatchery fish. See Paul Koberstein, Are Hatcheries Producing Salmon "Wimps"?, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 27, 1991, at 27 (citing NMFS study of Kalama River steelhead).
420. See Letter from Senators Larry E. Craig, Conrad Burns, Max Baucus, Mark O. Hatfield,
Dirk Kempthorne, and Slade Gorton to Angus Duncan, Chairman, Northwest Power Planning
Council (Dec. 13, 1994) (on file with author); Joan Laatz, Delay Decision, Senators Urge, OREGONIAN,
Dec. 14, 1994, at E1. Senators Craig and Kempthorne oppose the 1994 amendments because
they call for reservoir drawdowns. Bill Loftus, Flushing Fish: Craig Demands Justification for Plan,
LEWISTON MORNING TRIBUNE, Mar. 13, 1994, at 1C.
421. See Al Biggs, Gorton Suggests Federal Law to Solve Region's Salmon Crisis, [TACOMA] NEWS
TRIBUNE, Oct. 13, 1994, at B6. Any such attempt will apparently draw strong opposition from
Washington Senator Patty Murray and Oregon Congresswoman Elizabeth Furse. See Laatz, Power
Council OK's Plan to Save Salmon, supra note 21, at A1, A26; Laatz, Power Council's Plan Makes Waves in
NW, Elsewhere, at B6. There is some question as to the ability of these legislators to prevent such
congressional meddling, however. Both are Democrats and are therefore in the minority of both
Houses of Congress. Senator Gorton's plans may nevertheless fail in the face of Oregon Senator
Mark O. Hatfield's opposition. Hatfield, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, has
indicated that he will support legislation to fund actions required under the 1994 amendments.
411
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Batt's opposition. Batt does not believe that the water supplies currently used by his
state's farmers are adequate to allow the Council to acquire additional water supplies
for increased fish flows and is concerned that the revised Program will unnecessarily
harm navigation interests based at Lewiston, Idaho.422 Governor Batt's hostility to the
1994 amendments has already affected their continuing viability. Idaho's new
representatives on the Council are Mike Field, a former aide to anti-salmon recovery
Senator Larry Craig, and Todd Maddock, a former timber industry lobbyist. Both
oppose large portions of the Program, including drawdowns.423 In Oregon, Governor
John Kitzhaber has succumbed to pressure from conservative Republicans to seat an
eastern Oregonian on the Council.424
The effects of the recent political changes in the Pacific Northwest
have already been felt. Less than a month after adopting the 1994
amendments, the Council agreed to "reconsider" the "scientific justification"
for them.425 Of course, the region's industrial power consumers, irrigators
and navigation interests, as well as BPA, have signaled their opposition to
the recent amendments and have encouraged politicians to conclude that
they are unaffordable.426 The basis for the opposition to the Program is the

Laatz, Power Council OK's Plan to Save Salmon, supra at A26. The Republican 104th Congress may also
attempt to weaken the ESA, which might reduce pressure on the region to restore the salmon
runs. Joan Laatz, The New Order: The Endangered Species Act and Political Reality Clash as New Leaders Look to
Save Salmon, OREGONIAN, Nov. 29, 1994, at A1, A7; Cf. Foley' Loss, GOP Gains Stire the Pot, AMERICAN
POLITICAL NETWORK: GREENWIRE, Nov. 15, 1994, (available on Westlaw, APN-GR Database) (noting
that Washington Republican Senator Slade Gorton and Idaho Republican Senator Larry Craig will
"have more clout to oppose costly efforts at salmon protection and perhaps [to] dilute the
Endangered Species Act"). By March 1995, both Houses of Congress passed bills forbidding
further ESA listings in 1995, and the House of Representatives has passed a retroactive regulatory
moratorium that would invalidate nearly all rulemakings, including those under the Northwest
Power At and the ESA, since November 20, 1994.
422. See Idaho's Governor-Elect Asks Power Council to Delay Salmon Vote, OREGONIAN,
Dec. 13, 1994, at C6; Dan Gallagher, Idaho Governor Rips Salmon Recovery Plan, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 15, 1995, at B1.
423.

Id.

424. Governor Kitzhaber recently appointed eastern Oregon rancher John Brogoitti
to replace pro-salmon chairman Angus Duncan in September 1995, which means the
Council will lose one of its most persistent advocates for bold restoration measures. See
Jeff Mapes, Power Council Action Solves Problem, OREGONIAN, Mar. 17, 1995, at C6.
425. See First Step to Reconsider Plan to Protect Salmon Taken by Northwest Power
Council, BNA NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT DAILY, Feb. 14, 1995 (available on WESTLAW,
BNA-NED database).
426. Litigation challenging the 1994 amendments has already commenced. See Idaho
Power Co. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, No. 95-70205 (9th Cir., petition for review filed
Feb. 24, 1995). See Laatz, Power Council OK's Plan to Save Salmon, supra note 21, at A26 (quoting
Bruce Lovellin, spokesman for Columbia River Alliance, which represents aluminum
412
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increased costs that it measures will impose on BPA, utilities and the DSIs.
The Council estimates that the 1994 amendments will cost approximately
$177 million,427 resulting in an estimated average residential electricity bill
increase of $2 per month by 1996, with an additional $1 per month by 2015,
and a projected wholesale electricity rate increase of 7%.428
However, it is difficult to summon sympathy. BPA's 1994 revenues
exceeded $2 billion, and residential electricity rates in the region are
significantly lower than elsewhere in the United States.429 Meanwhile, the DSIs
and irrigators benefit from huge energy subsidies,430 and BPA has not attempted
to convince Congress to reduce or eliminate them.431 The subsidies continue

companies, irrigators, utilities, and navigation interests, arguing that costs of Program are
"beyond the region's ability to pay"); Mackenzie & Laatz, Planners Weigh Cheap Power, Salmon, supra
note 349, at C1, C7 (quoting BPA Administrator Randy Hardy's warnings that amended
Program will adversely affect power system "reliability" and increase BPA's "financial" risks). The
Columbia River Alliance has couched its opposition in terms of a warning that greater flows
and water velocity will "destroy" the Basin's economy. Thus, opponents of a credible recovery
effort continue to confuse the debate with questionable invocation of science to defend a
status quo that the courts have warned is legally inadequate.
427. Laatz, Power Council OK's Plan to Save Salmon, supra note 21, at A1; Northwest Power
Planning Council, News Release, supra note 21, at 3. The costs of the 1994 amendments are in
addition to the $250 million cost of preexisting Program measures. Northwest Power Council Unveils
Sweeping Strategy, supra note 357, at 2. The Council counts in the cost of the 1994 amendments
losses of income suffered by BPA and the additional expense of acquiring necessary
supplemental electric power supplies. Such costs total $57 million, while the remainder of the
newly-modified Program measures - mainly structural modifications to FCRPS dams - account for
the remainder of the $177 million increase. Laatz, Power Council OK's Plan to Save Salmon, supra note
21, at A1, A26.
428.

Laatz, Power Council OK's Plan to Save Salmon, supra note 21, at A1, A26.

429. BPA 1994 Report, supra note 249, at 26. The average residential electricity bill in the
Pacific Northwest is 40% lower than in other states. Timothy Egan, Fight to Save Salmon Starts Fight Over
Water, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1991, at A1; Hathorn, Save our Salmon, Save our Soul, supra note 10, at 14.
430. Subsidies that reduce electricity prices paid by the DSIs, primarily aluminum
companies, and the region's users of irrigation water total approximately $230 million per
year. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, and American Rivers, Changing the
Current: Affordable Salmon Strategies for Salmon Restoration in the Columbia River Basin (1994) (copy
on file with author); Joan Laatz, Report: BPA Off on Claims, OREGONIAN, Dec. 8, 1994, at C1, C9.
But cf. Ellie Winninghoff, Where Have all the Salmon Gone?, FORBES, Nov. 21, 1994, at 104 (noting
that federal government spends more than $1 billion per year to subsidize power
consumption by Pacific Northwest residential and industrial energy users and that BPA's
aluminum industry customers pay 2 cents per kilowatt hour for federal hydropower, or onethird the average industrial electricity rate nationwide).
431. Interview with K.C. Golden, Northwest Conservation Act Coalition (Feb. 25, 1995).
Other significant adverse impacts to BPA's financial health are drought and the increasing
413

12/16/2007 4:57 PM

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

because BPA is insulated from the electricity market. BPA is required by public
preference clauses contained in the Bonneville Project Act and incorporated
into the Northwest Power Act to sell the region's hydroelectric power at cost and
to offer it first to public-sector agencies, such as public utility districts.432 Only if
power remains available for sale after fulfilling public-sector demand may BPA
sell electricity to private-sector customers at cost.433 Under this system, the
inflation-adjusted price of BPA power fell from 2.74 cents per kilowatt-hour in
1940 to 2.28 cents per kilowatt-hour in 1990.434
Accordingly, one way to remedy BPA's concern that salmon
conservation costs will result in the loss of its customers may be to force the
agency to compete in the wholesale electric power market.435 Although
Congress fleetingly attempted to bring market forces to bear on BPA in the
1960s, when it authorized construction of an interstate power intertie,436 the
bills that authorized funding for intertie construction continued to constrain
BPA's ability to sell power outside the region by granting a preference to
Pacific Northwest electricity consumers.437 Thus, BPA cannot sell federal
hydroelectricity to the buyers who are willing to pay the most for it, even
though doing so may increase the amount of income produced by the

availability of low cost natural gas. Hearing Focuses on BPA Financial Problems, AMERICAN POLITICAL
NETWORK: GREENWIRE, Mar. 17, 1995 (available on WESTLAW, APN-GR database).
432. Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 839c(a), 839g(c); Bonneville Project Act
of 1937, 16 U.S.C. § 832c. See generally Joseph P. Mertor, Jr. & David C. Jory, The
Preference Clause Revisited: Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility District v. Johnson and the Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Plan and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 413 (1983).
433. Aluminum Co. of Am. V. Central Lincoln People's Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380,
384 (1984). See generally Jeffrey C. Fereday, Comment, The Meaning of the Preference Clause in
Hydroelectric Power Allocation Under the Federal Reclamation Statutes, 9 ENVTL. L. 601 (1979).
434. Winninghoff, supra note 430, at 104. Not surprisingly, one consequence of
the artificially low price created by the public preference clause is a reduced
incentive to conserve electricity. The Pacific Northwest consumes 61% more
electricity, per capita, than any other region in the country. Id.
435. BPA remains bound by preference requirements notwithstanding
Congress' recent decision to permit private utilities to engage in interstate wholesale
"wheeling" of electricity. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 723, 106
Stat. 2782, 2919 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824L).
436. See Act of Aug. 31, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-552, § 8, 78 Stat. 758 (1964). BPA may sell
power to non-Pacific Northwest consumers and transmit it to them by way of the intertie
only if such regional power purchasers do not desire to purchase the electricity. See 16 U.S.C.
§§ 824(i)(5), 837a-e. See generally California Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n v.
Bonneville Power Admin., 831 F.2d 1467, 1470-71 (9th Cir. 1987).
437.
414

See infra notes 438-39 and accompanying text.
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region's hydroelectric system.438 The net result is that BPA must increase its
wholesale electric rates to compensate for the preference discount.
BPA's concerns about the financial impacts of intensified salmon recovery efforts
also rest on warnings by some of its customers that they may buy electricity elsewhere.439
However, BPA is not facing the imminent loss of customers because most existing
power contracts bind purchasers to BPA electricity purchases until 2001.440 The agency
could reduce the financial risks created by the loss of a part of its market by imposing exit
fees to compensate for the federal investment in the power system's infrastructure.441 An

438. One promising market for BPA hydropower is the southwestern United States.
Changes in the power production operations at Glen Canyon Dam, a significant
hydroelectricity producer in the Colorado River Basin, to protect the ecosystem of Grand
Canyon National Park will force energy purchasers in that region to seek alternative supplies
during the month of the year when electricity demand is highest. Since those peak demands
occur in the desert southwest in spring and summer, BPA could sell power to interested
utilities at the same time the water used to generate it could benefit migrating smolts. One
recent estimate indicates that BPA could increase its revenues $30 million per year by taking
advantage of the southwest market. Salem Electric Cooperative, BPA's Competitiveness: Steps BPA
Can Take to Avoid Shifting Costs to Treasury 6 (no date) (unpublished report on file with author)
[hereinafter BPA's Competitiveness] (noting that changes in Glen Canyon Dam operations are
likely to cause loss of 450-800 megawatts of firm peaking capacity during months when
increased flows are needed on Columbia Basin rivers to assist smolts; cost to replace lost Glen
Canyon power is estimated at $28 per kilowatt-month, while BPA currently sells power at
approximately $5 per kilowatt-month). Of course, the preference clause would have to be
modified in order to allow BPA to enter into long-term contracts with southwest utilities.
Unfortunately, the current Administration apparently opposes any such change. See Interview:
Hazel R. O'Leary, 8 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 32, 60 (1994) (interview with Secretary of Energy).
439. Les Blumenthal, Agencies at Odds Over Salmon Runs: Policymakers Debate Who's to Pay for
Habitat, [TACOMA] NEWS TRIBUNE, Mar. 2, 1995, at A1; BPA May Face Spate of Defections, OREGONIAN, Jan.
13, 1995, at C2. If BPA's expenses remain high enough that the agency has difficulty holding onto
customers, then BPA may experience difficulty in repaying the federal treasury for the Basin's
hydroelectric infrastructures. But BPA's $16.3 billion debt could be reallocated to the taxpayers, or
BPA could seek to recoup from fleeing customers the investment in the hydroelectric system.
440.

Interview with K.C. Golden, Northwest Conservation Act Coalition (Feb. 25, 1995).

441. Some states are considering allowing utilities facing retail competition to
impose a transmission charge, which would allow recovery of a portion of the "stranded"
investment in the physical facilities needed to generate and deliver energy. See, e.g., California
Public Utilities Comm'n, Order Instituting Rulemaking and Order Instituting Investigation: On the
Commission's Proposed Policies Governing Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry
(Docket No. R94-04-031) (Apr. 20, 1994). It is not clear, however, whether recovery of a stranded
investment may proceed unrestricted. See Cajun Elec. Power Coop v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n,
28 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994). FERC recently announced a rule that would permit BPA to impose an
exit fee during a three-year experimental window. See Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,274 (1994).
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exit fee would not need to be particularly high. One recent study indicates that BPA
could impose a charge of 7.4 mills per kilowatt hour to cover all of the federal investment
in the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) plants, physical facilities
needed for salmon passage and conservation programs mandated by the Northwest
Power Act. A fee of that amount would also allow BPA to reduce electricity rates charged
to its preferred customers by 25% and maintain a price advantage over competing
regional power providers.442 And an exit fee would be equitable, because the harm to the
Basin's fisheries has primarily benefited BPA's customers, not caused by the FCRPS
taxpayers.443 Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration, faced with opposition from BPA
and Pacific Northwest utility interests, recently killed a proposal to require exit fees.444 But
an exit fee is not BPA's only available avenue for recovering its investments on behalf of
customers. BPA could impose a contract charge, which would require any customer
purchasing a service from BPA to pay a share of the WPPSS debt. Importantly, BPA
lawyers apparently believe a contract charge could be assessed without amending
federal law or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission rules.445
Salmon recovery costs are not even the most significant cause of BPA's
precarious fiscal position. There is little doubt that BPA's resources are stretched,446
but that is mostly the result of the debt accrued when the region launched its effort
to build nuclear power plants during the 1970s.447 Nor has BPA seriously pursued an
effort to force the region's utilities to bear a portion of the costs of the WPPSS

442.

See BPA's Competitiveness, supra note 438, at 7.

443. The aluminum industry receives approximately $180 billion in subsidies from FCRPS
each year, while Pacific Northwest irrigators receive an annual federal water subsidy of $50
million, and the region's navigation interests benefit from federally subsidized sonar on the
Columbia and Snake Rivers to the tune of approximately $30 million each year. See Cost the $64
Million Question for Salmon, 14 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION ACT REPORT 3, 6 (Jan. 13, 1995). The irrigation
subsidy figure does not include approximately $300 million in power revenues lost when water
stored in federal reservoirs is diverted to farms. Id.
444. Michael C. Blumm & Eric Lemelson, BPA Plight Exaggerated by Industry
(editorial opinion), OREGONIAN, Mar. 6, 1995, at B9. Congress is also apparently
unwilling to sanction exit fees. See Bill Mackenzie, Power Players Mull Fees For Those
Leaving BPA, OREGONIAN, Mar. 31, 1995, at B1.
445.

See Nuke Debt: Hole That May Become A Grave, supra note 249, at 1.3.

446. See ASSURING POWER SUPPLY, supra note 256, at 17. BPA does not, however,
appear to face imminent financial failure. See BPA 1994 REPORT, supra note 249, at 26
(noting 1994 net operating revenue of $315,614,000).
447. See BPA 1994 REPORT, supra note 249, at 25 (listing net non-federal projects
debt of $7,141,126); ASSURING POWER SUPPLY, supra note 256, at 27 (WPPSS debt
accounts for approximately 45% of BPA's total debt and interest costs and for about
one-fifth of its net revenue requirement).
416
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fiasco.448 In any event, much of the Program's financial impact on BPA is in the form
of lost revenues, not increased outlays.449 BPA's zeal to contain its expenses is also
not aimed at all the sources of its financial stress, as it has not publicly expressed
similar concerns about the loss of hydropower generating capacity created when
irrigators divest large quantities of Snake River Basin waters at very low prices.450
BPA has been content to continue the region's traditional approach of forcing the
fishery to bear the costs of the region's energy choices and water allocation
decisions; its complaints that increased costs caused by the 1994 amendments
threaten it with financial doom are not matched by a willingness to confront more
significant threats to the health and role in the region's economy. Nevertheless,
whether credible or not, BPA's complaints about the costs of restoring the Basin's
salmon runs have received the sympathetic attention of the Clinton Administration.
The President has agreed to provide $100 million during FY 1996 and 1997 to
implement NMFS' recovery plan for the listed runs.451

448. Interview with K.C. Golden, Northwest Conservation Act Coalition (Feb. 25, 1995). The
financial disaster spawned by the WPPSS has a long and tortured history. During the 1970's, utility
planners and BPA determined that the Pacific Northwest faced an imminent power shortage and
backed the construction of five nuclear power plants to produce additional electricity. BPA provided
crucial assistance in launching the projects by issuing net billing agreements, under which
participating utilities could trade their share of nuclear plant output for a credit toward their purchase
of energy from BPA. Eventually, nearly 100 of the region's utilities agreed to finance the WPPSS
nuclear plants. However, construction of the fourth and fifth nuclear plants was accompanied by a
variety of financial and technical problems, including spectacular cost overruns and a failure of the
expected power demand to materialize. In January 1982, WPPSS defaulted on repayment of $2.25
billion in construction bonds. Lengthy litigation over the question of liability on the bonds followed
the default, with BPA eventually agreeing to assume most of the region's nuclear power plant debt.
See generally WAYNE H. SUGAI, NUCLEAR POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM CRISIS 22-92 (1987); Benjamin E. Walters &
David F. Sugarman, WPPSS and the Pacific Northwest: A Mere Possibility of Unraveling a Hopelessly Twisted Debt,
16 ENVTL. L. 91, 93-104 (1985). As of the summer of 1995, BPA's WPPSS-related debt exceeds $7
billion. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, QUARTERLY REPORT FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30,
1995 (1995). Other financial consequences of the region's experiment with nuclear power are also
not in the past. WPPSS plant number 2 remains in operation, and during fiscal year 1993-94 the cost
to BPA to operate and maintain it was 39 mills per kilowatt-hour (m/kh). Unfortunately, BPA sells the
power generated by the plant to its utility customers for 27 m/kh. Utilities Rain on BPA's Funeral Parade,
14 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION ACT REPORT 1, 2 (Feb. 10, 1995).
449.

Id.

450.

Id. See supra note 443.

451. See Salmon Cost Shift to Taxpayers OK'd, 14 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION ACT REPORT 4 (Mar.
17, 1995). The agreement will enable BPA to shift $60-70 million per year in salmon costs to the
treasury, depending on water conditions. After two years, the shift will be $30-40 million per year.
In return, BPA must reduce its operating expenses by $30-40 million, but may reduce its required
cash reserves and therefore make less probable the payment on its debt to the treasury. Id. In
committing the federal treasury to pay a portion of BPA's salmon costs, the Administration
417
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BPA's financial condition aside, it is not likely that the 1994 amendments
violate the Northwest Power Act's requirement that an adequate, efficient, reliable
and economical power supply be maintained.452 Increased hydroelectricity
generation costs do not transgress this constraint,453 and the Program does not
threaten the region's ability to meet energy demands.454 Congress recognized that
the region's economy would see electricity costs rise since salmon recovery efforts
began, and the Council has concluded that significant adverse financial
consequences for some economic interests, such as the aluminum industry and
public utility districts, does not render the power supply as a whole uneconomic.455
BPA can protect its financial viability by forcing its customers to bear a more
equitable proportion of the region's hydroelectricity investment, and therefore the
Northwest Power Act's implicit mandate to preserve BPA as the region's
predominant electricity wholesaler is not violated by the 1994 amendments.456
B.

The Revised 1994-98 Biological Opinion and the Proposed
Recovery Plan

In March 1995, NMFS issued a revised 1994-98 biological opinion on the
FCRPS and a proposed recovery plan. The agency responded to Judge Marsh's
criticism in Idaho Department of Fish & Game and concluded that status quo

invoked section 4(h)(10)(C) of the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(C). Section
4(h)(10)(C) authorizes BPA to allocate the costs of Program activities "as appropriate" to "various
project purposes." The Administration apparently believes that a substantial portion of the
responsibility for the salmon runs should be absorbed by parties that receive benefits other than
energy from the FCRPS, but there is not an available mechanism for taxing all users other than
energy consumers. Salmon costs can be recovered only from federal taxpayers or regional
ratepayers. Some of the Northwest's representatives in Congress also apparently believe that
salmon recovery costs are the most significant threat to BPA's financial health. Congress is
considering bills that would cap BPA's salmon-related expenditures at percentage of its gross
power revenues. S.481, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. 91995); H.R. 1905, § 509, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995). The bills' definition of cost include foregone power revenues and the cost of power needed
to replace generating capacity lost when stored water is released for increased flows. The bills also
forbid the use of transmission rate increases to pay salmon costs. Id.
452.

See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(5).

453. See Northwest Resource Info. Center, 35 F.3d at 1371 n.13 (noting that
requirement applies to "power supply," not hydroelectric system).
454. See ASSURING POWER SUPPLY, supra note 256, at 11. The Program allows system
operators to draft reservoirs below elevations needed for fish purposes to meet firm loads.
455.

ASSURING POWER SUPPLY, supra note 256, at 3, 13-16.

456. The Council has interpreted the "economical" power supply constraint as a
requirement that BPA be maintained as an entity that can offer energy for sale at prices more
economical than those offered by alternative suppliers. ASSURING POWER SUPPLY, supra note 256, at 1, 3.
418
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operations of the hydroelectric system would jeopardize the listed stocks.457
Nevertheless, the measures contained in the revised 1994-98 biological opinion
and the recovery plan can be considered, at best, small steps toward salmon
recovery. After Idaho Department of Fish & Game and Northwest Resource Information
Center were decided, the Clinton Administration repeatedly promised the region
that it would require recovery efforts similar to those mandated by the Council's
1994 Program amendments. Unfortunately, NMFS produced an array of
restoration measures substantially weaker than those required by the 1994
Program amendments. NMFS' approach is therefore also less likely to prevent
further declines in the endangered runs. While the revised 1994-98 FCRPS
biological opinion and the recovery plan, if finished in its current form, may
survive a future challenge based on arguments that the agency failed to
consider all available information, NMFS has not adequately responded to
Judge Marsh's warning that aggressive action is needed to save the Basin's
salmon runs.
1.

Compliance with Idaho Department of Fish & Game

In the aftermath of Idaho Department of Fish & Game, NMFS opted to
reconsider the 1994-98 biological opinion on FCRPS operations that it had
issued soon before Judge Marsh's decision.458 NMFS also decided to include
the states and treaty tribes in the ESA section 7 consultation process.459
Accordingly, NMFS held discussions with these interested parties
throughout much of 1994. These meetings were intended to achieve a
consensus on the scientific evidence that should be obtained and
considered during the consultation process and the alternatives to current
FCRPS operations that should be considered.460 The Corps, the Bureau and
BPA reinitiated consultation on the FCRPS in December 1994.461 The final
FCRPS 1994-98 biological opinion was issued on March 2, 1995.

457. 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 410, at 88 (Snake River spring/summer
chinook), 89 (Snake River fall chinook), 91 (Snake River sockeye). Because NMFS' proposed
recovery plan includes essentially the same measures for mitigating hydropower system impacts
on listed stocks, it will not be discussed in detail. See NMFS, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION, PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN FOR SNAKE RIVER SALMON, V.2.10-V.2.90 (Mar. 1995).
458. See Letter from Fred. R. Disheroon, Esq., Special Litigation Counsel, U.S.
Department of Justice, to Hon. Malcolm F. Marsh (Apr. 7, 1994) (copy on file with author).
459. 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 410, at 8-9 (citing Federal
Defendants' Report on Compliance with the Judgment, Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v.
Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Or. 1994) (June 28, 1994)).
460.

Id. at 9.

461. See Letter from Maj. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell, U.S. Army Corp of Engineers,
to William W. Stelle, Jr., National Marine Fisheries Service, and Michael Spear, U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (Dec. 15, 1994) (transmitting U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
419
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The revised 1994-98 biological opinion addressed each of the holdings of Idaho
Department of Fish & Game.462 NMFS considered the "low case" test results and the
demographic risks associated with low populations that it had previously ignored.463
NMFS also repeated its 1993 finding that the existence of the hydroelectric dams
must be considered a part of the "environmental baseline"464 against which the
effects of the proposed operation of the hydroelectric system must be measured. In
addition, NMFS considered population levels during high and low water years,
rather than population levels only during high water years, as it did in the 1992 and
1993 consultation processes.

ET AL.,

SUPPLEMENTAL BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
OPERATIONS) (copy on file with author).

ON

FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER

462. Because the proposed recovery plan duplicates the measure contained in
the revised biological opinion in its section dealing with hydropower impact on the
listed runs, it will not be discussed separately. See PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN FOR SNAKE
RIVER SALMON, supra note 457, at V.2.10-V.2.90.
463. 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra 410, at 68-69 (Snake River sockeye test results); 69-71
(Snake River spring/summer chinook test results); 71-73 (Snake River fall chinook results). The three
tests for juvenile mortality, which are performed as a computer simulation on the effects of passage
through the hydroelectric system, are (1) the Columbia River Salmon Passage (CRiSP) model; (2) the
Passage Analysis Model (PAM); and (3) the Fish Leaving under Several Hypotheses (FLUSH) model.
Id. at 66-67. The three models "characterize juvenile passage in a similar fashion when input is
standardized and results are presented on a relative scale," but reflect different hypothesis. Id. at 67.
These are: (1) the distribution of survival over the lifespan of the fish; (2) the effect of flow on survival;
and (3) the benefit, in terms of reduced mortality, of juvenile transportation. Id. (citing L. BARNTHOUSE,
ET AL., COLUMBIA BASIN SALMONID MODEL REVIEW (Interim Report, Oct. 1994) (available from Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN)).
464. Id. at 12. The environmental baseline "includes the past and present impacts of all
Federal, State, or private activities in the action area, the anticipated impacts of all proposed
Federal projects in the action area that have already undergone formal or early [ESA] section 7
consultation, and the impact of State or private actions which are contemporaneous with the
consultation in process." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (definition of "effects of the action"). Thus, the
environmental baseline describes the current status of the listed species "in relation to the risks
presented by the continuing effects of all previous actions and resource commitments that are
not now subject to further exercise of federal discretion." 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note
410, at 12. In Idaho Department of Fish & Game, Judge Marsh rejected arguments that the existence of
the FCRPS dams could not be considered part of the environmental baseline. See supra notes 317319 and accompanying text.
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Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives

NMFS acknowledged that adult returns among each of the listed stocks are
expected to be very low in the next few years.465 Nevertheless, the agency set low
survival and recovery targets. For Snake River spring and summer chinook, NMFS
expects survival to be assured if 11,000-22,000 natural spawners are counted at Lower
Granite Dam.466 For fall chinook, the survival threshold is 300 spawners, while for
Snake River sockeye it is 150-300 returning fish.467 Recovery targets are set
substantially higher. For Snake River sockeye, the goal is 1000 naturally-produced
salmon in one lake and at least 500 in each of two other lakes in the Stanley River
Basin, Idaho.468 For fall chinook, the recovery objective is 2,500 naturally-produced fish
in the lower Snake River and its tributaries.469 For spring and summer chinook, the
target is 31,440 wild salmon at Lower Granite Dam.470
To achieve these targets, NMFS mandated four basic objectives for
FCRPS management during 1994-98. First, the agency recognized that
juvenile salmon need more water to assist their migration, and therefore
included a variety of measures aimed at augmenting flows in the biological
opinion. Second, NMFS acknowledged that releases of stored water over
dams allow smolts to avoid passage through hydroelectric turbines and
established criteria for such spills at several lower Snake and lower
Columbia dams. The objective of the flow and spill criteria is the
achievement of an 80% juvenile fish passage efficiency (FPE). Third, NMFS
required changes to the physical structures of the dams to improve adult
migration. Finally, the agency made clear that an "improved" transportation
program is essential to allow juveniles to reach the sea.
Although NMFS committed the federal government to the drawdown of
John Day reservoir and the four lower Snake River dams to minimum operating
pool by 1996, the agency postponed until 1999 any decision on whether to lower
the Snake River reservoirs below that elevation in an effort to further enhance
water velocity.471 Thus, even if NMFS eventually concludes that drawdowns below
minimum operating pool are necessary, none will occur before the twenty-first

465. Only two Snake River sockeye, 500 Snake River fall chinook, and less than
2,000 Snake River spring and summer chinook are expected to reach the mouth of
the Columbia River in 1995 under the current method of operating the federal
hydroelectric power system. 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 410, at 33-37.
466.

Id. at 27.

467.

Id. at 30, 32.

468.

Id. at 32.

469.

Id. The lower Clearwater River is excluded.

470.

Id.

471.

Id. at 92-94.
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century.472 Although recent tests have demonstrated that drawdowns are
beneficial to juveniles and economically feasible,473 the agency asked the Corps to
perform another complete feasibility study before 1996.474
3.

Flow Augmentation Measures

NMFS recognized the value of greater flows for juvenile salmon.475 But
the agency failed to require the biologically optimum flow targets long
advocated by state fish and wildlife agencies and treaty tribes.476 To provide
maximum benefit to smolts, flows on the lower Snake River should average
140 kcfs.477 On the lower Columbia, flows should average 300-350 kcfs.478
Under the revised 1994-98 biological opinion, the spring freshet on the lower
Snake River is to be maintained at 85-100 kcfs, while the average spring flow
objective on the lower Columbia River is set at 220-260 kcfs.479 During the
summer, the flow requirements are respectively 50-55 kcfs and 200 kcfs.480 If
flows on the lower Snake River are permitted only at the mandated
minimum levels, then the region will continue to find it necessary to remove
most juvenile salmon from the river.481
NMFS also suggested reasonable and prudent alternatives that are
unlikely to achieve the recommended minimum flows. Although the agency
allocates 11.5 maf more water toward flows than does the Council's 1994
Program amendments, the biological opinion actually provides 1 maf less
water for flows in the lower Snake River than the Council called for.482 The
only definite source of the water needed to provide increased flows is the

472. Id. at 92 ("[I]mplementation of drawdown . . . in the Snake River may
begin by 2000.")
473.

See supra note 332 and accompanying text.

474.

1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 410, at 92-94.

475.

Id. at 95-104.

476.

See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.

477.

THE WATER BUDGET, supra note 58.

478.

1981 COALITION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 57, at 167-69.1.

479.

1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 410, at 104.

480.

Id.

481. When flows on the lower Snake average 85 kcfs, approximately 74% of
migrating spring and summer chinook juveniles must be transported; at flows of 100
kcfs, the proportion is 56%. Id. at 112.
482. 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 410, at 99-100. This is because NMFS calls for
the purchase of less than 500 kaf of water from upper Snake River basin users each year between
1995-97. Moreover, the Bureau is not actually obligated to acquire that much water. NMFS
directed the Bureau only to "tak[e] such actions as are necessary to ensure a high probability of
providing provision of that volume by 1998." Id. at 99.
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drawdown of Dworshak Reservoir by 80 feet during the summer.483 The
success of other methods for acquiring the needed water depends on
whether the federal government can persuade private parties to provide the
volume needed. NMFS reiterated its earlier recommendation that the Corps
and the Bureau obtain 427 kaf from the upper Snake River from willing
sellers, but thus far it appears that the government is experiencing difficulty
finding sellers even at a very high price.484 NMFS also commanded the
federal government to negotiate the acquisition of an additional volume of
storage from the Canadian treaty projects to enhance spring and summer
flows.485 Releases from Brownlee Reservoir are also made voluntary because
NMFS has no authority over the Idaho Power Company through the ESA
section 7 consultation process.
To compound the revised biological opinion's lower water acquisition target,
NMFS required the dam operating agencies to obtain additional water only when it
proves convenient for third parties to provide it.486 This approach will not guarantee
the achievement of flow targets. NMFS further undercut its own emphasis on flows by
including in the biological opinion numerous constraints that may make achievement
of the flow levels impossible. Lake Roosevelt (behind Grand Coulee Dam), Hungry
Horse Reservoir, and Libby Reservoir must be filled by April 20 each year and are to
remain that way until releases for other project purposes draw down the elevations.487
That requirement eliminates the prospect of flow enhancement from upstream project
storage during the fall. Minimum reservoir elevations are also established for Lake
Roosevelt and Dworshak Reservoir.488
4.

Spills

The biological opinion recognizes that hydroelectric turbines have a
catastrophic impact on migrating juveniles and relies on spills at all of the

483. Stephen Steubner, NMFS Decision Leaves Industry Intact, Fish Little Hope,
IDAHO FALLS POST-REGISTER, Mar. 2, 1995, at A1.
484. Rocky Barker, NMFS Plan Lets Farmer Control Tap, IDAHO FALLS POST-REGISTER,
Mar. 2, 1995, at A1.
485. 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 410, at 100-101. However, the
agreement must be "revenue neutral," which means it probably cannot result in any
lost power revenues for either BPA or Canadian power sellers or increased energy
costs associated with power generated at the Canadian plants. Id.
486. Id. at 99 ("[T]he [Bureau] shall secure water for flow augmentation . . . from willing
sellers."). The Bureau is also forbidden to invoke the federal government's condemnation power.
NMFS directed it to obtain water "in a manner that is consistent with applicable state law." Id.
487. Id. at 95. The practical consequence of this provision will be to encourage
flood control releases in March, before migration season begins.
488.

Id.
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federal dams in order to avoid forcing the young fish through them.489 Spill
requirements are established for each hydroelectric project where
transportation collection does not occur.490 At Little Goose and Lower
Monumental Dams, however, spill is only required when flows exceed 85
kcfs in the Snake River, while spills are mandatory at Lower Granite Dam
only when flows on the Snake exceed 100 kcfs.491 Similarly, at McNary Dam
no spills are mandated when flows on the Columbia fall below 220 kcfs.492
These spill thresholds are not reinforced by NMFS' decision to allow
FPE goals to be achieved by exceeding gas supersaturation limits imposed
by the four Pacific Northwest states.493 The biological opinion specifies that
flows should not allow juveniles to be exposed, over the long term, to more
than 115% or, in the short run, to more than 120% of the gas saturation
levels mandated by the respective state water quality agencies.494 By
contrast, the Council established the same FPE target but required the
Corps to stay generally within state-mandated gas supersaturation limits
between April 15-July 31 on the Snake River and between May 1-August 31
on the Columbia River.495
5.

Changes to Dam Structures to Assist Adult Passage

NMFS established a fish guidance efficiency (FGE) target of 80% of
adults on the way to upriver spawning beds.496 To achieve that goal, the
biological opinion requires the Corps to improve adult routing and bypass
systems and calls for improvement in spill efficiency through modifications
to dam baffles, flip-lips and stilling basins.497
6.

Transportation

NMFS decided to reduce the number of juvenile salmon transported to
the base of Bonneville Dam below the levels currently subject to such

489. Id. at 45 (recognizing that mortality associated with passage through
turbines exceeds mortality caused by spillways and bypasses).
490.

Id. at 105.

491.

Id.

492.

Id. at 104.

493. Id. at 107-08. Fish passage efficiency refers to the proportion of fish
passing the dams without moving through turbines. Id. at 45.
494.

Id. at 107.

495.

1994 PROGRAM, supra note 358, § 5.6C.1, at 5-40.

496. 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 410, at 105. Fish guidance efficiency refers to
the proportion of fish passing the dams through juvenile bypass systems. Id. at 45.
497.
424
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handling when conditions permitting the achievement of flows above 100
kcfs in the lower Snake River exist.498 The agency also recognized that
improvements in the methods of transporting fish are necessary to reduce
the stress inflicted on smolts, as well as the occurrence of predation and
disease.499 The problem with these "improvements" is that they fail to
address the basic flaw in the plan. The state fish and wildlife agencies and
tribes believe that transportation will not assist the endangered runs to
recover so long as in-river conditions are not improved.500 Moreover, NMFS
decided to disregard test results that indicate that transportation may
actually decrease the likelihood of salmon recovery.501 The agency
compounded this mistake by establishing procedures for tests to be
conducted over the next several years that are unlikely to provide an
accurate assessment of the impacts of the barging and trucking programs on
wild juveniles.502
7.

Putting it All Together: Will the 1994-98 Biological
Opinion and Proposed Recovery Plan Restore Wild
Salmon to the Pacific Northwest?

The 1994-98 biological opinion on FCRPS operations recommends
recovery measures that are likely to be less effective than those mandated by
the Council in the 1994 Program amendments. Nevertheless, the cost of
NMFS' plan is not substantially lower than that of the Program.503 Nor does
NMFS' plan reflect the urgency so clearly demanded by the plight of the

498. Id. at 112. However, NMFS sanctioned nearly exclusive reliance on transportation to
assist migrating Snake River fall chinook, since the biological opinion failed to require full flows
adequate to permit in-river migration. Id. Moreover, nearly all migrating spring/summer chinook
would be transported. NMFS estimated that 74% would have to be barged when flow levels are
between 85-100 kcfs, with 56% taken out of the river when flows exceed 100 kcfs. Id.
499.

Id. at 111.

500. See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 358, at 15-116 to 15-123 (discussing various
studies of transportation program effects on salmon).
501. 1994-98 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 410, at 111 ("NMFS recognizes the
validity of the concerns raised by the states, tribes, and others both about the
absolute benefits of transportation and of its ultimate efficacy as a recovery tool.").
502. Id. at 111. NMFS proposes to compare adult returns from transported
smolts to survivals in the same river. However, this methodology entirely fails to take
account of survival rates on rivers with adequate flows and therefore cannot
accurately assess the efficacy of transportation as a recovery tool.
503. NMFS' recommendations, if fully implemented, may actually cost the
region more than the Council's Fish and Wildlife Program. See letter from F. Lorraine
Bodi, American Rivers to William Stelle, National Marine Fisheries Service, and Michael
Speer, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Feb. 9, 1995) at 2 (copy on file with author).
425

12/16/2007 4:57 PM

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

Basin's salmon and which both the Ninth Circuit and Judge Marsh thought
necessary. NMFS failed to provide adequate flows or to mandate spills at all of
the projects where they would be most helpful to migrating juveniles. The
agency has not summoned the courage to re-orient river management toward
a velocity-based scheme or acknowledged that lasting improvement in the
health of the runs can be achieved only if the federal dam operators let the
Columbia and Snake Rivers be rivers again. Despite convincing evidence of
their value,504 NMFS punted into the next century a decision on whether to
drawdown Snake River reservoirs in order to improve smolt travel time. Most
damningly of all, the 1994-98 biological opinion steadfastly upholds a fifteenyear experiment in transporting juveniles that offers little evidence that
human technological fixes can do better by the salmon than can the river.505
NMFS should have required much bolder efforts. To give the rapidly
disappearing salmon runs their best chance to survive into the next century,
NMFS should put into practice the tenets of adaptive management. Fifteen
years of experience has taught the region that barges and trucks are not an
adequate substitute for rapids and fast water. The Corps, the Bureau and
BPA should be forced to end the transportation program. Much higher flow
levels on the Columbia and Snake Rivers during the spring and summer
migration seasons should also be mandated. Minimum average flows
should be maintained much closer to the biologically optimum beneficial
levels.506 To avoid the huge mortality rates created by hydroelectric turbines,
spills should be mandatory at all of the hydroelectric projects. Finally, NMFS
should accept that juvenile mortality can be reduced most substantially if
the speed of the river's flow is increased. NMFS should pursue quickened
recovery by implementing reservoir drawdowns while enough fish to rebuild
the remaining tiny wild populations can benefit from them.
VIII. Conclusion
The 1994 Program amendments responded admirably to the court's
holdings and expression of impatience in Northwest Resource Information Center.
They briefly promised some hope that the region's leaders recognize that
aggressive actions are needed if healthy wild salmon runs are to be returned
to the Pacific Northwest. Nevertheless, the Council's new-found willingness
to lead the recovery effort may prove fleeting. The new Republican majority
in Congress and the changed political leadership in Idaho have already

504.

See supra note 332.

505. See 1994 Program, supra note 358, at 15-116 to 15-118 (discussing state fish and
wildlife agency and tribal criticisms of transportation program and noting that "[T]he
Council agrees that transportation is not a substitute for changes in the river.").
506. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of
biologically optimum flows.
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indicated strong sympathy toward the economic interests that may have to
sacrifice subsidies if the salmon are to be saved. The loss of Idaho as an
advocate of bold efforts to stave off the extinction of salmon may further
facilitate the breakdown of the fragile consensus behind the 1994 Program
amendments. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Northwest Resource
Information Center, while a useful and unprecedented interpretation of the
Northwest Power Act, may ultimately prove insignificant.
NMFS unfortunately failed to produce a blueprint for salmon recovery
that responds to Judge Marsh's warning that the salmon cannot, for much
longer, survive the entrenched resistance to fundamental change. Although
Idaho Department of Fish & Game forced NMFS to include all relevant scientific
information in the revised 1994-98 biological opinion on FCRPS operations,
NMFS avoided the hard choices that must be made. The 1994-98 biological
opinion appropriately calls for increased flows in the lower Columbia and
lower Snake Rivers during smolt migration seasons, but fails to provide the
means to achieve them. NMFS also unwisely postponed the measures
essential to achieve improved water velocity. Reservoir drawdowns are put
off until the next century at the earliest, and NMFS again failed to urge a
step away from continued reliance on barge and truck transportation as a
means for helping juvenile salmon reach the ocean. NMFS may have
complied with the ESA, but not with Judge Marsh's warning that the region's
river managers, fish and wildlife agencies, electricity consumers and
concerned fish advocates must quickly reconcile the needs of salmon to the
energy demands of the Pacific Northwest.
Northwest Resources Information Center and Idaho Department of Fish & Game
could have prompted the end of "business as usual" in the Columbia River
Basin. The Ninth Circuit and Judge Marsh clearly warned of their impatience
with the status quo and of their skepticism toward any approach that
continues to place the economic considerations of power consumers before
the urgent priority of returning thriving wild salmon runs to the region. For
all of that, however, the decisions have failed to convince the region's
entrenched economic powers that the Pacific Northwest's hydroelectric
system should not be maintained without changes at the expense of the
Columbia River Basin's most significant cultural and biological resource.
IX.

Afterword

Developments over the summer have cast further doubt on the
region's willingness to change the status quo in the Columbia River Basin.
NMFS has sought to avoid implementing measures included in its proposed
recovery plan and in the 1994-98 biological opinion on the FCRPS that might
antagonize upper Basin irrigators. In August 1995 the agency agreed to scale
back plans to increase flows during the final weeks of the Snake River fall
chinook smolt migration. NMFS caved in to pressure from Montana
Governor Marc Racicot and irrigation and flatwater recreation interests
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opposed to an increase in releases from Libby Dam of 4000 cfs.507
Meanwhile, the Corps allowed only 360,000 of 1.8 million wild Snake River
spring and summer chinook smolts to migrate in the river.508 The Corps also
failed to implement the spills mandated by the 1994-98 biological opinion
on the FCRPS until May, with the result that 16% of spring migrants were
killed in turbines or while in the reservoirs.509 The Corps also cut back
required spills later in the summer, which caused the FCRPS to fall below
the 80% fish passage efficiency mandated by the biological opinion.510
BPA's behavior has been even more troubling. Instead of taking Judge Marsh's
warning that the status quo is unacceptable to heart, BPA has continued to focus
almost exclusively on salmon recovery as the cause of its financial woes.511 The agency
has unilaterally imposed an $83 million cost cap on direct fish and wildlife costs,
including habitat restoration, systems improvement programs, and the cost of BPA
and Council management operations related to fish.512 BPA has also aggressively
pushed legislation that would exempt operation of the hydroelectric system from
virtually every environmental law, including the ESA and the Northwest Power Act.513
The proposed legislation would also place a cap on BPA's annual salmon recoveryrelated expenses.514 The cost cap would count power revenues foregone as a result of

507. See Bob Baum, U.S. Action Draws Fire of Salmon Advocates, OREGONIAN, Aug.
10, 1995, at C-1, C-3.
508. Notice of Suit Against NMFS BiOp Filed, 14 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION ACT
REPORT 2 (July 24, 1995). The Corps transported 13 million smolts this year. Id.
509.

Id.

510. Id. The reductions in spills were apparently deemed necessary because
the turbines at Ice Harbor Dam malfunctioned.
511. As discussed earlier, see supra notes 446-456 and accompanying text,
BPA's financial condition cannot be said to be the result of salmon recovery costs.
512. Shareholders Have Practical Solutions, 14 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION ACT REPORT
1 (May 12, 1995). Thus, BPA has shown an unwillingness to spend the amount of
money required to implement the provisions of the 1994 Fish and Wildlife Program
intended to benefit salmon. Id.
513. Joan Laatz, BPA May Get a Break From Environmental Laws, OREGONIAN, Sept. 12, 1995, at
A1, A7. There are several bills pending before Congress that would grant BPA the cost cap and
exemptions. One, introduced by Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R.-Oregon), is expected to be included as an
amendment to a fiscal year 1996 appropriations bill. The others, introduced by Senators Slade
Gorton (R.-Washington) and Larry Craig (R.-Idaho), would also exempt other hydroelectric dam
operators in the region, including the Idaho Power Company and the mid-Columbia PUDs, from
environmental laws. As of the date this was written, the Clinton Administration has not yet agreed to
so-called "sufficiency" language that would declare expenditure of costs up to the annual limit
adequate to comply with federal environmental laws. Id.
514. Senator Hatfield's bill would set up cap as a percentage of BPA's revenues. By
contrast, the Gorton and Craig bills would establish a Fish and Wildlife Enhancement
428
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spills or flows as costs.515 Congress is likely to decide whether to impose a limit on
BPA's salmon recovery costs and exempt the agency from environmental laws during
the debate over federal spending for fiscal year 1996.516
BPA has also decided that it is appropriate to continue the rate system
that has foreclosed any serious effort to fix the agency's financial problems.
Instead of moving toward a rate scheme that more equitably allocates BPA's
WPPSS-related debt to those who benefited from the region's investment in
it, BPA has decided to cut electricity rates for the DSIs for at least the next
five years.517 BPA has also allowed some of the DSIs to purchase power from

Fund to which BPA would contribute and which would serve as a sort of "checking
account" that imposes a limit on annual spending for salmon recovery. Shareholders Have
Practical Solutions, 14 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION ACT Report 1 (May 12, 1995).
515. In whatever form adopted, salmon cost cap legislation is likely to require that
BPA's costs be determined from a baseline assumption as to the amount of power that
could be generated if the Columbia River system were dedicated to maximum energy
production. The bills would also mandate use of the market value of the power that could
have been generated but for increased spills or flows as the measure for BPA's foregone
power revenues. Id. The Gorton bill would also require that BPA and the utilities that buy power
from the federal government be compensated for foregone power revenues that result from
reservoir and flow modifications. Thus, Senator Gorton proposes to mandate taxpayer
compensation to users of a publicly-owned resource if the government decides to redirect
use of that resource. Gorton Bill Draft: Write a Check, and that's "Sufficient." 14 NORTHWEST
CONSERVATION ACT REPORT 4 (Aug. 28, 1995).
516. The BPA cost cap apparently does not yet have unanimous support from the Pacific
Northwest congressional delegation. Idaho Senators Craig and Dirk Kempthorne (R.) have
indicated that they oppose Senator Hatfield's proposal because it "does not adequately
address the problem of Dworshak Reservoir drawdowns, rate increases to [Idaho] Power
Company customers and the creation of a regional authority to oversee salmon restoration."
Salmon: Dems Urge Emergency Fund; ID Sens Oppose GOP Plan, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK:
GREENWIRE, Sept. 25, 1995 (available on Westlaw, APN-GR database). Senator Kempthorne also
opposes exempting BPA from the ESA. Id. Meanwhile, Senators Patty Murray (D.-Washington)
and max Baucus (D.-Montana) have announced that they will support cost cap legislation only
if Congress creates an additional $500 million "emergency fund." The fund would cover salmon
recovery expenses in years when water flows in the Basin are inadequate to provide for all
existing uses of the river system. Id.
517. Joan Laatz, BPA Generates Static Over Power Deals, OREGONIAN, Sept. 14, 1995, at A1. BPA
defends its desire to cut the DSI's power rates as a "pragmatic business decision" intended to
secure a reliable customer base for federal power. Id. However, the effect of the DSI rate cut is to
repudiate every other obligation of the agency except providing power to the aluminum smelters,
since BPA has attempted to make up for the lost revenues concessions to the DSIs create by
reducing expenditures on salmon recovery and energy conservation. Special Report: BPA
Competitiveness Bill a Crossroads, 14 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION ACT REPORT 1, 2 (June 26, 1995).
Nevertheless, after initially opposing the DSI rate cuts, the Clinton Administration - pressured by
429
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competing generators before their existing contracts with BPA expire.518
Thus, BPA is willingly allowing its revenues to be reduced at a time when the
agency loudly complains that the costs of salmon recovery are placing a
potentially fatal drain on its resources.519
Nor is the outlook for one of the legal foundations supporting efforts
to recover Pacific Salmon bright. The House Resources Committee recently
approved an ESA "reform" bill that would de-list Columbia River Basin
Salmon stocks and forbid future listings of individual ones without
Congressional approval.520
Resource Guide: Columbia River and Endangered Salmon Issues
Michael C. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon: A History of Failure and a Dubious
Future, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 667 (1991-92).
Blumm's article examines the reasons behind the decline of Idaho's salmon and options for
preventing extinction of the state's salmon population. Focuses on the effects of Columbia
Basin water projects on salmon spawning grounds, briefly exploring the history of eight
major federal dam systems on the lower Snake and Columbia rivers and their particular
impact on juvenile salmon. After discussing past efforts to save the landlocked state's
salmon, including the Northwest Power Act's Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, the
author concludes that salmon advocates must adopt a broad-based strategy to contend with
both state water laws and federal hydropower laws and press for greater accommodations to
salmon in the operation of Columbia Basin dams.

several of the DSI subsidies - signed several power contracts. The new DSI contracts will allow
several aluminum companies to avoid any liability for BPA's salmon recovery costs or WPPSS
debt. Bill Mackenzie, BPA Zigzags, Then Signs Contracts, OREGONIAN, Sept. 29, 1995, at A14.
518. The BPA Ratecase: Background and Outline of Issues, 14 NORTHWEST
CONSERVATION ACT REPORT 1, 2 (Aug. 28, 1995). The DSI rate cut would lower per unit
electricity costs for aluminum and other intensive energy-using industries from 26
mills to 22.6 mills per kilowatt hour. Robert T. Nelson, BPA Called on Carpet Over Rate
Plan, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 19, 1995, at B1.
519. BPA's willingness to waive DSI contract provisions could cost the agency
as much as $30 million. See Enviros Seek to Void BPA Biz Concessions, GREENWIRE, Apr. 27,
1995 (available on Westlaw, APN-GR database). Moreover, BPA has offered to allow
the DSIs continued free access to the federal transmission system for twenty years,
even if a contractee decides to purchase power from another generator. BPA Generates
Static, supra note 509, at A1. Thus, BPA is unwilling to force the DSIs to contribute to
the costs of salmon recovery or to defray part of BPA's WPPSS debt through an
access charge, even though the DSIs have benefitted greatly from the FCRPS and
encouraged construction of the ill-fated WPPSS plants.
520. See H.R. 2275, 104th Cong., 1st sess. (1995): Young - Pombo ESA
Reauthorization Bill Approved by House Committee, BNA NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT DAILY, Oct.
16, 1995 (available on LEXIS, BNA Library).
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Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The Unraveling of the Parity Promise: Hydropower,
Salmon, and Endangered Species in the Columbia Basin, 21 ENVTL. L. 657 (1991).
One in a series on the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program: analyzes the effects of
the Program since its adoption in the Northwest Power Act of 1980. Blumm and Simrin
criticize the Northwest Power Planning Council as the agency responsible for
implementing the program, blaming the Council for a failure to fulfill the Program's
promise of placing salmon on "equal footing" with the hydroelectric power system, while
crediting the agency with preventing further developments in the Columbia Basin
hydroelectric system. Tracks the various amendments to the Act, and proposes pressuring
the Council to fulfill its mandate or parity between salmon and hydroelectricity.

Michael C. Blumm, Reexamining the Parity Promise: More Challenges Than
Successes to the Implementation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program,
16 ENVTL. L. 461 (1986).
Evaluates the first three-and-a-half years of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program, from 1982 to 1986. Outlines amendments adopted by the Northwest Power
Planning Council in 1984, 1985 and 1986. In the heart of the article, Blumm discusses
the various legal challenges to the Program's implementation and the outcomes of
those cases, concluding that the "jury is still out" on the Program's legal status.

Michael C. Blumm, Implementing the Parity Promise: An Evaluation of the Columbia
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 14 ENVTL. L. 277 (1984).
Reviews the goals of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program as adopted in
1982. Blumm provides the details of the Program's mandates, focusing on the
precedent setting provisions to (1) change water project operations to benefit fish
and wildlife; (2) give priority to rehabilitation of fish stocks and their natural habitat;
(3) adopt a series of conditions for future hydroelectric projects in order to avoid
problems created by systems built prior to 1982.

Michael C. Blumm, Fulfilling the Parity Promise: A Perspective on Scientific Proof,
Economic Cost and Indian Treaty Rights in the Approval of the Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program, 13 ENVTL. L. 103 (1982).
Blumm begins with an analysis of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act, hailing the Act as Congress' recognition of the debt owed by society
to the fish and wildlife of the Columbia Basin, whose habitat has been sacrificed for
energy consumption. This article explores possible definitions of approval standards
listed in the Act, advocating a biological feasibility v. cost-benefit standard where
biological concerns override economics, giving deference to the biological judgment of
the region's fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes.

Michael C. Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's
Anadromous Fish Resources for a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal Columbia River
Power System, 11 ENVTL. L. 211 (1981).
Examines the evolution of the conflict between hydroelectric power and anadromous fish
protection in the Columbia basin. Explores the reasons behind the development of a vast
hydroelectric power system to supply most of the region's energy needs at the expense of
the world's largest runs of chinook salmon and steelhead trout. The author also describes
the role the Indian treaty rights, the National Environmental Policy Act and other federal
acts in protecting the region's fish population, calling for an overhaul of the decision-
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making structure regarding the region's hydroelectric power system and fish population to
minimize conflicts between the various entities involved.

Kelly R. Bryan, Note, Swimming Upstream: Trying to Enforce the 1992 North Pacific
Salmon Treaty, 28 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 241 (1995).
Examines the 1992 North Pacific Salmon Treaty beginning with a recounting of the history
of the fishing industry and past fishing treaties of North America-Japanese and RussJapanese relations. After discussing the provisions of the new Treaty and problems of
illegal salmon fishing, the note concludes with an assessment of the Treaty's enforcement
provisions at land and sea.

ROBERT CLARK, RIVER OF THE WEST: STORIES FROM THE COLUMBIA (1995).
Chronicles the uneasy history of natives and settlers along the Columbia River.
Clark reconstructs for his readers how settlers, naturalists, historians and
politicians all impacted the river's destiny.

JOSEPH CONE, A COMMON FATE: ENDANGERED SALMON
PACIFIC NORTHWEST (1995).

AND THE

PEOPLE

OF THE

Traces the history of the plight of the Pacific salmon and the Americans fighting against the
salmon's extinction. Cone reconstructs the factors which caused the rapid depletion of salmon
stocks and traces the parallel growth in concern over the problem. A Common Fate is ultimately
about creating a viable future for salmon and people. The book provides a framework for
understanding what solutions will be genuine and which ones will save the Northwest Salmon.

WILLIAM DIETRICH, NORTHWEST PASSAGE: THE GREAT COLUMBIA RIVER (1995).
Beginning with an extensive history of the Columbia River, this book then focuses on the
total transformation of the river to provide electricity and reliable navigation. Dietrich
claims not to make a judgment on whether the transformation from river to energy source
was a good thing, with his main concern being the lack of argument and debate over the
transformation, and the possibility the other side was simply not heard.

Michael B. Early & Egil Krogh, Balancing Power Costs and Fisheries Values Under
the Northwest Power Act, 13 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 281 (1990).
The central thesis of this article is that the Northwest Power Act requires that
appropriate mitigation measures for the fisheries must be determined by balancing
the fisheries values against the costs incurred by electric power consumers. Early and
Krogh contend that the Act has been misinterpreted and discuss whether the
Council's actions have been consistent with the Act, concluding that balancing power
cost and fisheries values is not an easy balance to strike.

JEFFREY P. FOOTE ET AL., BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, POWER AND THE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST: A HISTORY OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION (1976).
Traces the development of the Bonneville Power Administration from an obscure
federal agency to an agency that has a dominant role in power planning for the Pacific
Northwest. The arena of judicial activity is explored as it has forced the BPA into the
area of long-term environmental planning. The article concludes with a discussion of
then current planning efforts to bridge the gap between energy supply and demand
and the various legislative proposals then being advanced.

Dale D. Goble, The Council and the Constitution: An Article on the Constitutionality of
the Northwest Power Planning Council, 1 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 11 (1986).
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Discussed constitutional challenges to Congress' authority in creating the Northwest
Power Planning Council as a state-appointed body authorized to guide the actions of a
federal agency. Provides a history of legislation which lead to the Council's creation and
focuses on the impact of the Council on the Appointments Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. This author ultimately concludes that the challengers' arguments are
flawed and serve only as a "red herring" in the environmental battle over water rights.

Thomas C. Jensen, The United States-Canada Pacific Salmon Interception Treaty: An
Historical and Legal Overview, 16 ENVTL. L. 363 (1986).
Provides an overview of the United States-Canada Salmon Treaty beginning with the
political, legal and resource management problems stemming from United States and
Canadian interception of each other's Pacific salmon, and the interception of each
nation's salmon by third-party fishing nations. The article then discusses other events
leading up to the treaty such as the cultural and economic significance of the Pacific
salmon, the Frasier River Convention, and the last minute maneuvering in the three
years leading up to the final agreement. After an overview of the treaty's text, the author
speculates on the treaty's probable future.

Judith A. Johansen, Is Hydropower an Endangered Species?, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 13 (1994).
Considers critical questions about the future of hydropower. Delves into the historical
development of hydropower, the role of hydropower in the development of the electric
utility industry and how society's attitude toward hydropower has changed. Presents the
issues of environmental protection that impact hydroelectric plants and whether such
plants will be able to continue operating within the bounds of environmental regulations.

Kai N. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence: Salmon, Science, and the Law in the Columbia
Basin, 21 ENVTL. L. 745 (1991).
Discusses various approaches advocated by academics and activists to the
threat of extinction of salmon populations. Describes the effect of human
intervention in the Columbia River Basin's ecosystem and explores various
bases for protecting salmonids. Advocates utilizing the Endangered Species
Act in conjunction with the authority of the Northwest Power Planning Council
and other relevant government agencies as a viable method of saving the
salmonids from extinction.

Michael V. McGinnis, On the Verge of Collapse: The Columbia River System, Wild
Salmon and the Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 63 (1995).
Describes the various fish species threatened with extinction in the Columbia
River Basin. Discusses the scope of authority vested in the Northwestern
Power Planning Council in determining the future of the Columbia River fish
stocks. Concludes that efforts to save the Columbia River fish population
depend on the development of a non-conquering approach to nature on the
part of the government and private agencies utilizing the resources of the area.

Andrew S. Noonan, Just Water Over the Dam? A Look at the Endangered Species Act and the Impact
of Hydroelectric Facilities on the Anadromous Fish Runs of the Northwest, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 781 (1992).
Noonan examines the environmental impact of the Northwest's dependence on
inexpensive electricity produced by hydroelectric dams, concluding that hydropower
dams account for more than ninety-five percent of the human impact causing a decline
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in the salmon population. His article explores the ESA's impact on the Northwest rivers'
salmon, focusing on the no-jeopardy and takings clauses of the ESA.

Panel, Issues Under the Northwest Power Planning Act, 2 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 153 (1987).
A panel with separate presentations by Michael C. Blumm, John M. Volkman, Terence
Thatcher and Bill Kloos on a variety of issues affecting the Act. Blumm evaluates the
innovative measures and unfulfilled promises contained within the Act, while Volkman
focuses on Indian treaty fishing rights. Thatcher discusses the proposed expansion of
electrical lines in the Northwest and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
handling of fishery issues in its hydroelectric licensing process. Kloos provides a brief
overview of litigation before the Federal Regulatory Commission.

Michael T. Pyle, Beyond Fish Ladders: Dam Removal as a Strategy for Restoring
America's Rivers, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 97 (1995).
Provides a rationale for removing dams from American rivers in order to restore the
wildlife and fish populations dependent on affected rivers. Discusses the social and
economic effects of removing the dams, and tackles the political question of
succeeding in such a strategy through the Federal Power Act and license
expirations. Concludes that dams can and should be removed.

Colloquium, Who Runs the River?, 25 ENVTL. L. (1995).
Includes articles by Lorraine Bodi, Michael C. Blumm and Adam Berger. Bodi
provides the history and legislative background of the Northwest Power Act, while
Blumm discusses two recent judicial decisions: Idaho Department of Fish & Game v.
National Marine Fisheries Service and Northwest Resource Information Center v. Northwest Power
Planning Council. Berger also analyzes the Northwest Resource Information Center's
challenge to the Council, but as an insider working for the Center.

Symposium, Seattle Master Builders and Creative Cooperative Federalism, 17 ENVTL. L. (1987).
Symposium issue covering the effects of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Seattle Master
Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Electric Power & Conservation Planning Council. Author Dave
Frohnmayer reviews the court's ruling that the Council was not subject to the
Appointments Clause and saved what Frohnmayer called an "imaginative, complex and
very important experiment in regional federalism." The case tested the authority of the
Northwest Power Planning Council as a multistate agency setting energy conservation
guidelines for the region. Other symposium articles examine federal acts affecting
conservation efforts in the Columbia River gorge and the potential for new forms of
governing decisions affecting river basins.

John M. Volkman, Making Room in the Ark: The Endangered Species Act and the
Columbia River Basin, 34 ENVIRONMENT 18 (1992).
One of three articles on regional efforts in the Northwest to protect fish stocks
of the Columbia River using the ESA. Volkman discusses efforts to list various
salmon species as endangered and the reasons behind the region's failure to
gain protection of the river basin's fish population through the Act's listing
procedures. Concludes that the Act, combined with regional political efforts,
can still save the dwindling salmon populations.

RICHARD WHITE, THE ORGANIC MACHINE: THE REMAKING OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER (1995).
Chronicles the history of the Columbia River. Throughout his narrative White
takes what he calls an unromantic and dogma free approach. White argues that
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the effort to transform nature is not a defiling of nature. Rather, the combined
efforts of groups who push for transformation purify society by freeing both
human labor and nature.

CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING
FUTURE OF THE WEST (1992).

THE

NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER

AND THE

Provides a broad overview of environmental issues facing the Western states,
covering mining rights, ranchers, and forest preservation. Wilkinson dedicates
several chapters to the fish of Western river systems, including the once-bountiful
salmon. Advocates the adoption of a sustainable yield in order to preserve the
West's delicate eco-system.

Charles F. Wilkinson & Daniel K. Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery:
Conservation and Allocation of a Transbounding Common Property Resource, 32 U. KAN.
L. REV. 17 (1983-84).
Authors Wilkinson and Conner begin with the premise that salmon and steelhead trout are
among the most intensively exploited resources, leading into a discussion on why these fish
are vulnerable to such exploitation. The article also traces the history of fisheries in the Pacific
Northwest, starting with the practices of Indian tribes in the area, followed by destructive
methods of the new settlers, culminating in a free-for-all era of the early 1900's. The authors
end with modern-day attempts at restoration and the difficulties of balancing the competing
interests of hydroelectric dams, conservationists and Indian treaty rights.
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